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1 INTRODUCTION, RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
 AND STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
For many years, it was common policy for manufacturers to produce in large 
batches to keep productionand ordering costs low.  Unfortunately, the current 
trend in consumer requirements does not support this idea any longer.  Consumers 
wish to be served according to their own “special needs” and the variety of prod-
ucts is increasing.  Obviously, this makes production lines busier with frequent 
setup and down time due to the higher product variety.  Inline with this idea, a 
manufacturer needs to develop a closer relationship with suppliers in order to 
maintain their service level.  
1.1 Introduction to mass customization  
The term “mass customization” (MC) was coined by Stanley M. Davis (1987) in 
his book “Future Perfect”, and it was further developed  by Pine (1993), who de-
fined it as “processes for low-cost, volume production of great variety, and even 
for individually customized goods and services” (page 7). Furthermore, the author 
mentioned that achieving MC could be optimized by producing a standard plat-
form which allows the production of a myriad variety of final products.  This 
concept has been re-discussed by making a clear differentiation between variety 
and customization.  Variety means anticipating customer demands by putting 
product choices in outlets and hoping  some customers will choose the products, 
while customization means giving customers exactly what they want (Pine, 1993).   
Related to the MC objective, Pine (1993) proposed four types of value chain re-
engineering based on differentiation of the customization stages.  In general, 
product and service customization represent the differentiation.  The higher cus-
tomization degree in the value chain processes requires quick response manufac-
turing.  Originating from this idea, in application Hart (1995) proposed the four 
pillars of MC in pursuing an explicit MC strategy, namely customer sensitivity, 
process amenability, competitive environment, and organizational readiness. 
In considering the four pillars of MC in terms of manufacturing and service op-
erations, process amenability requires manufacturing process customization and 
customer sensitivity requires service customization.  Manufacturing process cus-
tomization and service customization support a competitive strategy in sustaining 
a competitive environment by exploring the capabilities to measure organizational 
readiness.  Thus, it is essential to study MC from a competitive strategy point of 
view in pursuing competitiveness (Hart, 1995).  
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1.1.1 Definition of mass customization 
Even if MC has been previously defined (Pine,, 1993; Davis, 1987; Kotha, 1995). 
it is still not a simple concept to comprehend.  This research proposes two con-
cepts of MC according to a management vision and production management 
paradigm in order to explore the future needs for MC. 
1.1.1.1 MC as a management vision 
As a management vision, MC is the ability to make profits in providing customers 
with anything they want, any time they want it, anywhere they want it, and any 
way they want it (Davis, 1987; Pine, 1993; Hart, 1995).  In other words, the vi-
sion of MC is to offer competition based on strategic flexibility (Hayes and 
Pisano, 1994) in order to sustain competitive advantage (Kotha, 1995).  Thus, MC 
as a vision necessitates a manufacturing role that should also provide the required 
flexibility (Hayes and Pisano, 1994).  
MC as a management vision seeks the competitive advantage of the firm by creat-
ing knowledge throughout  the entire organization. Knowledge creation extends 
organization knowledge by gathering information from employees and end users 
in order to apply MC as strategy for knowledge creation and organization learning 
(Kotha, 1996), together with competitive advantage, as competitors cannot obtain  
this information. 
Based upon the literature review, MC as a management vision has the following 
characteristics:  
1. MC is a strategy for achieving competitive advantage by creating knowledge 
in the entire organization. 
2. MC is a customer focus strategy in providing customers with anything they 
want profitably, any time they want it, anywhere they want it, and any way 
they want it. 
1.1.1.2 MC as a new paradigm in production management 
In addition to MC studies on competitive strategy (e.g. Boynton et al, 1993; Lam-
pel and Mintzberg, 1996), MC has also been studied in terms of manufacturing 
strategy (e.g.Westbrook and Williamson, 1993; Kotha 1996) to represent MC as a 
new paradigm in production management (Davis, 1989) by controlling its focus 
on responsiveness and flexibility (Pine, 1993).  The flexibility discussed here is 
focused on mix and volume flexibility (Alderson, 1950; Bucklin, 1965; Zinn and 
Bowerzox, 1988; Zhang et al, 2003; Su et al, 2005) by achieving machine, labor, 
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material handling, and routing flexibility as manufacturing competencies to 
achieve manufacturing capability.  Indeed, Zipkin (2001) added elicitation (a 
mechanism for interacting with the customer and obtaining specific information) 
as a third MC focus.  Thus, the focus of this new paradigm is on production proc-
ess in terms of manufacturing strategy.  
In enabling mix and volume flexibility, the development of a commonality metric 
(Martin and Ishii, 1996; Jiao et al, 2000; Blecker and Abdelkafi, 2007) and com-
ponent modularity degree (Mikkola, 2007) supports product development strat-
egy.  Furthermore, Sharifi (2006) proposed design for the supply chain to meet 
manufacturing process and product development coordination.  Thus, manufactur-
ing agility is the goal of MC in terms of manufacturing strategy.   
Based upon the literature review, MC as a new paradigm in manufacturing strat-
egy has the following characteristics:  
1. Flexible manufacturing processes to offer individually tailored products or 
services on a large scale by developing manufacturing capabilities to produce  
customer satisfaction (Zhang, 2003) 
2. MC enables agile manufacturing by coordinating manufacturing process and 
product development process design (Sharifi et al, 2006).  
1.2 Mass customization in the literature  
It is important to investigate different perspectives on  MC to  finding discrepancy 
and congruency. This analysis paves the way to develop future MC application 
models to support business practices.  This section is composed of three sub-
sections.  Section 1.2.1 discusses MC as a competitive strategy. Section 1.2.2 dis-
cusses MC in the context of manufacturing. Finally, section 1.2.3 discusses MC in 
the context of marketing and procurement. These three sections view MC from 
the backend of the value chain (procurement) to the front end (marketing). 
1.2.1 MC as a competitive strategy 
MC as a source of competitive advantage has shifted the paradigm in competitive 
strategy by changing from price oriented mass marketing to segmented marketing 
strategy (Kotler, 1989) and at the same also shifted the production strategy from 
mass production to MC (Kotha, 1996).  On the other hand, MC is also constrained 
by high production technology, elaborate systems for meeting customer wants, 
strong logistics systems, and personalization (Zipkin, 2001).  Personalization re-
quires the firm to be different not only in manufacturing but also in marketing by 
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satisfying the cumulative requirements of price, quality, flexibility and agility by 
applying information and operational technologies (Kumar, 2008).  Finally, faster 
knowledge exploitation through innovation over competitors is the key to achiev-
ing competitive advantage (Cooke, 2008).   
Knowledge exploitation in MC contributes to the manufacturing capability in 
terms of flexibility (Narashiman and Das, 1999) by producing a significant source 
of differentiation, a unique signature to the organization and future advantage 
consideration (Prahalad, 1993), brand identification, specialization, push-pull 
strategy, channel selection, product quality, vertical integration, cost leadership, 
price policy, service, and relationship with the parent company (Porter, 1980).  
Exploiting knowledge is important in terms of value creation by generating stra-
tegic flexibility (Kotha, 1995).  One example of knowledge exploitation is the 
case of the National Bicycle Industrial Company (NBIC), where knowledge shar-
ing between mass customized and mass production plant generates direct com-
munication from the end customer to the production floor (Kotha, 1995). A sec-
ond example is a study of the Honda experience, which gives us an insight into  
putting emphasis on flexibility and efficiency as two sources of its success in the 
“New economy.”  Honda headquarters in Japan provides the core technologies 
from which its subsidiaries provide process flexibility (Sonoda, 2002).  This ex-
ample signifies that customization level determines the level of flexibility and 
time to market (Kotha, 1995).   
Flexibility in terms of mix and volume flexibility (Zhang, 2003) enable a firm to 
offer tailored products or services on a large scale (Zipkin, 2001) that require col-
lective action of technology, governance process and collective learning (Praha-
lad, 1993). On the other hand, Pine (1993) insists on generating these flexibilities 
by injecting long-term investment in capital, human and technological, in the new 
competition to increase variety and customization.  This is the paradigm of MC 
(Pine, 1993).  
In conclusion, MC as a competitive strategy must consider process change and 
product change (Boynton et al, 1993) in terms of product variety and process effi-
ciency at minimum cost.  Furthermore, stable product and process change can be 
obtained by analyzing component commonality and modularity (Jiao and Tseng, 
2000 Mikkola, 2007; Blecker and Abdelkafi, 2007), where cost minimization can 
be achieved by assigning strategic inventory (Graves and Willems, 2000; 2008).  
While operations capability such as product platform modularity and postpone-
ment are the keys of operations capability, they will not be achieved without con-
sidering competitive strategy when pursuing MC (Safizadeh et al, 1996; Brown 
and Bessant, 2003).  
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1.2.2 MC in the context of manufacturing  
When considering MC as a new form of competitive strategy, then global supply 
chains also force manufacturing strategy to be integrated into MC (Watts et al, 
1995; Tseng and Du, 1998).  The application of the manufacturing paradigm tree 
for mass customization (Tang et al, 2005) provides conflict resolution among the 
three order winners of customization, zero customer lead times and low cost.  
Decoupling the process capability in terms of product and process commonality 
to increase flexibility as a prerequisite of long-term stability (Tang et al, 2005) 
can synergize these three order winners.  In supporting the paradigm, we syner-
gize the order winners by reconfiguring the product options (Du, et al, 2003) and 
optimize  the manufacturing strategy to satisfy customer wants such as price, 
flexibility and agility (Kumar, 2008).  Furthermore, this research also supports the 
concept of agile manufacturing in term of e-commerce by reducing gap between 
manufacturing and marketing by identifying customer needs through concurrent 
engineering (Gunasekaran and Yusuf, 2002).  Thus, concurrent engineering en-
ables MC by aligning customer and supplier into product development (Shariffi et 
al, 2006).  
In conclusion, the discussion on the MC in the context of manufacturing leads us 
to extend MC discussion from product oriented to customer-oriented strategy.  
This finally forces manufacturing manager reconsider about competition and 
rapid changes into manufacturing strategy.   
1.2.3 MC in the context of marketing and procurement   
Jiao and Tseng (2000) mentioned that the way to achieve MC is by letting cus-
tomers compose their own design, illustrating the multi-dimensional decision 
making process of product architecture development (Tseng and Du, 1998).  The 
descriptions of customers and requirements have to be defined in order to analyze 
the requirements for obtaining knowledge of functional structural and technical 
design of the product family structure (Agard and Kusiak, 2004).  Thus, custom-
izing production visibility to the customer via customerization represents MC in 
the context of marketing (Wind and Rangaswamy, 2001). 
In addition to the customer-marketing interface, producing competitive advantage 
by extending the array of sourcing frameworks has replaced the current trend in 
strategic sourcing decision-making from cost reduction to the ability of core com-
petence identification (Venkatesan, 1992; Sislian and Satir, 2000).  If the manu-
facturer does not have the capability (resources and time) to invest in strategic 
activities, then strategic sourcing is the option.  Thus, a strategic item or activity 
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that has high impact on and risk for the buyer is appropriate for strategic sourcing 
(Kraljik, 1983). 
Strategic sourcing triggers a strategic partnership with suppliers.  Thus, for MC, a 
firm may outsource strategic but non-core competence activities by requiring that 
the suppliers achieve the best in their class in innovation while the main firm can 
focus on its core competence activities and concentrate its whole resources to 
achieve competitive advantage (Porter, 1980). Without arguing against the previ-
ous literature, the discussion of MC leads us to the agile approach (Brown and 
Bessant, 2003; Sharifi et al, 2006), which is not only discussed in terms of  proc-
ess, but also strategy, people and linkage to obtain an agile supply chain through-
supply chain design. This finally forces the manufacturing manager to reconsider 
the issues of competition and rapid changes. While information sharing is a key to 
operations capability, it cannot be achieved without considering product devel-
opment and supply chain integration when pursuing MC (Brown and Bessant, 
2003; Sharifi et al, 2006).  
To that end, marketing and purchasing strategy support MC by aligning them to 
manufacturing strategy in order to create continuous improvement (Boynton et al, 
1993).  In addition, information technology architecture brings about modularity, 
flexibility, and reusability in designing systems to support integration and control.  
Thus, the development of information sharing and physical flow coordination is 
the key to supply chain business process management (Lambert and Cooper, 
2000) in marketing and procurement. 
1.3 MC in business practice 
More companies are applying a mass customization effort to improve their com-
petitiveness, for instance the business practices in Dell computers (Lee, 2004), 
Hewlett Packard desk jet printers (Feitzinger and Lee et al, 1997), Amazon 
(Kassmann and Allgor, 2006), and Phillips Personal Garment Care (Sanchez, 
2002). One of them, Hewlett Packard (HP), established the Strategic Planning and 
Modeling (SPaM) group to apply more radical approaches, namely the realign-
ment of manufacturing and distribution strategies, improvement in forecasting 
techniques and methods and product and process redesign for supply chain man-
agement.  
HP strategy has further investigated the application of logistics and manufacturing 
postponement strategy (Lee, 1996).  Furthermore, Feitzinger and Lee (1997) rein-
vestigated this strategy by modularizing the power supply and postponing the 
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assembly of the product.  The other example of the paper is how to redesign the 
production process to postpone the customizing process just after the order 
comes.  The important outcome of the research is how to optimize supply chain 
performance by building coordination among marketing, research and develop-
ment (R&D), manufacturing and distribution and finance activities.  
The second example is taken from Phillips Personal Garment Care (Sanchez, 
2002), which creates a platform strategy for strategic flexibility.  The platform 
strategy separates components into common and varied parts, in which the com-
mon parts are grouped into modules, according to their functionality.  An example 
of this application is the powered toothbrush using different styles and features 
not directly related to basic brush-tip design, and motion also became an impor-
tant basis for product differentiation by the late 1990s.  
The third example is Dell Computers’ virtual integration that insists on the manu-
facturers specializing and stitching together the business with partners.  One im-
portant piece of information from this example is that mass customization also 
opens the possibility for outsourcing strategy.  This outsourcing definition, how-
ever, is different to the traditional thinking of outsourcing where the buyer also 
outsources his or her problems.  Indeed, risk sharing emerges as a form of supply 
chain collaboration.  In this case, Dell Computers is not just cost effective and 
fast, but also agile, adaptable and aligned (Lee, 2004).  
From the three above examples, mass customization best practices can be catego-
rized into three properties, namely agility, adaptability and alignment, in order to 
achieve a quick response to highly varied demands (Lee, 2004).  This conception 
is interesting since the three examples represent at least one of these: Dell Com-
puters for alignment and agility, HP postponement strategy for agility and adapt-
ability and Phillips Personal Garment Care for agility and adaptability.  The ques-
tio now emerges in regarding to the “Triple A” Supply Chains (Lee, 2004) of 
“how to assess the most suitable “A” strategy to our organization?”  This question 
is important since it going to streamline the manufacturing strategy as well as 
supply chain and marketing strategy to achieve competitive advantage in the mar-
ket.  
Product differentiation strategy, overall cost leadership and focusing on a particu-
lar buyer group can achieve competitive advantage (Porter, 1980).  Focus strategy 
is the important one since it combines overall cost leadership and product differ-
entiation.  This implies that MC should be focused on a certain market target by 
maximizing customer expectation on product quality through product differentia-
tion and winning competition against broader focused competitors through overall 
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cost leadership.  Thus, investigation of the development of MC methods is impor-
tant in order to find out the state of current research and the future needs of MC. 
1.4 Research problem 
 This research categorises the problem of MC systems using previous literature as 
follows (Fisher and Foreit, 2002).  
A potential research situation arises when three conditions exist: 
1. A perceived discrepancy exists between what is and what should be. 
2. A question exists about why there is a discrepancy. 
3. At least two possible and plausible answers exist to the question. 
We will use these three situations to locate  theresearch problem. Section 1.3.1 
finds out the discrepancy between current MC and the need for future MC. Sec-
tion 1.3.2 finds out all possible causes of the discrepancy. This dissertation uses 
the causes to analyse the required postponement strategies for meeting the re-
quirements of future MC.  
1.4.1 Perceived discrepancy between “current mass customization” and  
  “the needs for future mass customization” 
Silveira et al (2001) identified six success factors for MC systems: these are mar-
ket condition appropriateness, the existence of a demand for variety, readiness of 
the value chain, availability of technology, customizable products, and knowledge 
sharing.  Knowledge sharing enables highly intensive communication between 
MC and mass production (Kotha, 1995), where it implicitly highlights the impor-
tance of value chain reengineering to enable this communication.  Thus, supply 
chain integration and coordination is essential for MC by optimizing information 
flows (Staedtler, 2005). 
Furthermore, Fogliato et al (2003) support supply chain integration and coordina-
tion by developing a system-wide MC by integrating product development and 
manufacturing strategy (Tseng and Du, 1998). The development refers to all 
product development, production, and supply chain costs that would be incurred 
in developing and realizing new product variations over the lifetime of the plat-
form to consider design for the supply chain (Sharifi et al, 2006).  
In a strategic level discussion of MC, however, this integration and coordination 
issue was rarely discussed in the light of the new concept of postponement strate-
gies (Van Hoek, 2001). There is a growing stream of publications on postpone-
ment in various disciplines (see, for example, Feitzinger and Lee, 1997 on  strat-
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egy; Garg and Tang, 1997 on  operations research; Van Hoek et al, 1998 on logis-
tics). However, Van Hoek (2001) mentioned that the increased production of 
knowledge on postponement mean that, after 30 years of incubation, the principle 
has not been integrated in managerial practice and academic research. Postpone-
ment strategies have been acceptable in application (Bowersox et al, 1995). 
Morehouse and Bowersox (1995) predict that it will increase in application, to the 
extent that by the year 2010 half of all inventory throughout the food and other 
supply chains will be retained in a semi-finished state waiting for finalization, 
based upon customer orders. There are well-known case studies of companies that 
have grown (Dell: see Magretta, 1998) and flourished (HP: see Feitzinger and 
Lee, 1997) through postponement. These studies suggest that in terms of manage-
rial practice, postponement is not new, either in conceptualization or in applica-
tion, to innovative companies. Perhaps we should interpret the growing interest 
in, and application of, postponement as a rediscovery of the concept. In that case, 
we want to find out what is new and what has changed. 
In conclusion, postponement application to enable MC needs a global supply 
chain perspective. The previous research  struggles  on an  academic perspective, 
thus the discussions have been only partial. For instance, some of the literature  
concentrates on component commonality studies (Collier, 1981; Martin and Ishii, 
1996) to enable postponement strategies.However, some of the required supply 
chain strategies  are ignored. For instance minimizing total inventory costs at 
widely dispersed networks ((Lee and Billington, 1994; Su et al, 2005) to support 
strategic flexibility and agility for developing competitive manufacturing strategy 
(Hayes and Pisano, 1996; Shariffi et al, 2006). 
1.4.2 Why is there a discrepancy between “current mass customization” and 
“the needs for future mass customization”? 
The absence of a supply chain perspective for postponement design might be the 
answer to  the question. The problem is that  the academic literature has tried to 
maximize the benefits of  postponement strategies by designing product family to 
maximize product reusability.This effort will minimize product life cycle and 
development time (Jiao et al, 2004). As a result, product based decision making is 
pursued to minimize mass confusion, and as a result customers often do not have 
sufficient knowledge of the product specification which corresponds to their 
needs (Piller, 2004). Correspondingly, Vesanen (2008) and Kumar (2007, 2007b) 
proposed mass personalization for pursuing design collaboration between cus-
tomer and producer. It seems that previously research tried to develop customer 
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based MC but ignored lead times and delivery reliability as two parameters of 
customer satisfaction.     
However, developing customer-based MC should go beyond the lead times and 
delivery reliability previously used (Lee et al., 1993; Zinn and Bowersox, 1988). 
Any customer will want fast and reliable order fulfillment. Customization, how-
ever, might pertain to functionalities, product specifications, and the degree of 
customer-defined component selection (Van Hoek, 2001). Since a company needs 
to pursue fast and reliable order fulfillment, then the study of MC needs to be 
extended to study the implementation of selected supply chain structures, where it 
is possible to make change management through agile supply demand networks 
(Helo et al, 2006). Given the comprehensiveness of these elements and the poten-
tially supply chain coordination and integration, an agility concept might be ad-
visable here.Generalizations on points and degree of application along the supply 
chain can be developed in relation to market operating circumstances and contin-
gencies. In order to close the loop, these findings can be used as input to new 
postponement and supply chain initiatives. 
In conclusion, discrepancy between current research and the future needs of cus-
tomer-based MC can be eliminated by developing MC in global supply chain per-
spective.Thus, supply chain coordination and integration should be pursued where 
it promotes economies of integration. 
1.5 Research objective and research questions 
Although the reviewed literature is  helpful in drawing attention to postponement 
as an enabler for MC,  it  fails  to address many important details. First, it sug-
gests that performance improvements result from competitive strategy initiatives 
manifested in their implementation via value co-creation (Piller, 2004).  a value 
chain model can analyze value creation by assigning costs to value adding activi-
ties and deciding on a make or buy analysis to perform a firm strategy in post-
ponement better than the competitors. Thus, efficient information flows perform 
value creation. 
Recent investigations on postponement insist on technology and management 
methods for providing the required flexibility and responsiveness by optimizing 
product design and configuration (Collier, 1981; Jiao and Tseng, 2000; Piller, 
2002; Salvador et al, 2002; Mikkola and Larsen, 2004; 2007; Huang, 2007).  
Moreover, Kumar (2007; 2007b), and Vesanen (2008) extends the discussion into 
Information Technology (IT) by pursuing mass personalization in the area of 
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marketing.  However, this discussion is limited to the downstream of supply 
chains and final customer communication. How to apply  this IT to the overall 
supply chain is  still emphasized in ERP as an everyday operation tool. There still 
a lack of IT design that can manage postponement as an enabler for supply chain 
design and reconfiguration.  
Furthermore, in considering global competition, postponement strategy needs to 
investigate the possibility of supporting supplier relationship and managing the 
supply chain and product development simultaneously (Shariffi et al, 2006).  Mo-
tivated by this deficiency, this research revisits the ideas of Zhang et al (2003) on 
using postponement strategies as the main instrument in enabling MC in the con-
text of global supply chains.  Thus, this research formulates two research ques-
tions, as follows: 
Research question (RQ) 1 
The goal of MC is to undertake the low cost production of individually custom-
ized products and services (Pine, 1993).  Thus, this research revisits postpone-
ment strategies as an enabler of MC, and supports it with component commonal-
ity strategy. Moving  from this idea, it is important to revisit the basic business 
idea of becoming competitive (Porter, 1980) by generating strategic flexibility 
(Kotha, 1995) to exploit the firm’s capability for  customers (Zhang, 2003).  Pine 
(1993) proposed four aspects of MC to enable strategic flexibility.  Strategic 
flexibility requires overall competitive positioning in the market by identifying 
capabilities as sources of competitive advantage and does not attempt to guide  
short term choices between conflicting priorities (Hayes and Pisano, 1994).  
Alderson (1950) and Bucklin (1965) proposed postponement as a marketing ca-
pability for reducing lead times as well as inventory costs.  Postponement strate-
gies can provide the required flexibility by giving lower process change in times 
of turbulent demand change.  Appropriate distribution of postponement strategies 
into four types of MC will enhance a firm´s competitive positioning in the market 
by giving the required manufacturing capabilities.  Thus, this dissertation pro-
poses the first research question as “How do postponement strategies approach 
mass customization?” 
Research question (RQ) 2  
Attention to the firm’s capabilities in terms of flexible manufacturing strategy 
delivers what are called mix and volume flexibility for enhancing competitive 
position (Zhang et al, 2003).  However, Wall Mart has proved that procurement, 
logistics, and marketing capabilities are also needs to be considered in order to 
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win the competition (Stalk et al, 1992).  Wall Mart also showed that building effi-
cient information flows is the prerequisite of a supplier’s integration.  The inte-
gration of suppliers, manufacturers, and customers must be included in creating 
values in terms of price, quality, flexibility, and agility (Fine and Freund, 1990; 
Vesanen, 2007; Kumar, 2007b). Moving manufacturing efficiency beyond the 
historical level and ensuring maximal efficiency and operational fit with opera-
tional objectives in terms of price, quality, flexibility, and agility (Hopp, 2003) 
needs the integration of suppliers, manufacturers, and customers.  Moving from 
this requirement, this research therefore formulates the second research question, 
as follows: 
How do postponement strategies approach economies of integration for satisfying 
lead times and delivery reliability? 
Solving these two research questions through analogical theories will explain re-
lationships within supply chains (suppliers, manufacturers and customers) in bor-
rowing from well-understood models and by suggesting that the explained system 
behaves in a similar fashion to that described by the well-understood models.  
Thus,the results are predicted  from application of the rules of of the original the-
ory. In following the research questions, this section focuses on locating the re-
search objective, as follows. 
1.6 Research objective 
The two research questions present the future research directions in MC in gen-
eral and postponement strategies in particular. They cover three elements, namely 
competitive advantage, customizable product and process, and technology support 
(Silveira et al, 2001).  Furthermore, the level of customization, considering cus-
tomer penetration point, service customization, information technology involve-
ment and quality related issues (quality control and product reliability) exploits 
the viability of manufacturing capability.  From the above considerations, this 
dissertation objective is: 
To extend postponement strategies from the supply chain perspective to 
achieve economies of integration. 
In considering the above objective, this research finally chooses a definition of 
extended postponement strategies, as follows: 
"The use of economies of integration to achieve competitive advantage by 
producing varied and often individually customized products and/or services 
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at the low cost of a standardized, mass production system (Pine, 1993) 
through the support component commonality". 
To support the definition, this research investigates information and physical flow 
application in mass customization by incorporating logistics, product design, and 
marketing strategy   
1.7 Structure of the study 
This work consist of five sections, Section 2 will carry out a further literature re-
view from previous similar research.  The literature review investigates the cur-
rent state of development in postponement strategies and future directions of the 
strategies. 
Section 3 details the research methodology based on research paradigms and the 
problems of developing an appropriate model for the research objectives of this 
research.  This section will explore the essence of each proposed paper for an-
swering the research questions. 
Section 4 explores the author´s contribution by presenting the findings of the in-
cluded  papers. This section also builds a further framework for the research by 
presenting a comprehensive conclusion developed from research questions 1 and 
2.  The contribution of the author also extends the current state of MC strategies.  
Section 5 explores the issue of research validation by giving some examples from 
the literature.  This study does not intend to use the developed analytical models 
for specific industrial application.  Instead, they will convince and guide readers 
and researchers in MC about the future research direction based on several case 
examples.  
Sections 6 and 7 outlines the research conclusions and discuss the benefits of the 
proposed papers for managers.   
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The term postponement strategy was coined by Alderson (1950) and Bucklin 
(1965), who launched this idea as a marketing strategy.  Since then, other con-
cepts have also been introduced to enable the application of postponement, for 
instance modularity, introduced by Starr in 1965 (Ernst and Kamrad, 2000), and 
followed by introducing Moscato’s commonality metric in 1976 (Blecker et al, 
2007). Thus, the combination of postponement and commonality/modularity is an 
effort to integrate economies of scale and scope (Pine, 1993). 
The combination of postponement and commonality/modularity brings in market-
ing capability in terms of price, quality, flexibility, and agility (Kumar, 2007; 
2007b). Furthermore, other benefits of marketing capability support customer-
based MC by merging the personalization concept (Vesanen, 2007; Kumar, 
2008). More support for combining  postponement and commonality/modularity 
comes from Kotha (1995), who proposes  postponement as an operational flexi-
bility to support strategic flexibility by considering learning and development 
(Adler, 1988).  
There are three major aspects of choice in terms of  flexibility type and measures 
to be used in practice. They are: (1) the competitive strategy of the firm, (2) the 
different types of variety and uncertainty that may exist in the external and inter-
nal environments, and (3) the manufacturing process configuration that may pro-
vide different types of flexibility (Gupta and Goyal, 1989; Ramaresh and Jaya-
kumar, 1991; Fogliato, 2003). A global view of postponement supports these as-
pects by delivering marketing capability in terms of price, quality, flexibility and 
agility. 
In supporting competitive strategy as an aspect of choice of flexibility types, 
Watts et al (1995) furthermore propose purchasing, manufacturing, and distribu-
tion strategy as three functional strategies to support competitive strategy.  Fur-
thermore, consistency in terms of cost, technology quality, delivery dependability 
and flexibility must be derived from corporate competitive strategy.  Creating a 
partnership-like relationship with the supplier helps both buyers and suppliers in 
improving capabilities that impacts on cost, quality, delivery, and flexibility per-
formance, so that recognizing and incorporating this new supplier relationship is 
critical (Watts et al, 1995). Postponement strategies are useful to create partner-
ship-like relationships with supplier component commonality. This component 
commonality enables postponement application by putting some inventories in 
component form, and at the same time creating rapid product customization 
(Zhang et al, 2003).   
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Besides operational and supply flexibility benefits, postponement creates market-
ing flexibility by extending the previous concept into price postponement. This 
concept brings price as a competitive  weapon instead of process flexibility (Wind 
and Rangaswamy, 2001) by customizing the selling price relative to the degree of 
customization and tailoring it to a specific user. Thus, price postponement is ap-
propriate for satisfying customers by allowing them to compose their own “spe-
cial needs.” 
Dudey (1992) introduces price postponement as dynamic edgeworth-bertrand 
competition in order to solve dynamic competition under capacity constraint.  The 
Dudey model assumes that customers come to the market at different times and 
the firm's price can be reset at any time with an opportunity that at least one of the 
duopolists can sell all the units it is able to produce.  Similar to the approaches of 
Dudey (1992) on price, Singh and Vives (1984) focus their analysis on flexible 
capacity/price appropriateness to hedge against predetermined price/quantity con-
tracts.  Their analysis adapts to a new demand or price after making a price or 
delivery quantity contract formerly under the absence or presence of product vari-
ety.  The research, however, shows that even price can be postponed in order to 
hedge against demand variety.  
In extending recent postponement applications, it is essential to consider the im-
portance of managing the information flows between partners in supply chains as 
a form of supply chain integration and coordination. The emergence of network 
economy forces firms to comprehend and maximize the impact of these new in-
formation flows.  Postponement should consider three dimensions of supply 
chains: these are monetary flow, goods flow and information flow. This situation 
triggers firms to utilize efficient communication between themselves and these 
new suppliers and distributors (Van Hoek, 2001).  
The need for information flows develops supply chains in coordinating activities 
“across the supply chain to create value for customers, while increasing the prof-
itability of every link in the chain.”  (Anderson, et al., 1997)  This coordination 
aspect brings in the important, but largely ignored, role of information flows that 
complement the physical flows in the analysis of the supply chain.  
In conclusion, the study of postponement comprises physical flows and informa-
tion flows within supply, production, product development, and marketing strate-
gies.  There is a need to increase the discussion on information flows by consider-
ing supply chain alignment to hedge against market pressure on customization. 
Thus, economies of integration as the new concept of postponement need collabo-
ration among procurement, manufacturing, and marketing functions within orga-
nizations and suppliers and end customers to create competitiveness. 
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This section reviews some literature on  postponement strategies. In addition, 
modularity and component commonality literature is also surveyed to find direc-
tions for this research on meeting the needs for MC.   
Table 1. Some literature on postponement. 
 
Authors Focus area Idea 
Alderson 
(1950). 
Marketing channel. Postponement is used to reduce vari-
ous marketing costs because of the 
product itself and/or the geographical 
dispersion of inventories.  
Bucklin 
(1965). 
Logistics channel. A combination principle between 
postponement and speculation, putting 
a speculative inventory at each point 
in a distribution channel whenever its 
costs are less than the net savings of 
postponement to both buyer and seller. 
Zinn and Bo-
werzox (1988). 
Logistic channel. Postponement is used for increasing 
manufacturing flexibility by using 
labeling, packaging, assembly and 
final manufacturing at the final stage 
of production. Furthermore, post-
ponement is also used for reducing 
lead times and product availability by 
putting the final product at the closest 
selling point. 
Lee H.L 
(1996). 
Manufacturing chan-
nel. 
Postponement is used to enable prod-
uct proliferation by controlling inven-
tory level and lead times.  
Feitzinger and 
Lee (1997). 
Distribution channel. Modular product supports postpone-
ment by developing agile supply net-
works. 
Garg and Tang 
(1997). 
Manufacturing chan-
nel. 
Push and pull strategies are used to 
define postponement strategies in dif-
ferent manufacturing channels. 
Birge (1998). Manufacturing chan-
nel. 
Price and capacity postponement is 
used to optimize the profit of substi-
tutable products. 
Pag and Coo-
per (1998). 
Logistics channel. Postponement strategies are divided 
into manufacturing and logistics post-
ponement in order to divide between 
speculative and postponement strate-
gies. 
Van Hoek et al 
(1998). 
Logistics systems. Postponement strategies effect the 
formation of network organization. 
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(Table 1 Postponement literatures continued) 
 
On the other hand, some of the literature in MC emphasizes product family analy-
sis for maximizing product platform reusability and reducing total costs through 
its alignment with process platform design (see Table 2). Table 2 shows the im-
portance of component commonality and product modularity in supporting post-
ponement strategies by providing the required operational flexibility.  
 
Table 2.  Some literature on component commonality and product modularity. 
 
Authors Focus area Idea 
Evans 
(1963; 
1970) 
Optimization of 
product modulari-
ty 
To match between component and module for 
minimizing supply and production costs. 
Rutenberg 
(1971) 
Component com-
monality. 
To minimize aggregate safety stocks level by 
developing component commonality index.   
Author(s) Focus area Idea 
Miegham and 
Dada (1999). 
Manufacturing and 
marketing channel. 
Postponement in terms of price and 
production is used to reduce invest-
ment and inventory uncertainty by 
reducing timely demand information. 
Ernst and 
Kamrad (2000) 
Logistics channel. Postponement is appropriate to decen-
tralized supply chains where suppliers 
and buyers have their own decision 
authority. 
Johnson M.E 
and Anderson 
E (2000) 
Manufacturing chan-
nel 
Form postponement is used to design 
common product platform as an in-
termediate product before the cus-
tomization stage 
Van Hoek 
(2001) 
Supply chain view. The need for extending postponement 
strategies into the supply chain per-
spective. 
Yang and 
Burns (2003). 
Distribution channel. Postponement is used to allocate in-
ventory whether in part form (manu-
facturing postponement) or in final 
form (logistics postponement). 
Swaminathan 
and Lee 
(2003). 
Manufacturing chan-
nel. 
Product and process reengineering are 
used to enable postponement by in-
creasing their commonality or modu-
larity. 
Biller et al 
(2006). 
Demand uncertainty 
mitigation. 
Price postponement is used to adjust 
profit according to different demand 
levels. 
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(Table 2 Product family analysis continued) 
 
Authors Focus area Idea 
Collier D, A 
(1981) 
Component commonali-
ty. 
To minimize aggregate safety stocks 
level by developing component 
commonality index.   
Thomas 
(1991) 
Commonality analysis Cluster strategy for reducing the 
variety of water tank specifications. 
Jiao and 
Tseng (2000) 
Commonality indices 
development to under-
stand product family 
Component commonality and proc-
ess commonality is developed to 
conduct feasibility study of product 
family  
Martin and 
Ishii (1996) 
Developing concept of 
design for variety. 
Building component commonality, 
differentiation point, and set-up cost 
to allow the decision makers to es-
timate some of the generally un-
measurable costs of providing vari-
ety. 
Thonemann 
and Brandeau 
(2000) 
Optimal commonality in 
component design 
To optimize component commonal-
ity to reduce number of components 
variants. 
Simpson et al 
(2001) 
Concurrent engineering 
is used to meet stan-
dardization and differ-
entiation strategies. 
Product variety tradeoff evaluation 
method for assessing product plat-
forms alternatives to optimize indi-
vidual product performance 
Mikkola and 
Gassman 
(2003) 
Developing modularity 
function 
Develop modularization 
function based on the number of 
components and 
the degree of coupling between 
them. 
Mikkola and 
Larsen 
(2004) 
Supply chain integration 
implication to MC 
strategies. 
Component commonality is useful to 
support modularity strategy to en-
able supply chain integration. 
Blecker and 
Abdelkafi 
(2007) 
Developing commonal-
ity metric for MC. 
Customer preference is included in 
the metric development 
Mikkola 
(2007) 
Product modularity for 
MC. 
Understanding product modularity 
and its effect to customization de-
gree 
Jiao et al 
(2007) 
Design for MC by com-
posing process platform 
planning. 
Coordination from design to produc-
tion through general product and 
process platform 
Fixson 
(2007) 
Review on modularity 
and component com-
monality researches. 
Studies on commonality is less em-
phasized than modularity and the 
effect of those researches to quality, 
time and variety is less than that of 
costs effect. 
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From Table 1 and 2, we can see that postponement, component commonality and 
modularity are complementary. Modularity, as laid out in Evans’ work on modu-
lar design (Evans, 1963; 1970), was described as the problem in which to deter-
mine the best configuration of small multi-use parts (in Evans’ case, kits of 
screws) to satisfy a variety of demands. Commonality, in contrast, was the idea of 
using identical components in a one-per-product setting, but in different prod-
ucts.Downward compatibility (Rutenburg, 1971) allowed the use of one type of 
component in multiple products.Twenty years later, Thomas (1991) viewed 
commonality as a partitioning problem and suggested clustering techniques for its 
solution. More recently, the commonality optimization approach suggested by 
Thonemann and Brandeau (2000) uses a logic that strives for common parts to be 
identical, often also implying downward compatibility.  
 
Table 3.  Some literature on product platform effect on supply chains. 
 
Authors Focus area Idea 
Salfizadeh (1996) Product and process 
matrix 
Postponement and modular-
ity/component commonality 
planning must be linked 
Novak and Ep-
pinger (2001) 
Make or buy decision To assess make or buy deci-
sion by considering product 
complexity 
Durray (2000; 
2004) 
Modularity as an en-
abler for MC 
Combination between modu-
larity and customer order de-
coupling point significantly 
affect MC configurations. 
Fixson (2005) Design for SC for co-
ordinating product de-
velopment and supply 
chain 
To link among product, proc-
ess and supply chain decision 
by product-process strategy 
combination 
Hofer and Halmann 
(2004;2005) 
Component and layout 
commonality 
Extension of product plaform 
usability from product family 
to product portfolio. This ex-
tension enables process com-
monality for different market 
share  
Dong and Chen 
(2005) 
Component commonal-
ity effects to supply 
chain performance 
Component commonality can 
greatly reduce the inventory of 
a supply chain and improve its 
performance. 
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(Table 3: some literatures on MC effects to supply chain continued) 
Shariffi et al (2006) Design for SC for co-
ordinating product de-
velopment and supply 
chain 
Providing guidance to product 
design at concurrent engineer-
ing application 
Huang et al, (2007) Product platform and 
supply chain configura-
tion integration 
Choosing on several possible 
modules of product platform 
by considering supplier capa-
bility 
Ro et al, (2007) Product modularity 
benefit to supply chain 
coordination 
Modularity gives significant 
impact supply chain coordina-
tion, outsourcing and product 
development  
Wilkner et al 
(2007) 
System dynamic analy-
sis for MC for repre-
senting supply chain 
coordination 
Providing system dynamic 
analysis to cover demand agil-
ity at constrained capacity. 
Fixson (2007) Modularity and com-
monality research in 
terms of supply chain 
coordination 
Studies that incorporate modu-
larity and commonality multi-
ple effects on various players 
along the supply chain, and 
that follow systems over time 
appear very promising. 
Vesanen (2007) Mass personalization as 
a form of marketer and 
customer collaboration 
To collaborate marketer and 
service provider in terms of 
product or service, price, pro-
motion and delivery. 
Kumar (2007b) Mass personalization as 
a form of marketer and 
customer collaboration 
MC is lack of knowledge in 
terms of supply flexibility cost 
and required knowledge for 
customer co-creation  
Brabazon and 
McCharty (2004) 
Virtual built to order as 
MC order fulfillment 
process 
To provide product reconfigu-
ration capability by imple-
menting postponement strate-
gies at different decoupling 
point. 
 
This research summarizes Tables 1 to 3 as follows: 
1. Product and process design and supply chain coordination are the three areas 
of MC research 
2. There is a trend in postponement strategies to incorporate the supply chain 
perspective into their application. 
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3. Supply chain perspective in a global view requires coordination and integra-
tion according to agility, adaptability, and alignment.  Thus, supply flexibility, 
component commonality, and/or product platform modularity can be  applied 
to various players along the supply chain if there are  information flows from 
the supplier to customer and vice versa (Lee, 2004). 
4. Postponement strategies need a commonality either in component or process, 
or even both, to achieve production line flexibility (Ma, 2002). In fact, produc-
tion line flexibility influences price flexibility since most price changes can be 
accounted for by changes in direct costs for labor and materials (Yance, 1960), 
where it signifies the importance of component commonality to improve proc-
ess flexibility. 
2.1 Some insights from the literature  
Besides time and form postponement, other forms of postponement strategies, 
namely price and production postponement, also influence the strategic invest-
ment decision of the firm and its value (Miegham and Dada, 1999). Price post-
ponement is believed to be a reliable strategy to hedge against demand uncer-
tainty, where it is good for investment and production decision in terms of pro-
duction capacity and inventory level. However, the price and production post-
ponement decision are not generally applicable to all business types. Some situa-
tions, for instance, need production postponement to reduce waste, or, in some 
situations, price postponement is more appropriate for high volume and high mix 
production.Furthermore, in relating to component commonality, there is the ques-
tion of when and in what situation price and production postponement are appro-
priate with the absence or existence of product commonality.  
In addition to previous literature, competitive postponement strategies are  intro-
duced in this dissertation.The reasons for  applying competition into postpone-
ment decisions are twofold. First, the competition level influences the strategic 
investment decision (production capacity and inventory level) of the firm and its 
value,with the result that, secondly,  the higher level of competition increases the 
value of the postponement decision (Miegham and Dada, 1999).Thus, a higher 
competitive level induces postponement strategies, which increase their value by 
carrying out  customization in the final manufacturing stage in a shorter period: 
for instance, when a manufacturer introduces a new product. After investing in 
capacity, the firm announces either production quantity or price information. 
Then, in response to the revealed market demand, an appropriate production 
quantity or price is set. An example of this type is where most retailers have a 
commitment to order at a certain quantity from a manufacturer as a form of busi-
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ness contract, and most manufacturers announce price lists in advance in order to 
attract customers. 
With regard to the insights, this dissertation developed a methodology that intro-
duces the importance of competition in postponement strategies. The implication 
of this dissertation is that product managers, operations managers and logistics 
managers can broaden their view in a global and autonomous supply chain per-
spective. The difference with  previous perspectives is that in global and autono-
mous networks a firm cannot act as a leader without considering other partners´ 
benefits. In conclusion, the development of competitive postponement strategies 
is essential to build a  new concept in postponement strategies.  
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3 METHODOLOGY 
This section starts with methodology as the focal point and only addresses the 
background for the readers in order to understand the motivation of this research, 
how and why the research methods and techniques were chosen in answering the 
research questions. Thus, this section presents a comprehensive framework within 
which this research operates. 
First, a research paradigm describes the research assumptions of reality and 
knowledge.There are four alternatives research paradigms: positivist/postposi-
tivist, interpretivist/constructivist, transformative and pragmatic (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4.  Research paradigms, methods and examples. 
 
Paradigm Methods (primarily) Data collection tools (examples) 
Positivist/ 
Postpositivist 
Quantitative methods The object of study is independent 
of the researchers; knowledge is 
discovered and verified through 
direct observations or measure-
ments of phenomena; facts are 
established by taking apart a phe-
nomenon to examine its compo-
nent parts 
Interpretivist/ 
Constructivist 
Qualitative methods 
predominate, although 
utilization of quantita-
tive methods may also 
possible. 
Knowledge is established through 
the meanings attached to the phe-
nomena studied; researchers inter-
act with the subjects of study to 
obtain data; inquiry changes both 
researcher and subject; and knowl-
edge is context and time dependent 
Transformative A mix of qualitative and 
quantitative methods.  
Contextual and histori-
cal factors described, 
especially as they relate 
to oppression  
Diverse range of tools -  a particu-
lar need to avoid discrimination,  
eg: sexism, racism, and homopho-
bia. 
Pragmatic Possible use of qualita-
tive and/or quantitative 
methods.  . 
May include tools from both posi-
tivist and interpretivist paradigms.  
E.g. Interviews, observations, test-
ing and experiments. 
(Adapted from: MacKenzie. N and S. Knipe, 2006) 
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3.1  Research ontology 
Ontology involves the philosophy of reality, In considering the research ontology, 
naïve realism (Guba and Lincoln, 1994) was finally chosen. The reasons can be 
summarized as follows:    
1. Quantitative research quantification is limited in nature, looking only at one 
small portion of a reality that cannot be split or unitized without losing the 
importance of the whole phenomenon. However, quantitative research is 
predominant in science and assumes that science quantitatively measures 
independent facts about a single apprehensible reality (Healy & Perry, 2000).  
In other words, the data and its analysis are value-free and the data do not 
change because of observation.  That is, researchers view the world through a 
“one-way mirror” (Healy & Perry, 2000).  
2. In terms of the ontology element, this research uses naïve realism because the 
reality that is considered in this thesis is real and apprehensible (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994). Furthermore, this thesis investigates how to apply postpone-
ment strategies in logistics, product design and marketing work to support 
MC operations and this  requires quantitative analysis. The findings must be 
true in terms of their  application by giving evidence from measureable ana-
lytical modeling. This research does not want to use constructivism because 
the aim of this dissertation is not to transform the current postponement strate-
gies by proposing a very new idea for current postponement strategies, but 
rather to understand the actions of decision makers rather than changing them 
or their approach to strategy formulation. Furthermore, nor does this research 
use a constructivist  paradigm because it  is not appropriate for business re-
search requiring the kind of measurement  required for our research questions. 
The purpose of this thesis is simply to stick to what we can observe and meas-
ure.  In other words, we can conclude that our research area covers logistics, 
product design, and marketing decision optimization, where it is closer to the-
ory testing research (Healy & Perry, 2000).  
3.2  Research epistemology 
Research epistemology addresses how we come to know that reality by identify-
ing the particular practices used to attain knowledge of it. A dualist/objectivist 
approach was chosen (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The reasons can be summarized 
as follows:     
 
A dualist/objectivist approach guarantees the generality of the  research outcomes 
because the analytical models are developed according to general rules in many 
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industrial fields. Particular practices are identified, for instance how prices have 
changed according to demand changes, or vice versa (Singh and Vives,1984), and 
how higher component commonality affects product substituability (Lee, 1996). 
Thus, all analytical models follow common acceptable behavior in industrial 
practice, where the analytical models try to optimize the outcomes such that they 
are better than the previous research.  
3.3  Research methodology 
In considering the research methodology, experimental or manipulative ap-
proaches have been chosen. The reasons can be summarized as follows:   
1. In optimizing logistics, product design and marketing strategy, we do not at-
tempt to involve humans and their real life experiences.  Indeed, I attempt to 
extend current applications, for instance the use of response analysis in built to 
order supply chain and manufacturing process and product design for design-
ing the supply chain. 
2. The focus of this research is on optimizing information flows in the area of 
logistics, product design, and marketing to support MC. Thus, the developed 
tools are largely mechanistic.  
3. In terms of research epistemology, this research does not suppose that several 
operators of analytical models would give widely different outcomes.  Indeed, 
the outcomes of this thesis are true findings that can be used in general. Fur-
ther development of analytical models into computer software applications 
will give replicable answers by considering application areas.  
3.4 Research Design 
This section explores research design in terms of its operationalization (section 
3.4.1) and details the methods to answer RQ 1 and RQ 2 (section 3.4.2 to section 
3.4.7).  
3.4.1 Operationalization of the Research 
RQ 1 focuses on finding manufacturing capabilities through postponement strate-
gies distribution across the four types of MC to generate competitive advantage.  
Thus, analytical models are developed and used as research methods by making 
analogy from previous well-established theories. This research uses postponement 
types to represent a firm’s capability in MC.  The reason is that postponement 
will minimize process change dynamics as well as maximize product change dy-
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namics. Thus, the results of the research can develop guidance in deciding on MC 
systems optimization. 
RQ 2 focuses on finding economies of integration by using postponement strate-
gies to satisfy lead times and delivery reliability.  Analytical models are devel-
oped and used as research methods also by making analogy from previous well-
established theories. This dissertation uses five characteristics of a good theory, 
namely ability to account for data, explanatory relevance, testability, prediction of 
novel events and parsimony (Bordens and Abbots, 2002).  Some problem exam-
ples from existing literature show the developed models´ testability and ability to 
account for the data. Each model tends to a specific situation, for instance buyer-
supplier relationship, a firm and its competitor relationship, supplier  competition, 
functions of relationships within a firm to represent the models’ explanatory rele-
vance. Furthermore, the novelty of each model gives a new insight into  the pre-
vious literature and the comprehensiveness of the models shows the parsimony of 
the developed theory. For instance, the postponement strategy  models combine 
the previous postponement strategy  concepts that were separately discussed. 
Thus, the developed models build a thread among several postponement strate-
gies, in this case price and production postponements and time and form post-
ponement strategies.  
In addtion to RQ2, value chain re-engineering gives benefit to economies of inte-
gration to optimize postponement strategies. Therefore, this research develops 
analytical models of  Advanced Planning and Scheduling (APS) to represent sup-
pliers, manufacturers, and customer  integration. Simulated information and data 
signify  that the models fit at any different data level. Empirical information re-
garding model parameters are not applied by considering that the previous litera-
ture has  given enough information regarding the required main and important 
variables for model development For example, the price model of widely accept-
able capacity and product substitutability independent variables. The costs model 
is composed based on widely used production, setup, holding, investment and 
order costs.  
In conclusion, without ignoring other research methods, this research excludes the 
application of discrete event simulation because the area of the  research is the  
strategic and tactical level. A second reason for this is that most previous research  
in MC used analytical models (Fixson, 2007), since analytical models are more 
appropriate for solving the efficiency and optimization problem. Other methods, 
for instance case study are more appropriate for theory building or finding new  
variables for maximizing the impact of postponement strategies on  customer sat-
isfaction. Discrete event simulation makes it possible to introduce a random num-
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ber generator to represent operations performance and it can be used to optimize 
manufacturing competencies (machine, material handling, labor and routing 
flexibility) (Zhang et al, 2003).  However, that is outside the scope of this disser-
tation.    
3.4.2 Framework of research design 
This research divides the discussion into five research papers that answer RQ 1 
and RQ 2.Two papers were prepared to answer  RQ 1 and one book chapter and 
three papers for RQ 2. The developed analytical models will answer both RQ 1 
and RQ 2.  This research excludes other methods such as discrete event simula-
tion, empirical studies, case studies, reviews, and experimentation (Fixson, 2007) 
since mathematical models are more appropriate for solving efficiency and opti-
mization problems.  Other methods are more appropriate for theory building or 
finding new variables for maximizing MC impacts on customer satisfaction.  
Applications of different analytical models are not mutually exclusive, so that a 
combination of several, and occasionally all of them together, provides drastic 
change and improvement throughout a firm’s organization, including develop-
ment and production (Pine, 1993). Thus, combining them gives benefit in sup-
porting MC systems from different perspectives (Pine, 1993).This benefit goes to 
a firm that can maximize its manufacturing, marketing, and procurement capabil-
ity in market turbulence demand and innovation by empowering the organiza-
tion’s resources.   
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Below is the framework of research design based on some publications 
 
 
Figure 1. Composition of papers for value chain building. 
Figure 1 shows that each paper covers a different area of the value chain.  Papers 
3.4.3 and 3.4.4 are intended to answer RQ1, papers 3.4.5 to 3.4.7 to answer RQ2. 
RQ1 is used by marketing to decide on what postponement strategy fits their 
needs. From the marketing decision, the operational decision (papers 3.4.5 to 
3.4.7) is then elaborated through procurement, production, and distribution deci-
sions. Finally, the supply chain decision monitors the outcomes of the marketing 
and operational decisions in terms of inventory value, lead times, and profitability 
by developing Agile Supply and Demand Networks (ASDN).We can see the rela-
tionship amongst the decisions in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2.  Interaction among several value chains by developing Advanced 
Planning and Scheduling (APS). 
Figure 2 shows the interaction among value chains for optimizing supply chains 
as a whole in terms of Agile Supply Demand Networks (ASDN).  Furthermore, 
one paper discusses this interaction in detail.One additional feature of this interac-
tion is that the supply chain is able to decide on the sourcing decision, customer 
order decoupling point and availability to promise (ATP).  
Thus, below is a summary of the essence of each paper for answering RQ1 and 
RQ2   
1. Research Question 1: How do postponement strategies approach 
mass customization? 
In answering Research Question 1, section 3.4.3 uses dynamic prices and quantity 
postponement strategies, and section 3.4.4 time and form postponement strategies 
to investigate their appropriateness in  different conditions, for instance customer 
requirement specifications (high or low product substituability) and component 
prices from suppliers (component price at fixed prices or at discounted prices at 
different levels of order).  
3.4.3 Dynamic Prices and Quantity Postponement Strategies (Kristianto. Y, 
2010) 
This paper addresses flexible price and production as marketing tools in cus-
tomerizing customer orders. Flexible price (called price postponement) is in-
tended for highly configurable product application, while flexible production 
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(called production postponement) is focused on highly customized products that 
share limited components or modules with other products. The models are tested 
by using randomized demands and prices to investigate the profitability of price 
and production postponement.This paper uses product substitutability degree to 
represent the customization degree when compared with other products from 
competitors that have a similar function. It concludes that price postponement is 
appropriate for highly substitutable products and production postponement for 
highly differentiable products. 
Clearly, this paper uses a  combination of different postponement strategies to 
represent their appropriateness in  different market conditions. This paper can be 
used to support marketing strategies in terms of volume flexibility (Zhang et al, 
2003).Volume flexibility at lower product substitutability is achieved by applying 
production postponement and price postponement for higher product substitut-
ability.  
3.4.4 Time and Form Postponement Strategies under Dynamic Behavior of 
Demand (Kristianto. Y and Petri Helo, 2009a)  
Time and form postponement addresses the location of the customization process 
and level of component standardization as marketing tools in the customization of 
customer orders (Lee, 1996).  In brief, time postponement refers to delaying the 
various product differentiation steps (manufacturing, integration, customization, 
localization and packaging) as late as possible.Form postponement aims at stan-
dardizing the upstream stage as much as possible. Thus, time postponement refers 
to cosmetic customization, while form postponement to adaptive customization.  
The models are tested by using randomized demands and prices to investigate the 
profitability of the two types of postponement.  It concludes that time postpone-
ment is appropriate for lowly substitutable products and form postponement for 
highly differentiatable products, at discounted prices at different order quantity. 
This paper clearly uses a  combination of different postponement strategies to 
represent their appropriateness in  different supply conditions. This paper can be 
used to support procurement strategies in terms of volume flexibility (Zhang et al, 
2003). Mix flexibility at lower product substitutability is achieved by applying 
form postponement and time postponement for higher product substitutability. 
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1. Research Question 2: How do postponement strategies approach economies of 
integration for satisfying lead times and delivery reliability? 
In answering Research Question 2, section 3.4.5 uses dual sourcing strategy to 
minimize supply uncertainty. Section 3.4.6 uses response analysis to investigate 
the benefit of component commonality to postponement strategies. Section 3.4.7 
uses strategic inventory allocation to give guarantees on lead times. Section 3.4.8 
integrates the ideas of section 3.4.3 to section 3.4.7 into Agile Supply and De-
mand Networks (ASDN) to measure the benefit of postponement strategies.  
3.4.5 Strategic Thinking in Supply and Innovation in Dual Sourcing 
Procurement (Kristianto. Y and Helo. P, 2009b) 
This paper represents purchasing strategy by studying a buyer and two supplier’s 
strategic moves in order to gain competitive advantage over suppliers, by consid-
ering the buyer and the suppliers’ payoffs. Thus, selling price optimization for the 
buyer and suppliers, as well as the innovation level through product substitutabil-
ity signifies strategic competitiveness.The results show that innovation in terms of 
developing component commonality supports postponement strategies by making 
available to promise to the customer and giving benefit to suppliers by increasing 
the component price at a higher level of component commonality.  
With respect to managerial implication, the  paper suggests that the buyer should 
encourage innovation by offering higher incentives to the suppliers, as well as 
imposing penalties for lack of promptness in supply.This research suggests that 
strategic thinking is appropriate for highly customized and innovative products. 
The novelty of the research is in the formulation of competitive strategy in dual 
sourcing where innovation is encouraged. 
The  paper proposes procurement strategy formulation to give strategic response 
to a rapidly changing competitive environment. The paper presents supply flexi-
bility in terms of benefit and cost analysis by considering supplier and manufac-
turer integration.  The paper is thus used to respond  to the economies of integra-
tion by maximizing supply efficiency and creating value in terms of flexibility 
and quality. As a result, attempts to apply dual sourcing strategy are designed for 
achieving flexibility in the promised supply.  
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3.4.6 Strategic Thinking in Supply and Innovation in Dual Sourcing 
Procurement (Kristianto. Y and Helo. P, 2009b) 
This paper represents purchasing strategy by studying a buyer and two supplier’s 
strategic moves in order to gain competitive advantage over suppliers, by consid-
ering the buyer and the suppliers’ payoffs. Thus, selling price optimization for the 
buyer and suppliers, as well as the innovation level through product substitutabil-
ity signifies strategic competitiveness.The results show that innovation in terms of 
developing component commonality supports postponement strategies by making 
available to promise to the customer and giving benefit to suppliers by increasing 
the component price at a higher level of component commonality.  
With respect to managerial implication, the  paper suggests that the buyer should 
encourage innovation by offering higher incentives to the suppliers, as well as 
imposing penalties for lack of promptness in supply. This research suggests that 
strategic thinking is appropriate for highly customized and innovative products. 
The novelty of the research is in the formulation of competitive strategy in dual 
sourcing where innovation is encouraged. 
The paper proposes procurement strategy formulation to give strategic response to 
a rapidly changing competitive environment.The paper presents supply flexibility 
in terms of benefit and cost analysis by considering supplier and manufacturer 
integration.  The paper is thus used to respond  to the economies of integration by 
maximizing supply efficiency and creating value in terms of flexibility and qual-
ity. As a result, attempts to apply dual sourcing strategy are designed for achiev-
ing flexibility in the promised supply.  
3.4.7 Built to Order Supply Chains: Response Analysis with Control Model 
(Kristianto. Y and Helo. P, 2010b) 
This paper addressescontrol systems modeling in built–to-order manufacturers 
facing customized demand. The general purpose of the paper is to present a novel 
approach to managing collaboration, by considering information exchange be-
tween the manufacturer and the supplier. The methodology applies feedback con-
trol into postponement strategy of built-to-order (BTO) to analyze supplier-buyer 
collaboration (production capacity and promised lead times and supply flexibil-
ity). The application of tournament game ahead of control system application will 
minimize the effect of supply uncertainty, with the ultimate goal being profit 
maximization.  In terms of the dynamic of MC in terms of component commonal-
ity effects on various players along the supply chain, this paper visualizes the ef-
fect of product design decision in reducing lead time variability and increasing 
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production process change stability by keeping the level of product variety 
(Boynton et al, 1993; Pine, 1993).  Furthermore, pursuing supply contract and 
promising supply delivery promptness reflect the improvement in the benefits of 
the supply chain.  
The paper proposes  a tool of innovative management to give strategic response to 
rapidly changing competitive environments. The  paper thus proposes information 
technology application in  product development and supply strategy to meet the 
new challenge of manag a firm´s responsiveness and responding to the dual com-
petitive requirements of responsive delivery and production efficiency. Thus, this 
paper is used to respond to the economies of integration by maximizing supply 
efficiency and creating value in terms of flexibility, delivery, and quality.  
3.4.8 Designing for Supply Chain by Coordinating Manufacturing Process 
and Product Development Process (Kristianto. Y and Helo.  P, 2010c)  
This paper focuses on decision-making related to the coordination between prod-
uct development process and manufacturing process to represent marketing strat-
egy and manufacturing strategy in terms of the product development process.  
This coordination is important in terms of agility requirement (Sharifi et al, 2006).  
Furthermore, in terms of MC as a competitive strategy, discussion on agility is 
important since it is a part of the core competencies in manufacturing by combin-
ing flexibility and leanness or cost consciousness (Takala, 2002).  The paper sup-
ports postponement strategies by producing component commonality and investi-
gates its effects on various players along the supply chain and supply flexibility. 
A manifestation of manufacturing process development is through push pull 
manufacturing strategy, where it incorporates supplier and customer demand in-
formation to decide on the Customer Order Decoupling Point (CODP). CODP 
represents the degree of customer involvement in the manufacturing process.  .  
The benefits of postponement strategies through managing product variety are 
appears in component commonality analysis.The introduction of a new common-
ality measure represents a form of customer involvement in product development.  
Analysis of customer requirements by using Multi Criteria Decision Making 
(MCDM) signifies customer co-creation by giving product information and re-
configuration to the customer. Furthermore, the linking of this index to manufac-
turing strategy optimization guarantees that product varieties are handled appro-
priately by assigning their manufacturing process to the right decoupling point 
and customer service level. 
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Production capacity decision made by considering supply variance and produc-
tion process variance reflects the cost of supply flexibility in terms of guaranteed 
lead-time. The new approach of strategic safety stock allocation minimizes the 
cost of flexible supply. Thus, the cost of flexible supply is linked directly to a 
firm’s total costs in order to investigate its effect on the supply chain cost struc-
ture.  
Clearly, designing for the supply chain supports economies of integration by 
aligning customers to the production and product development processes. This 
paper develops marketing capability in using mix and volume flexibility.  Mix 
and volume flexibility enable a firm to apply price and production postponement 
to support marketing capability and flexibility (Zhang et al, 2003), thus, maximiz-
ing efficiency and fitting operational objectives in terms of price, flexibility, agil-
ity, and delivery. 
3.4.9 Value Chain Re-engineering by the Application of Advanced Planning 
and Scheduling (Kristianto. Y, P. Helo and A. Mian, 2010d) 
This paper details value chain re-engineering by utilizing the new concept of Ad-
vanced Planning and Scheduling (APS).The methodology applies collaboration 
among suppliers, buyers and customers to fulfill orders.The paper exploits the 
benefits of network economy in terms of promised lead-time, inventory alloca-
tion, and supply strategy and revenue maximization.  
The models show that it is possible to re-engineer the value chain by incorporat-
ing the supply side (suppliers) and demand side (customers) within the new con-
cept of APS.  A problem example shows how to implement this concept by em-
phasizing important aspects of the supplier and customer relationship. This con-
cept, however, does not take account the importance of service and customer in-
terface and transport optimization; hence, the research excludes the effect of cus-
tomer requirement.  
The proposed APS, however, depends on the above mentioned postponement 
strategies. Furthermore, the integration of the proposed APS and Agile Supply 
Demand Network (ASDN) requires many extensions in terms of ASDN building.  
This innovation makes a contribution to ASDN as well as APS in viewing the 
value chain as a macro form by including the supply and demand sides.  
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3.5 Analysis 
3.5.1 RQ 1: How do postponement strategies approach mass customization? 
Papers 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 support RQ 1 by giving a new insight into managerial deci-
sions on mass customization in a supply chain perspective. One notable result is 
that price and production postponements as well as time and form postponements 
have a strong relation to component commonality and product modularity in 
terms of  MC. This relation is important since until today there has been no pub-
lished paper wholly devoted to this area. As a result, postponement strategies are 
emphasized in the firm´s capability to delay product differentiation without con-
sidering supplier reaction.The effect of this discrepancy is significant since the 
supplier and buyer relationship motivates different types of postponement.  
Figure 3 shows that adjustable component price and product substitutability de-
gree (higher product substitutability signifies a lower level of component com-
monality or product modularity) motivate supply chains to apply form and/or time 
postponement. In defense of the results, it is often in practice so  that the compo-
nent price is different at different levels of order size to attract more buying quan-
tity and to create economies of scale in terms of quantity discount. On the other 
hand, production and price postponement is very common in a business to-
business transaction to minimize the total costs of satisfying demand by fixing the 
order quantity to the component supplier. Finally, we can summarize the results 
from paper 1 and 2 as in Figure 3 below 
 
Table 5.  Postponement types according to MC systems. 
 
Economies of scale to 
exploit quantity discounts 
Form postponement Time postponement 
Economies of scale to 
exploit fixed costs 
Production postponement Price postponement 
 Lower product  
substitutability 
Higher product  
substitutability 
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Figure 3.  Postponement strategies in supply chain perspective. 
 
Figure 3 shows postponement strategy applications to the supply chain.The figure 
shows that supply chains are enabled to maximize their benefits in terms of prof-
itability, delivery reliability and inventory level optimization in terms of MC.  
3.5.2 RQ 2: How do postponement strategies approach economies of 
integration for satisfying lead times and delivery reliability? 
Paper 3.4.5 supports MC systems by developing procurement strategy for manag-
ing information sharing between two suppliers and a buyer. It makes the suppli-
ers’ bargaining position over the buyer also improve  because each of them can 
give the buyer more freedom to make more product varieties and promises to the 
end customer about product availability and delivery lead times. This evidence 
also encourages the buyer to be more innovative by moving from single mass 
production to mass customized production by developing a flexible product plat-
form. The positive effects of innovation by collaborating with suppliers are  two-
fold: first, the buyer and the suppliers obtain higher productivity with higher sell-
ing prices so as to support continuous improvement and cost reduction. Second, 
market positioning is heightened by offering a wide variety of products to the end 
customer in order to achieve competitive advantage in the market by focusing on 
customer satisfaction. Additionally, the buyer can avoid suppliers colluding to 
reduce innovation by updating the market requirements to the suppliers. Conse-
quently, innovation will never stop, because if one supplier cannot follow the new 
requirement, then the product substitutability degree will decrease, which will 
make the product platform flexibility also decrease.  Thus, core competence in 
know-how is supported by considering R&D in component modularization and in 
flexibility by producing a flexible product mix and flexible volume of production 
so as to reduce delivery lead times. In conclusion, procurement strategy is impor-
Supplier Manufacturer End cus-
tomer 
High product substituability 
Price postponement 
High product substituability 
Time postponement 
Low product substituability 
Form postponement 
Low product substituability 
Production postponement 
 Acta Wasaensia     37 
 
tant to manufacturing strategy by supporting the whole competencies needed to 
achieve competitive advantage.  
Paper 3.4.6 supports MC by investigating how information exchange effects to 
optimize MC systems. It provides highly reliable information through the applica-
tion of information technology to increase demand visibility. It can also encour-
age the supplier to produce exactly what  the manufacturer wants, since he or she 
must ensure the demand information validity. Thus, information exchange also 
has effect on  procurement strategy by managing the supply chain through the 
supplier´s relationship with the manufacturer.In conclusion, information flows is 
important to MC systems to achieve competitive advantage in terms of promised 
lead times and minimum total costs. 
Paper 3.4.7 supports RQ 2 by presenting product platform commonality as a 
source of competitive advantage. The motivation is that commonality degree sup-
ports product mix and volume flexibility, which effect on  manufacturing capabil-
ity (Zhang et al, 2003). Furthermore, in terms of supply strategy, the mutual im-
pact between the manufacturer and supplier production quantity and inventory 
decisions creates competitive advantage. This paper concludes that inventory and 
production benefits go to those who can optimize the information exchange effect 
on lead-time reduction, because of high product commonality. Thus, a combina-
tion of production quantity and inventory decisions and product commonality 
decisions supports strategic flexibility in terms of the supply chain by customiz-
ing product at least in terms of cost (production and inventory) through achieving 
high product platform commonality to improve production flexibility.   
Paper 3.4.8  combines the three contributions above (papers 3.4.3 to paper 3.4.7) 
by developing them into a new form of advanced planning and scheduling (APS). 
Furthermore, this paper gives additional information to the ASDN model in order 
to  develop  further in the area of sourcing decision, inventory allocation and 
promised lead times to  achieve  capability in product mix and volume flexibility 
and  deliver customer satisfaction (Zhang et al, 2003). 
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4 THE AUTHOR´S CONTRIBUTION 
One important result is that this dissertation places  postponement  in a  more cen-
trally important position in MC systems. Moreover, a clear division between  
postponement strategies will enable decision makers to  decide  not only to apply 
postponement  the production process but also in product development by match-
ing the structuring postponement strategy to fit the product substitutability degree 
and to manage economies of scale in the supply chains (Paper 3.4.3 and 3.4.4). 
The present study contributes to existing knowledge of MC by investigating gaps 
in MC study.This research mentioned that strategic thinking on  hedging against 
supplier opportunistic actions is useful in order to maximize supply flexibility by 
reducing supply uncertainty through reward and punishment.Reward and punish-
ment in this dissertation (Paper 3.4.5) represents strategic moves on threat and 
promises by giving punishment and reward. Furthermore, Paper 3.4.5 proves that 
reward and punishment will never disadvantage the firm since both the supplier 
and the firm will receive low payoffs for higher supply uncertainty.  
This dissertation contributes to existing knowledge in MC by placing marketing 
strategy as a newly added strategy with competitive strategy (Watts et al, 1995) in 
supporting MC as a competitive strategy (Boynton et al, 1993).  The motivation is 
that since postponement strategies are an enabler for MC, therefore  marketing as 
the first area for postponement strategies (Alderson, 1950) should be included in 
the  decision making process.Furthermore, the trend in MC nowadays - personal-
ization (hereafter called customerization) is intensified in the area between mar-
keting and end user (Vesanen, 2007; Kumar, 2008). This dissertation  proposes  
customer co-creation by linking it to manufacturing, procurement and distribution 
strategy so as to extend end user involvement in the order fulfillment process. 
This dissertation emphasizes the importance of postponement as a marketing 
strategy in meeting MC vision and for achieving competitive advantage by prom-
ising lead times and delivery reliability to tie customers in to the the entire orga-
nization (Paper 3.4.7). Thus, marketing involvement in supporting MC cannot be 
avoided anymore in providing customers with anything they want: profitably, any 
time they want it, anywhere they want it, and any way they want it.  
Another contribution to SCM is that of synchronized supply (Paper 3.4.6), which 
represents the importance of information sharing between the buyer and the sup-
plier. A special form of response analysis, which considers  the level of product 
platform commonality, is used to describe the importance of information sharing 
to encourage more integration of supply chains by exhibiting the lead times and 
inventory level reductions (Paper 3.4.6).  The contribution of this dissertation 
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compared to previous literature (Towill, 1996; Wilkner et al, 2007) is the incorpo-
rating of mass customization enablers (component commonality and postpone-
ment) within built to order supply chains.  Paper 3.4.6 shows that a higher level of 
information sharing increases manufacturer credibility.  
The papers that compose this dissertation discuss MC from  different perspectives 
by presenting different problem examples. However, all of the  papers focus on 
how to think of MC strategically by considering the industrial competition per-
spective to achieve competitive advantage. Finally, in order to extend the applica-
bility of this dissertation, papers 3.4.5, 3.4.6 and 3.4.7 support Advanced Planning 
and Scheduling (APS) for creating an Agile Supply and Demand Network 
(ASDN).The methodology was different to previous APS, while the proposed 
APS emphasizes SCM efficiency by proposing collaboration as a means of com-
petitive advantage in mass customized industry (Book Chapter).   
Below is the model for MC as a competitive strategy. 
 
Figure 4.  Model for MC as Competitive Strategy. 
Figure 4 depicts an MC strategy framework for achieving competitive advantage.  
Deployment of the MC area into product design, logistics, and marketing strategy 
includes a wide area such as supply, manufacturing, transportation and warehous-
ing. All of these strategies are enabled by the application of postponement and 
component commonality strategies.In this figure component commonality sup-
ports postponement strategies by providing sufficient flexibility in terms of manu-
facturability and deliverability. Finally, information flows enable the building of 
postponement strategies in the perspective of the global supply chain (Van Hoek, 
2001). 
MC strategy 
Product development 
strategy 
Logistics strategy Marketing strategy 
Component commonality and postponement 
Information flows 
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Table 6 shows the publications and their contribution to supporting the proposed 
new concept of postponement strategies structure.  
 
Table 6.  Publications and their contributions. 
 
Paper title Novelty Results 
International Journal of In-
formation systems and Sup-
ply Chain Management 
“Dynamic price and quan-
tity postponement strate-
gies” 
Dynamic price and 
quantity postponement 
as forms of MC sys-
tems 
Price postponement can 
be used for developing 
economies of scale to 
exploit fixed costs at 
higher product substitut-
ability, and production 
postponement at lower 
product substitutability. 
Operations and Supply 
Chain Management: an In-
ternational Journal  
“Time and  form postpone-
ment strategies under dy-
namic behavior of demand” 
Time and  form post-
ponement strategies as 
forms of MC systems 
Time postponement can 
be used for developing 
economies of scale to 
exploit quantity discounts 
at higher product substi-
tutability, and form post-
ponement at lower prod-
uct substitutability. 
International Journal of Ap-
plied Management Science 
“Strategic Thinking in Sup-
ply and Innovation in Dual 
Sourcing Procurement” 
 
Strategic thinking for 
managing supply con-
tract between buyer 
and two suppliers 
The results show that it is 
possible for suppliers to 
be involved at a higher 
level of cooperation by 
considering rewards and 
punishment from the 
buyer, which means it is 
possible to apply multi-
sourcing to strategic 
items 
International Journal of In-
dustrial and Systems Engi-
neering 
“Designing supply chain by 
coordinating manufacturing 
process and product devel-
opment process”  
 
Developing new com-
monality index and 
strategic inventory 
allocation according to 
100% guaranteed lead 
times 
The results show that 
customer co-creation is 
possible together with 
supply chain optimiza-
tion 
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(Table 5 continued) 
Journal and Paper title Novelty Results 
International Journal of 
Procurement Management 
“Built to order supply 
chains: Response analysis 
with control model” 
A control system 
model of “Built-to-
Order Supply Chain” 
includes product 
commonality and re-
sponse analysis in the 
simulation model.  
 
The results show that a 
higher product common-
ality degree gives more 
opportunity for  quick 
response built-to-order 
supply chains, which are 
managed by feedback 
control, and at the same 
time to possibly mitigate 
supply violation by ap-
plying threat and incen-
tive 
Book Chapter 
“Value chain reengineering 
by the application of Ad-
vanced Planning and 
Scheduling (APS)” 
A comprehensive 
study of  APS from the 
supply chain point of 
view by considering 
Agile Supply Demand 
Networks 
APS can be linked to 
ASDN and some future 
research directions are 
exploited for further de-
veloping ASDN 
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5 MODEL VALIDATION 
The ultimate goal of model validation is to make the model useful in the sense 
that the model addresses the right problem, provides accurate information about 
the modeled system, and makes the model actually used. 
There was an earthquake in September 1999 in, where the situation made Dell 
changed its product configuration and price levels (Lee, 2004).  Paper 3.4.3 con-
cludes that a highly substitutable product is appropriate for price postponement. 
The validation for Paper 3.4.4 refers to modularization in HP (Feitzinger and Lee, 
1997) in power supply and postponing the assembly of the product.  The valida-
tion for Paper 3.4.5 refers to contrasting the case of Nokia andEricsson in March 
2000, when a Phillips facility in Albuquerque, New Mexico, went up in flames. 
The plant made radio frequency (RF) chips, key components for mobile tele-
phones for both Scandinavian companies.When the fire damaged the plant, 
Nokia’s manager quickly carried out design changes and contacted back-up 
sources from two suppliers in Japan and the United States by making a modular 
product platform.  Conversely, Ericsson was unable to hedge against this emer-
gency because it did not prepare for a dual sourcing strategy with the result that 
they lost sales.    
Validation for Paper 3.4.6 also comes from Lee (2004) by taking an example 
from the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which by 
giving suppliers proprietary tools, data and models design and engineering 
changes can be made accurately and quickly. An example from Cisco further en-
hances the validity in that the company recently created an e-hub, which connects 
suppliers and the company via the Internet.  This allows the firms to share infor-
mation in terms of supply and demand data on a real time basis.  Thus, the case of 
Cisco validates Paper 3.4.6 by supporting the information sharing idea. 
Validation for Paper 3.4.7 comes from Lee and Billington (1995). The supply 
chain for HP’s product contains manufacturing, R&D, and sales and service 
where fill rate improvement was   efffected by applying inventory network opti-
mization. This case validates Paper 3.4.7 by moving from inventory modeling to 
manufacturing and distribution modeling through product and process redesign. 
Validation for Paper 3.4.8 comes from Agile and Supply Demand Networks 
(ASDN). Paper 3.4.8 corroborates papers 3.4.3 to 3.4.7 by creating advanced 
planning and scheduling (APS) re-engineering for improving fill rate and mini-
mizing inventory level.   
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 The following sections explain in detail each analytical model validation by con-
sidering its applicability and feasibility. 
5.1 Dynamic Price and Quantity Postponement 
Strategies (Paper 3.4.3) 
The paper discusses price and quantity postponement under the dynamic behavior 
of demand. The validity of the analytical models lies in  the conclusion part, 
where it is mentioned that price postponement gives higher profit stability.The 
analytical model has been tested according to highly varied demand and prices at 
different levels of product substitutability (higher product substitutability reflects 
a degree of component commonality). The developed analytical models are valid 
because at several analysis runs (by applying varied price and demand), the re-
sults converge to the same pattern. The results also support previous literature on 
price and quantity postponement which state that quantity postponement is better 
to be applied to highly differentiated products (lower product substitutability) by 
giving a higher component commonality degree. 
5.2 Time and Form Postponement Competition under 
Dynamic Behavior of Demand (Paper 3.4.4)  
The developed analytical models follow make to stock (time postponement) and 
assembly to order (form postponement) cost functions. The cost structures are 
widely used for inventory management. The validity of the results lie in  their 
consistency with  previous concepts of time and form postponement, where time 
postponement is appropriate for higher product differentiation degree and time 
postponement for lower product differentiation degree. Furthermore,  this paper 
gives new insight into  postponement strategies by introducing competitive analy-
sis for both postponement strategies. This new added analysis makes possible a 
simultaneous analysis of time and form postponement. Finally, this simultaneous 
analysis is useful for multi-production lines, where one product is appropriate for 
time postponement and another product for form postponement.  
5.3 Strategic Thinking in Supply and Innovation in 
Dual Sourcing Procurement (Paper 3.4.5) 
The paper discusses the benefit of dual sourcing in terms of the  the existence  of 
component commonality. The validity of the analytical models lies in  the results 
44      Acta Wasaensia 
 
part, where a higher degree of component commonality requires higher commit-
ment from  the suppliers and the buyer. In many situations, developing a higher 
component commonality where the manufacturing processes are diversfied in 
location needs a commitment from  the component manufacturers to meet the 
specification of the buyer, otherwise some manufacturing and testing related 
problems will appear  in the final assembly. Moreover, the application of rewards 
and punishment are valid for the analytical models since they encourage  both 
suppliers to minimize the supply uncertainty. Furthermore, the effectiveness  in-
creases  at a higher degree of product substitutability. The results are valid since 
at higher product substitutability, the suppliers’ interdependency is high  than that 
of a lower substitutability degree, which  makes the suppliers have a stronger  
bargaining position over the buyer. Thus it increases the component prices. As a 
result, supply uncertainty becomes less since the buyer´s customers can easily 
change their choice from one product to another when the first option is not avail-
able.   
5.4 Designing Supply Chain by Coordinating 
Manufacturing Process and Product Development 
Process (Paper 3.4.6) 
This paper discusses the benefit of strategic inventory allocation to give promised 
lead times and reduce inventory costs to the entire supply chain. The validity of 
the analytical models can be referred to Graves and Willems (2000), based on a 
study of  camera supply chains. Basically, this analytical model extends the pre-
vious model (Graves, 2000) by placing  supply and demand uncertainty into the 
previous model, and relating the inventory allocation problem to component 
commonality development. The analytical models prove that strategic inventory 
allocation gives benefit to component commonality strategy by significantly re-
ducing component total costs. If we refer back  to another component commonal-
ity principle (Collier, 1981; 1982; Jiao and Tseng, 2000), it is mentioned that 
component commonality depends on the amount  of component utilization and its 
total costs. Thus, the developed analytical models are valid since they give the 
same results as previous literature:  that the application of strategic inventory al-
location reduces supply chain total costs as well as increasing the component 
commonality degree. 
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5.5 Built-to-Order Supply Chain: Response Analysis 
with Control Model (Paper 3.4.7) 
The paper here discusses the benefit of information sharing in terms of order 
quantity and inventory level to two levels of built to order supply chains. There 
are many papers which discuss  this area, for instance Towill (1996) and Wilkner 
(2007). The previous literature excludes the effect of component commonality in  
information sharing. However, the present dissertation concludes that a higher 
degree of component commonality positively supports information sharing.The 
validity of this conclusion comes from everyday operations in supply chains, 
where a higher degree of component commonality makes the component supplier  
invest  in component inventory to guarantee that supplier delivery lead times are 
met. We can confront this argument with ABC analysis, which  is widely used in 
accounting.Moreover, higher component commonality reduces production re-
sponsiveness, where it also valid since it also reduces the changeover period be-
tween one product to another. In conclusion, the developed analytical models 
support the dissertation concept on postponement strategies by suggesting that 
higher component commonality degree increases operational stability by using 
common component for several production lines,and increases delivery reliability 
by reducing supply uncertainty because more common components are used. 
5.6 Value Chain re-Engineering by The Application of 
Advanced Planning and Scheduling (Paper 3.4.8) 
The paper discusses the benefit of economies of integration for  global supply 
chains by using Advanced Planning and Scheduling (APS) and Agile Supply and 
Demand Networks (ASDN) (Helo et al, 2006). Basically, this paper uses previous 
results of time and form postponement to decide on the Customer Order Decou-
pling Point (CODP) (Paper 3.4.4), dual sourcing strategy (Paper 3.4.5), response 
analysis for built to order supply chain for optimizing total stocks, delivery lead 
times and product substitutability degree (Paper 3.4.6), and strategic inventory 
allocation and component commonality strategies for achieving 100% guaranteed 
lead times. One example from truck manufacturing is taken to illustrate the oper-
ability of the proposed analytical models. The validity of the analytical models 
mostly comes from the future requirement of postponement strategies (Van Hoek, 
2001) and supply chain integration and coordination (Staedtler, 2005).The future 
requirement of postponement strategy is that it gives the required operational 
flexibility to support supply chain reconfiguration. The proposed analytical mod-
els answer this requirement by introducing comprehensive analysis from strategic 
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planning to operational planning by using APS. Furthermore, supply chain inte-
gration and coordination are also possible by developing the analytical models 
through game theory analysis to create acceptable solutions for the inter-related 
parts in supply chains. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
This study extends previous MC Strategy by shedding new light on competitive 
strategy. Competitive strategy upgrades the level of MC discussion from manu-
facturing considerations to the wider perspective of procurement, product devel-
opment and marketing perspectives by drawing  attention to the importance of  
balance between information and physical flows. This importance comes from the 
reality that in order to customize the process, the firm needs many resources and 
elaborate systems (Zipkin, 2001). Obviously, finding a balance between this huge 
investment and MC strategies according to product and process capabilities is 
essential. 
In terms of managing economies of scale in the supply chain, it is important to 
apply different postponement strategies with  different type of supply and demand 
contracts. If the product substitutability is high, then a buyer (manufacturer) needs 
to divide  its products costs into two parts. The first part is subject to the compo-
nent supplier by applying price postponement at fixed order quantity to minimize 
the order receivingand transporting costs. The second part is subject to the final 
customer by applying time postponement to gain  advantage from economies of 
scale to exploit quantity discounts (Paper 3.4.3). Conversely, if the product substi-
tutability is low, then a buyer (manufacturer) needs to divide its product costs also 
into two parts. The first part is subject to the component supplier by applying 
production postponement at fixed order quantity to minimize the order,receiving 
and transporting costs. The second part is subjected to the final customer by ap-
plying form postponement to gain  advantage from economies of scale to exploit 
quantity discounts (Paper 3.4.4). The combination of the two postponement 
strategies at a certain product substitutability level maximizes the profitability of 
the supply chain. 
In terms of the tactical decision level, it is important to consider this level aligned  
to the previous strategic level. In other words, any tactical decision should con-
sider the competitiveness of the  products. Competitiveness at  this stage is fo-
cused on the whole products of the firm that share the same functions and  con-
sidering their profitability. The effect of this decision is that the firm must estab-
lish not only core competence analysis, but also product platform commonality in 
order to build a competitive strategy for the product family.  
In supportings competitive strategy, a supplier evaluation by considering make or 
buy decision and dual sourcing strategy also helps a manufacturer to maintain 
competitiveness in supply strategy (Paper 3.4.5).  In other words, creating com-
petitiveness through purchasing strategy creates stability and competitiveness in 
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the supplier pool (Porter, 1980). The leveraging of this situation creates fair com-
petition between the suppliers, and possibly produces  strategic moves among  the 
suppliers through reward and punishment as forms of threats and promises (Paper 
3.4.5). Furthermore, creating competition among suppliers also promotes stan-
dardization, so that it also undercuts the erection of switching cost, stabilizes and 
maintains the competitiveness of the supplier pools, achieves an optimal degree of 
vertical integration, allocates the number of purchases among qualified suppliers 
and creates maximum advantage with the chosen suppliers (Porter, 1980). 
In terms of logistics strategy, information sharing supports competitive strategy 
by showing  that standardization can reduce lead times and inventory level (Paper 
3.4.6).  This conclusion also undercuts the erection of switching cost by promote 
standardization among suppliers (Porter, 1980). Leveraging of this attempt en-
sures the supplier trusts the demand information from the buyer with a  high de-
gree of confidence. Control system application shows that information sharing 
increases the credibility of the buyer and, indirectly, this is the other form of stra-
tegic move of the buyer.  
In terms of marketing strategy, coordinating the product development processes 
and manufacturing prices, as well as customizing price and order size, supports 
competitive strategy of a firm. These supports come from the improvement of the 
customer involvement degree in product development and increasing customer 
satisfaction, by improving the firm´s visibility to the customer (Paper 3.4.7). 
Thus, meeting the customer´s wants more closely than other competitors creates 
competitive advantage.   
In terms of product development strategy, coordinating product development 
processes and manufacturing prices as well as customizing price and order size 
supports competitive strategy by improving the customer involvement degree in  
product development and increasing  customer and supplier alignment to the 
manufacturer (Paper 3.4.8).Thus, it also reduces time to market as well as mini-
mizing information assymetry.   
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7 FURTHER RESEARCH 
One of the issues raised in this study concerns the fact that analytical modeling is 
the basis for much of the content of the thesis. It would be useful  in the future to 
test the models in a real case study. However, in detail, some of the future re-
search possibilities are listed below: 
1. In terms of future research direction, the oligopoly model should be con-
sidered for price and quantity postponement development according to fu-
ture market demand, which is determined by how closely customer re-
quirements are met, so in future the oligopoly model of quantity and price 
could  be replaced with parameters such as inventory and lead times. From 
this result, a sequence between lead times and inventory could  be deter-
mined and the outcome would  be a decision as to  whether agility or effi-
ciency are  more important for a company, so that the outcome can be 
used by top management to formulate  their business strategy. Finally, fu-
ture research should accommodate strategic and tactical level alignment in 
order to develop comprehensive decision analysis. 
2. The analytical model of dual sourcing procurement (Paper 3.4.5) focuses  
on strategic thinking application in dual sourcing by considering innova-
tion. In terms of future research direction, it would be necessary to inves-
tigate the possibility of applying strategic thinking in dual sourcing, where 
one of the suppliers assumes that the buyer is not the dominant customer. 
An example of this situation in industry is with computer fan suppliers. 
The fan is a critical component of the personal computer. If one buyer 
asks the suppliers to change the design by increasing the speed and reduc-
ing the power consumption of the fan, then the fan suppliers will not di-
rectly change the design without considering the contribution of the buyer 
to the suppliers’ market share. Thus, it is difficult to attract a stronger sup-
plier to maximize innovation. The possible solution is not only threats and 
promises, but also the commitment to use the fan in the entire product 
portfolio. The problem is that dual sourcing allows dual supplier applica-
tion simultaneously. This is the future research area that should be investi-
gated. 
3. The analytical model of information sharing in built to order supply chains 
(Paper 3.4.7) focuses  on symmetrical information sharing between two 
parties. In terms of future research direction, it would be necessary to in-
vestigate the possibility of applying strategic thinking in the model, where 
the supplier assumes that the buyer is not the dominant customer. Thus, it 
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is difficult to maintain information security in terms of the buyer’s plat-
form design, so that the issue of security can also be raised. This is a fu-
ture research area that should be investigated. 
4. Finally, in considering the “knowledge economy”, information sharing 
should be extended into what is called “knowledge sharing”. The differ-
ence is that in knowledge sharing, the role of supply chain integration is 
more dominant than supply chain coordination. Furthermore, in resource 
based competition, the capability to exploit knowledge inter-
organizationally is important for generating agility and enterprise interop-
erability.Knowledge sharing is not only capable of mitigating the bullwhip 
effect, but also makes time to market shorter and the product innovation 
level to increase significantly. 
These four future research directions would fulfill  the future needs of MC in 
general. Specifically, postponement strategies are becoming more applicable 
in MC by producing component commonality at a higher level and allowing 
information to flow freely along supply chains.   
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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies duopolistic competition under dynamic price and production 
quantity postponement for two differentiable products, which share common 
components from one supplier at a certain degree of substitution. Both price and 
quantity postponement is benchmarked according to the Bertrand and Cournot 
Stackelberg game. In addition, system dynamic is applied to show the long term 
effect of both strategic decisions (price and production quantity) on profit and 
against demand uncertainty. The results show that price postponement is appro-
priate for high modular products (make-to-stock) and production quantity post-
ponement for special orders (make-to-order). The final part of the paper con-
cludes the results and outlines future research directions.  
Keywords: Strategic Planning, Supply Chain Management, Game Theory, Mana-
gerial Flexibility, Market Share 
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INTRODUCTION 
Price and production capacity are two strategic decisions which product managers 
face over time. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) showed that if firms choose capaci-
ties before engaging in Bertrand-like price competition, then the Cournot outcome 
is the result if the given capacities are at Cournot levels, or they should be ra-
tioned when the capacity cannot meet market demand. Davidson and Doneckere 
(1986), however, argued against this investigation and showed that the alternative 
rationing rule can eliminate idle capacity because the players agree to compete at 
higher equilibrium capacity.  
Because the products undertaken by order-based firms are characterized by 
uniqueness, uncertainty and complexity, however, the Kreps and Scheinkman or 
Davidson and Doneckere rationing rules are difficult to apply to this type of firm. 
One reason is that order-based firms are different from mass production-based 
firms in many respects. These differences extend to their requirements with re-
spect to product substitutability because consumer preferences are diversified 
among the available brands (Perloff and Salop, 1985). Since a homogenous prod-
uct gives no options to consumers, most discussions of price or production post-
ponement focus on their appropriateness, depending on the single firm demand 
uncertainty (Fine and Freund, 1986, 1990; Miegham, 1998; Miegham and Dada, 
1999), while the product substitutability effect is often considered exogenous, so 
that such models may underestimate the benefit of production and price post-
ponement to mass customized products. 
The effectiveness of product substitutability degrees has been extensively studied 
in a large number of contributions (Spence, 1976; Singh and Vives, 1984; Katz 
and Shapiro, 1985; Perloff and Salop, 1985; Martin S, 1995; Colombo, 2002; 
Lambertini et al, 2004; Panchal et al, 2007). Some of them, for example Singh 
and Vives (1984), analyse the dominant strategy between price and quantity pre-
determined contract in a differentiated duopoly. On the other hand, Cellini and 
Lambertini (2002) and Lambertini and Mantovani (2004) investigated a long term 
join venture in Research and Development (R&D) to optimize the product differ-
entiation degree (hereafter called product substitutability degree) of cooperating 
and non-cooperating firms according to the competition, according to Cournot.   
With respect to previous efforts in product substitutability degree investigation, so 
far, few serious attempts have been made to investigate the effect of product sub-
stitability degree on price and production quantity dynamics instead of their val-
ues at any given of time. However, the dynamic property is important with regard 
to the optimum price and quantity postponement decision, at which every player 
has no reason to change his price or production quantity decision. Our effort in 
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this paper broadly follows Singh and Vives (1984), except that we take into ac-
count the possible effects of long term price and production quantity postpone-
ment strategic decision, resulting from the presence of product substitutability, as 
a result of common product platform application, and Dr. C.F Ross (1925) in 
terms of the possible effect of change in the rate of price and production quantity 
resulting from demand variety. In particular, unlike most of the existing literature 
on repeated games under product differentiation, we explicitly model those de-
mand uncertainty effects which affect firms’ production quantities as well as 
prices. 
In addition to recent literature, the open loop water tank analogy is a special case 
of price and production postponement for a continuous product substitutability 
distribution. This new approach is quite different to previous methods in the dif-
ferentiated duopoly game (Singh and Vives, 1984) or price and production post-
ponement (Fine and Freund, 1986, 1990; Miegham, 1998; Miegham and Dada, 
1999), where the decision is assumed to depend merely on the price or production 
quantity at any given time, without considering whether the price or production 
quantity is increasing or decreasing at this time. Even this new approach also 
quite different to Lambertini et al (2002), where competition is assumed under 
Cournot solely, without considering production quantity competition under the 
Bertrand game or impact of price postponement to capacity and flexible invest-
ment (Biller et al, 2006), where price postponement is used to balance between 
available supply and demand, without considering time the demand is increasing 
or decreasing at this time or Birge et al (1988) where price and capacity post-
ponement is used to substitutable product, without considering the demand vari-
ety. Indeed, in order to comprehend price and production quantity postponement 
application appropriately, we compare price and production quantity postpone-
ment in terms of their profitability at several product substitutability degrees and 
under varied demand. 
The following sections first introduce related literature on dynamic analysis in 
competition, product substitutability in duopoly competition and the research area 
of this paper (Related Literature Section). Methodology section is started by price 
postponement analysis using the Cournot game model, which continues with pro-
duction quantity postponement (hereafter called production postponement) by 
applying the Bertrand game model. Discussion section presents and discusses the 
simulation results, which are concluded in Conclusion and further research, which 
explores the information behind the simulation results in the previous section and 
discusses some future research opportunities.  
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RELATED LITERATURE  
Dynamic analysis in competition was firstly presented by Dr. C.F Ross (1925) 
and it was rediscussed further by Smithies and Savage (1940). Dynamic analysis 
was used to represent a decision maker who intends to plan his capacity in ad-
vance according to the present situation. It is clear that production capacity needs 
long term planning and the paper addresses a problem of two competitors adapt-
ing to a new demand function with the goal of profit stability in the future. In con-
trast, Dudey (1992) argues against both papers by introducing dynamic edge-
worth-bertrand competition in order to solve dynamic competition under capacity 
constraint, which causes Nash equilibrium inexistance. The Dudey model as-
sumes that customers come to the market at different times and the firm's price 
can be reset at any time with an opportunity that at least one of the duopolists can 
sell all the units it is able to produce. When this game is a duopoly, the payoff 
function of each firm maps the duopolists' strategy choices into the firm's total 
expected profit. Even though the Dudey model used dynamic pricing, this model 
presents price as a short term decision, which can be changed at any time. How-
ever, our model posits price and production quantity as two strategic decisions, 
which are fixed at a certain finite time in order to handle demand change.  
Similar to the approaches of Smithies and Savage (1940) or Dudey (1992) on 
price and quantity, Singh and Vives (1984) focus their analysis on flexible capac-
ity / price appropriateness to hedge against predetermined price/quantity con-
tracts. Their analysis adapts to a new demand or price after making a price or de-
livery quantity contract formerly under the absence or presence of product substi-
tutability degree. In contrast to that paper, we contribute to this literature by add-
ing dynamic behavior onto the Singh and Vives (1984) duopoly model by analyz-
ing the impact of demand uncertainty on the firm´s profitability by applying dy-
namic price or production quantity postponement strategy. In particular, the 
Cournot duopoly model (Singh and Vives, 1984) is a special case of price post-
ponement and the Bertrand duopoly model a special case of production post-
ponement. In conclusion, our contribution is focused on the dynamic analysis of 
the Singh and Vives model (1984). With a different objective to the Smithies and 
Savage (1940) or Dudey (1940) models, this paper uses dynamic analysis to in-
vestigate the price and production quantity postponement effect on supply chain 
profit.  
METHODOLOGY 
Suppose now that two firms can agree on only two types of contracts: the price 
contract and quantity contract. Singh and Vives (1984) use predetermined price or 
quantity to supply customer demand at any levels. From this point on, we refer 
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our discussion on price postponement as make-to-stock and production post-
ponement as make-to-order. The reasons are that the price postponement manu-
facturer holds inventory at his final manufacturing stage and the price is deter-
mined after customer demand (hereafter called production quantity) is known, 
while the production quantity postponement manufacturer never produces any 
products before an exact order specification based price is known. To focus the 
discussion, this paper uses Singh and Vives demands and their reverse function 
by assuming that both products are perfect substitutes. The effects of this assump-
tion are products having a sticky price and quantity, which enforces equal cost 
application. Sticky price and quantity in this case are a situation where both 
duopolists have no reason to change their decisions on price or production quan-
tity. To gather general understanding for this concept, both postponement con-
cepts will be discussed separately and then the general concept will be developed. 
Beforehand, some notations are introduced to guide the following discussion. 
Notations 
 Equilibrium quantity  
 Retailer 1 price   
 Retailer 2 price  
 Retailer 1 quantity 
 Retailer 1 quantity 
 Supplier price 
 Product substitutability degree 
 Maximum price 
 Retailer 1 and 2 total production capacity 
 Supply chain profit according to the Cournot game 
 Supply chain profit according to the Bertrand game 
 
Model Description for Price Postponement 
In this model we consider a Cournot duopoly model (see Cournot, 1960; Gibbons 
1992) with price function for retailers given by  
     (1) 
Where is total production quantity from both retailers (retailer 1 and 2). In the 
Cournot game firms choose their own quantity to maximize their profit by taking 
their opponent’s quantity as a given, and in the Bertrand game they choose their 
price to maximize their profit by taking their opponent’s price as a given. This 
66      Acta Wasaensia 
 
means that they are going to sacrifice price in the Cournot game and quantity in 
the Bertrand game. We thus propose a methodology to avoid price sacrifice by 
applying the Dynamic Stackelberg game just after a predetermined quantity or 
price game. 
To illustrate, we suppose two firms can make two types of contracts, namely price 
and quantity contracts. If the firms choose price postponement, then they must 
hedge against production fluctuation as a result of demand uncertainty. If the 
firms choose production quantity postponement, then they must hedge against 
price fluctuation. Firms first choose what type of contract and afterwards they 
compete on the chosen type of contracts by considering selling and material 
prices. Restricting attention to the subgame perfect of this two stage game, we 
shall see that if firms choose price postponement, then predetermined quantity is 
used to optimize the selling price, where it is finally used by the supplier to opti-
mize his material price. Both retailers do not have any benefits by shifting from 
their optimum point, while the supplier also does not have any reasons to threaten 
retailers. From this point on, the game is started from stage 2, where both retailers 
decide their capacity. 
Stage 2 Retailers decide their capacity according to the Cournot game 
In this stage retailers 1 and 2 simultaneously choose production quantity to 
maximize their profit, taking supplier price (c) as a given. That is, maxi-
mize , where  is a function of c, derived from profit equation below 
 
    (2) 
By assuming equal costs function (c) and incorporating a degree of product sub-
stitability (), so (2) can be modified according to Cournot duopoly inversion (see 
Singh and Vives, 1984) as follows  
 
  (3) 
The first order condition (FOC) for supplier-1 is then 
    (4) 
Similarly, the FOC for supplier-2 is 
    (5) 
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We can solve (4) and (5) simultaneously to be 
 q2 = q1 =
1  2( )
a. 1 2.( )
1+ ( )
 c. 1 2.( )
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 4. 2
   (6) 
We see it slope down for the increasing of material price (c). This relationship 
also supports the subgame perfect principle with both retailers taking the material 
price as given and at the same time the supplier maximizes his profit by taking the 
retailer´s order quantity as given.  
Since two-stage games can solve only individual contracts,, this game uses pro-
duction quantity and price contracts consecutively. The reason is we assume that 
the products are perfect substitutes. We shall use this upcoming section to make 
price contracts for both retailers.   
Stage 1 price decision 
Singh and Vives (1984) use a two-stage game, in which the firm will have to sup-
ply the amount the consumers demand at a predetermined price or quantity. This 
paper applies a similar principle to Singh and Vives (1984), except that we take 
into account the price or quantity at infinite time in order to optimize the post-
poned decision resulting from the presence of long term price or production quan-
tity contract. Different to the Stackelberg game of Ferstman and Kamien (1987) 
,Fujiwara (2006) or Clemhout et al (1971), this stage is developed by using time 
and Laplace domain dynamics, which describes price or quantity response against 
production quantity or price contract decision. These approaches describe a natu-
ral response instead of optimal setting, even though we can guarantee their opti-
mality by assigning optimal production or price quantity. This approach is de-
scribed as follows 
 p
.
t( ) =
a
1+ 
 1
1  2
q1 

1  2
q2  p t( )
 
  
 
  
;
 
(7) 
By assuming sticky quantity and prices, then (7) can be reformulated as 
 p
.
t( ) =
a
1+ 
 1+ 
1  2
q  p t( )
 
  
 
  
   (8) 
Equation (8) describes price dynamics, which is caused by quantity decision. This 
paper uses the analogy of water level in a tank: for instance, if production quan-
tity is increased then price is automatically reduced. The same case applies in a 
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water tank: if the water outflow is increased then the tank level is automatically 
reduced.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 is taken from waterflow analogy. Inflow describes a steady state quantity 
and it is assumed to be constant. Outflow describes the actual demand and it is 
assumed to be dynamic. The price decision naturally follows according to de-
mand. We can rearrange (8) according to  
    (9) 
Equation (9) is a first order price dynamics. By manipulating it into time domain 
price dynamics, Laplace domain price dynamics is obtained as follows 
 p s( )
q s( )
=
 1+ ( )
s+1( ) 1  2( )
    (10) 
Equation (10) is formed by excluding in (9) and a step response (1/s), 
which represents demand variety, can be attached to (10) so that we 
have p s( )
q s( )
=
 1+ ( )
s. s+1( ) 1  2( )
. This Laplace domain is finally converted to time domain 
price dynamics as follows 
 p t( ) =
a
1+ 
 1+ 1+ ( )
1  2
.e.t
 
 
 
 
 
 .q t( )   (11) 
At a steady state, the price function can be simplified to be p =
a
1+ 
 .q 
The result of equation (10) is used by the supplier to set his selling price to retail-
ers as the following relationship 
Figure 1 Dynamic Price Postponement 
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 max
c
b  p1 + p2( ).c     (12) 
By combining (6) and (12) then we have 
max
c
b +  1( ) a
1+ 
 .
1  2( )
a. 1 2.( )
1+ ( )
 c. 1 2.( )
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 4. 2
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
.c    (13) 
c =
1 4. 2
2 1 2.( ) 1  2( )
1  2( )
a. 1 2.( )
1+ ( )
1 4. 2( )
+ 1 ( ) a
1+ 
 b
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.  (14) 
Equation (14) describes a strong relationship among product substitutability (), 
retailer´s quantity and supplier price setting. We can see that supplier price is a 
concave function of product substitutability ().  
Model Description for Production Postponement 
Consider a Bertrand duopoly model with price function (see Gibbon, 2002) for 
retailers given by  
 Q = b  pi +  .p j     (15) 
Where and is price of product 1 and 2.  
In the Bertrand game firms choose their own price to maximize their profit by 
taking their opponent’s price as a given. We thus propose a methodology which is 
similar to the previous Cournot game, except that we take into account the quan-
tity at infinite time in order to optimize the postponed decision resulting from the 
presence of long term price contract. 
This game decides the equilibrium price first before capacity and it can be de-
scribed as follows 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Dynamic Production Postponement 
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Figure 2 is taken from waterflow analogy. Inflow describes a steady price state 
and it is assumed to be constant. The managerial price related decision is located 
at the output and it is assumed to be dynamic. Quantity automatically follows, 
whatever the price pattern, as the water level is also controlled by its flow in a 
storage tank. These two situations are identical to one another.  
Stage 2 Retailers decide their price according to the Bertrand game 
In this stage, retailers 1 and 2 simultaneously choose the product price to maxi-
mize their profit, taking the supplier price (c) as given. That is, maxi-
mize , where  is a function of c, derived from the profit equation below 
 max
p1
b  p1 +  .p2( ) p1  c( )    (16) 
The first order condition is 
 b  2p1 +  .p2 + c = 0     (17) 
Similarly, the FOC from the second product variant is 
 b  2p2 +  .p1 + c = 0     (18) 
Solving these two equations simultaneously, one obtains  
 P2 = P1 =
 + 2( ) c + b( )
4   2( )
    (19) 
We see it slope up for the increasing of material price (c). This relationship sup-
ports the Bertrand principle, where both retailers and suppliers maximize the price 
by sacrificing production quantity.  
Since two-stage games can solve only an individual contract, this game uses 
product price and quantity contracts consecutively. The reason is we assume that 
the products are perfect substitutes.  
Stage 1 Leader decides his own profit function 
At the first stage we can find the material price by optimizing supplier profit func-
tion as 
 max
c
b  p1 + p2( ).c     (20) 
Find c by insert (19) into (20), so we get 
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 max
c
b +  1( )
 .c +  .a + 2.c + 2.a( )
4   2( )
 
 
  
 
 
  .c    (21) 
 c =
4 +   2( ).b
1 ( ) 2. + 4( )
    (22) 
Equation (21) describes a strong relationship among product substitutability (), 
retailer quantity and supplier price setting. We can see that supplier price is a 
concave function of product substitutability (). We shall use this upcoming sec-
tion to make a quantity contract for both retailers.   
Capacity decision  
In the same manner as price postponement, quantity postponement uses time and 
Laplace domain dynamics as follows  
 q
.
t( ) = b  p1 +  .p2  q t( )( ) ; p 0( ) = p0  (23) 
Equation (23) describes quantity dynamics, which is caused by pricing decision. 
This paper uses the analogy of water level in a tank as well as the price post-
ponement model (see Figure 2) 
By assuming sticky price and quantity, then (23) can be rewritten as 
 q
.
t( )  q t( ) = b  1 ( )p( )   (24) 
Equation (24) is a first order price dynamics, which describes firm effort to 
achieve optimum production quantity level against pricing strategy. By manipu-
lating it into time domain price dynamics, Laplace domain price dynamics is ob-
tained as follows 
  q s( )
p s( )
=
 1 ( )
s+1( )
    (25) 
Equation (25) is formed by excluding in (24) and a step response (1/s), which 
represents demand variety, can be attached to (25) so that we have q s( )
p s( )
=
 1 ( )
s. s+1( )
. 
This Laplace domain is finally converted to time domain quantity dynamics by 
incorporating as follows 
 q t( ) = b  1+
1
1 
.ek.t
 
  
 
  
.p t( )    (26) 
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Equation (26) is a quantity postponement as a result of price predetermined con-
tract. 
DISCUSSION 
Studies on price and production postponement have been able to shed light on the 
supply chain as a dynamic system. In addition, they have underscored the impor-
tance of such long term stability as values, meanings and commitments and paved 
the way for more elaborate research on interface between supply chain and reve-
nue management. 
What happens if both firms choose the price contract? In that case firms choose 
production quantity to maximize their profit, taking as given. This yields the 
profit reaction which corresponds to the Bertrand reaction. Notice that it is 
downward sloping for the increasing of product substitutability degree. The re-
verse action is shown for production quantity contract, where firms choose price 
to maximize profit. These discrepancies inform us that price postponement is an 
appropriate choice for higher substitutability degree (see Figure 3).    
 
 
To examine the case with erratic demands, suppose firms strictly predetermine 
their price or quantity settings, which is strictly revised in their profitability. Now 
if we randomize or value to represent demand variety, then we get 
or as a function of , and ; hence, the results can be drawn as follows 
Figure 3 Profit from price and production postponement as a function of prod-
uct substitutability degrees 
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Figure 4 and 5 clearly show that price postponement is more stable at varied de-
mands, which also shows further that price postponement gives higher stability at 
higher product substitutability degrees. These results again ensure that price post-
ponement reaction is appropriate at higher compatible products.  
Figure 4 Profit dynamics at =0,1 for price and production postpone-
Figure 5 Profit dynamics at =0,9 for price and production postponement  
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We know that profit stability is a common goal of price and production quantity 
contracts. High profit stability ensures two firms can cooperate without worrying 
about any losses. Below is a comparison between two postponement types, which 
is gathered by finding profit at different price or quantity settings. Now if we 
measure their deviation from optimum profit value (replace or by our own 
assumption), then we get or as a function of , and . Benchmarking 
them against optimal value, the results can be exhibited as figure 6 below 
 
 
In addition to the managerial implication, price postponement is also significantly 
superior to production postponement from the customer service level point of 
view (see Figure 7). That figure shows that price postponement can cover market 
demand at a higher level than production postponement. This result supports the 
managerial policy of product commonality, where price can be determined later 
after final customization is completed.   
 
Figure 6 Profit deviation at =0,1 and 0,9 for price and production postponement  
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What happens if demand pattern is smoothed? In that case, firms choose produc-
tion postponement to maximize their profit, taking as given (see Figure 8).  
Furthermore, price postponement is still superior over production postponement 
at a higher product substitutability degree. This result once more supports the 
view that make-to-order (production postponement) is only appropriate to highly 
unique products. The reverse result is shown for price postponement, where firms 
develop a common platform to maximize profit. Those discrepancies also inform 
us that price postponement is an appropriate choice for higher substitutability de-
gree.    
Figure 7 Service level at different postponement types 
Figure 8 Profit level at smooth demand pattern 
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CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This paper revisited the Singh and Vives model on price and production post-
ponement by considering the dynamic behavior of demands. We may summarize 
the results derived from the model, as follows. 
1. Price postponement is superior to production postponement at many respects. 
This type of contract guarantees profit stability and at the same time supports the 
product standardization effort 
2. Price postponement is also a dominant strategy for substitutable products. This 
conclusion is at odds with the previous Singh and Vives conclusion (Singh and 
Vives, 1984). This discrepancy is caused by the Singh and Vives model perhaps 
assuming that in Bertrand price-like competition, the quantity setting will avoid 
both firms having to reduce their production quantity further. On the contrary, this 
paper assumes sticky prices and quantities, where it pushes both firms to cooper-
ate at higher levels. By sticky prices and quantities, this paper is more appropriate 
for common platform based products instead of two widely differentiated prod-
ucts.  
3. Production quantity postponement (make-to-order) is a dominant strategy for 
highly differentiable products. This conclusion supports the article of Miegham 
and Dada (1999), who discusses postponement strategies differentiation accord-
ing to their applicability.  
The dynamic behavior analysis in this paper helps decision makers to decide their 
long term postponement policy with regard to their manufacturing types, namely 
make-to-stock or make-to-order. The analysis results also support both modularity 
and customization principles in mass customized products, where decision uncer-
tainty can be reduced by making closer customer order decoupling, point to sales 
point. This paper suggests that product developers design common platform 
products and decide the price according to customer specific requirements.  
In terms of future research direction, the oligopoly model should be considered 
for development according to future market demand, which is determined by how 
close customer requirements are met, so in future the oligopoly model quantity 
and price can be replaced with some parameters such as inventory and lead times. 
From this result, a sequence between lead times and inventory can be determined 
and the outcome will be a decision about whether agility or efficiency is more 
important for a company, so that the outcome can be used by top management to 
compose their business strategy. Finally, future research should accommodate 
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strategic and tactical level alignment in order to develop comprehensive decision 
analysis. 
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Abstract 
This paper studies assembly-to-order (form postponement) and make-to-stock 
(time postponement) duopolistic competition under dynamic price and production 
strategies for two differentiable products, which share common components at a 
certain degree of substitution. Both strategies are benchmarked according to the 
Bertrand and Cournot Stackelberg game. In addition, dynamic game is applied to 
show the long term effect of both strategic decisions (price and production quan-
tity) on profit and against demand uncertainty. The results show that precommited 
production is appropriate for high modular products and precommited price for 
special orders. The final part of the paper concludes the results and outlines future 
research directions.  
Keywords: Strategic Planning, Supply Chain Management, Game Theory, Mana-
gerial Flexibility, Market Share, Collaborative Agents 
____________________ 
Re-printed with permission of Operations and Supply Chain Management. 
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1.  Introduction  
Price and production capacity are two strategic decisions which product managers 
face over time. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) showed that if firms choose capaci-
ties before engaging in Bertrand-like price competition, then the Cournot outcome 
is the result if the given capacities are at Cournot levels, or they should be ra-
tioned when the capacity cannot meet market demand. Davidson and Doneckere 
(1986), however, argued against this investigation and showed that the alternative 
rationing rule can eliminate idle capacity because the players agree to compete at 
higher equilibrium capacity.  
Because the products undertaken by order-based firms are characterized by 
uniqueness, uncertainty and complexity, however, the Kreps and Scheinkman or 
Davidson and Doneckere rationing rules are difficult to apply to this type of firm. 
One reason is that order-based firms are different from mass production-based 
firms in many respects. These differences extend to their requirements with re-
spect to product proliferation because consumer preferences are diversified 
among the available brands (Perloff and Salop, 1985). Since a homogenous prod-
uct gives no options to consumers and diminish brand loyalty (Klemperer, 1992), 
most discussions of price or production decision focus on their appropriateness, 
depending on the single firm demand uncertainty (Miegham and Dada, 1999), 
while the cooperation between make-to-stock and make-to-order based firm is 
often considered exogenous (Alptekinoglu and Corbett, 2005), so that such mod-
els may underestimate the benefit of product substitutability to represent prod-
uct’s customization (Singh and Vives, 1984; Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Perloff and 
Salop, 1985; Martin S, 1995; Lambertini et al, 2004; Panchal et al, 2007).  
With respect to previous efforts in mass customization investigation, so far, few 
serious attempts have been made to investigate the effect of product substitability 
degree on make-to-stock and assembly-to-order cooperation by considering the 
price and production quantity dynamics instead of their values at any given of 
times. However, the dynamic property is important with regard to the optimum 
price and quantity decision, at which every player has no reason to change his 
price or production quantity decision. Our effort in this paper broadly follows 
Singh and Vives (1984), except that we take into account the possible effects of 
long term price and production quantity strategic decision, resulting from the 
presence of order based and stock based firms, and Dr. C.F Ross (1925) in terms 
of the possible effect of change in the rate of price and production quantity result-
ing from demand variety. In particular, unlike most of the existing literature on 
repeated games under product differentiation, we explicitly model those demand 
uncertainty effects which affect firms’ production quantities as well as prices. 
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In addition to recent literature, the make-to-stock versus make-to-order are repre-
sented by two firms is a special case of time and form postponement for a con-
tinuous product substitutability distribution. This new approach is quite different 
to previous methods in the differentiated duopoly game (Singh and Vives, 1984) 
or price and production postponement (Miegham and Dada, 1999), where the 
decision is assumed to depend merely on the price or production quantity at any 
given time, without considering whether the price or production quantity is in-
creasing or decreasing at this time. Even this new approach also quite different to 
Miegham and Dada (1999), in the light of production and holding costs are as-
sumed under make-to-order or make-to-stock solely, without considering their 
coexistence under the same product line. Indeed, in order to comprehend price 
and production contract application to time and form postponement appropriately, 
we compare Cournot and Bertrand competition in terms of their profitability at 
several product substitutability degrees and under varied demand. 
The following sections first introduce related literature on dynamic analysis in 
competition, product substitutability in duopoly competition and the research area 
of this paper (Section 2). Section 3 is started with price (quantity) contract analy-
sis by using the Cournot game model (Section 3.1), which continues with quantity 
(price) by applying the Bertrand game model (Section 3.2). Section 4 presents and 
discusses the simulation results, which are concluded in Section 5, which explores 
the information behind the simulation results in the previous section and discusses 
some future research opportunities.  
2. Related Literatures  
Dynamic analysis in competition was firstly presented by Dr. C.F Ross (1925) 
and it was rediscussed further by Smithies and Savage (1940). Dynamic analysis 
was used to represent a decision maker who intends to plan his capacity in ad-
vance according to the present situation. It is clear that production capacity needs 
long term planning and the paper addresses a problem of two competitors adapt-
ing to a new demand function with the goal of profit stability in the future. In con-
trast, Dudey (1992) argues against both papers by introducing dynamic Edge-
worth-Bertrand competition in order to solve dynamic competition under capacity 
constraint, which causes Nash equilibrium inexistance. The Dudey model as-
sumes that customers come to the market at different times and the firm's price 
can be reset at any time with an opportunity that at least one of the duopolists can 
sell all the units it is able to produce. When this game is a duopoly, the payoff 
function of each firm maps the duopolists' strategy choices into the firm's total 
expected profit. Even though the Dudey model used dynamic pricing, this model 
presents price as a short term decision, which can be changed at any time. How-
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ever, our model posits price and production quantity as two strategic decisions, 
which are fixed at a certain finite time in order to handle demand change.  
Similar to the approaches of Smithies and Savage (1940) or Dudey (1992) on 
price and quantity, Singh and Vives (1984) focus their analysis on flexible capac-
ity / price appropriateness to hedge against predetermined price/quantity con-
tracts. Their analysis adapts to a new demand or price after making a price or de-
livery quantity contract formerly under the absence or presence of product substi-
tutability degree. In contrast to that paper, we contribute to this literature by add-
ing dynamic behavior onto the Singh and Vives (1984) duopoly model by analyz-
ing the impact of demand uncertainty on the firm´s profitability by applying dy-
namic price or production quantity strategy, which also covers assembly-to-order 
and make-to-stock firm, which have quantity based total costs instead of marginal 
cost, according to Cournot or Bertrand. In particular, the Cournot duopoly model 
(Singh and Vives, 1984) is a special case of price contract and the Bertrand 
duopoly model a special case of production contract. In conclusion, our contribu-
tion is focused on the dynamic analysis of the Singh and Vives model (1984). 
With a different objective to the Smithies and Savage (1940) or Dudey (1940) 
models, this paper uses dynamic analysis to investigate the price and production 
quantity postponement effect on supply chain profit.  
3. Introduction to Analytical Model 
Suppose now that two firms must agree on two types of contracts: the price con-
tract and quantity contract. Different to Singh and Vives (1984) use predeter-
mined price or quantity to supply customer demand at any levels, our model uses 
both types of contracts to maximize supply chain profit. To focus discussion, this 
paper uses Singh and Vives demands and its reverse function by assuming that 
both products are perfectly substitutes. Effects of this assumption are products 
have a sticky price and quantity, which enforces both firms to make long term 
plan for their price and quantity decision. Both firms however are operated under 
two different manufacturing strategies, namely make-to-stock (time postpone-
ment) and assembly-to-order (form postponement). To gather general understand-
ing for dynamic concept for long term price and quantity strategic decision, both 
time and form postponement will be discussed separately according to static and 
dynamic games and then general concept will be developed.  
3.1 Model Description for Dynamic Cournot Game 
In this model we consider a Cournot duopoly model (see Gibbons 1992) with 
price function for retailers given by  
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 P(Q) = a Q (1) 
Where is total production quantity from both retailers (retailer 1 and 2), is 
maximum acceptable market price. In Cournot game firms choose their own 
quantity to maximize their profit by taking their opponent’s quantity as a given, 
and in Bertrand game they choose their price to maximize their profit by taking 
their opponent’s price as a given. This means that they are going to sacrifice price 
in Cournot game and quantity in Bertrand game. We propose thus a methodology 
to avoid this kind of sacrifice by applying Dynamic Stackelberg game just after 
quantity has been determined. 
To illustrate, we suppose two firms must make two types of contracts, namely 
price and quantity contracts. If the firms choose form postponement, then they 
must hedge against production fluctuation as a result of demand uncertainty. In 
this paper, leader firm chooses time postponement and follower firm chooses 
form postponement. Firms first choose quantity contract and afterwards they 
compete on the chosen quantities by considering selling and material prices. Re-
stricting attention to the subgame perfect of this two stage game, we shall see that 
if leader firm chooses time postponement, then predetermined quantity is used to 
optimize follower firm quantity, where it is finally used by the both firms to op-
timize their selling price and production quantity. Both firms do not have any 
benefits by shifting from their optimum point. From this point on, the game is 
started from stage 2, where both retailers decide their capacity. 
In this modeling, we define total costs for both of time postponement and form 
postponement as  
 E(CFP ) = h2 2( ).q2 + CP .q2 LT + CW .L + Cmq2 (2) 
and     
 E(CTP ) = CO .q1 + h1
q1
2
+ Cpur .q1 (3) 
Equation (2) and (3) represent the follower firm (Form Postponement) and the 
leader firm (Time Postponement) costs function. Follower costs function as a 
function of its production quantity describes that products assembled by putting 
material inventory (h2) and production cost (CP), which is restricted by limited 
allowable order queue cost (CW), delivery lead times LT, and purchased material 
order (Cm). On the other hand, leader firm cost function as a function of its pro-
duction quantity describes leader reserves customers by putting inventory of 
ready made products in his show-room (h1), which is ordered from his supplier at 
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cost CO/item and purchased at CPur/item. Symmetric information is assumed in 
this modeling in order to show contract visibility instead of that the products are 
produced by the same manufacturer.  
Stage 2: Quantity contract optimization 
In this stage follower firm chooses production quantity to maximize his profit, 
taking leader firm quantity (q1) as given. That is, maximize q2 = f q1( ) , derived from 
profit equation below   
 Max
q2
= a  q1  q2  E C( )( )q2   (4) 
Expected costs E(c) in (4) can be reffered to (2) as equation (4) is a form post-
ponement profit optimization. Furthermore, demand inter-arrival rate and process-
ing rate is assumed according to M/M/1 queue model and total customers in the 
system can be intrepretated as 
 L =

1 
 (5) 
Where is FP service utilization as a function of FP production rate and cus-
tomer demand rates . That equation informs us about whether there is a de-
lay/backorder or not in our order. Compete equation for form postponement total 
costs is composed by incorporating (5) into (2) as follow 
 E(C) = Cm +
h2
2
 
  
 
  
q2
2
+ CP .μ + CW

1 
 (6) 
By combining (4) and (6) and incorporating degree of product substitability () so 
(4) can be modified according to Cournot duopoly inversion (see Singh and 
Vives, 1984) as follow  
 Max 2
q2
=
a
1+ 
 1
1  2
q1 

1  2
q2 
CP
LT2
+ Cm +
h2
2
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 q2( )  CW

1 
 
  
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  
 (7) 
Equation (7) can be optimized against q2 by finding its first order condition. Thus, 
its production quantity can be founded as 
 q2 =
1  2( )
a
1+ 
 q1
1  2
 CP
LT2
+ Cm +
h2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.
 (8) 
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Equation (8) represents form postponement production quantity by considering 
leader firm production quantity as given. We see it slope down for the increasing 
of q1.  
Since two stage games can solve only individual contract, on the contrary, this 
game uses production quantity and price contracts consecutively. The reason is 
we assume that the products are perfectly substitutes. We shall use this upcoming 
section to make price contract for both firms.   
Stage 1 Price contract optimization  
Singh and Vives (1984) use two stages game, which firm will have to supply the 
amount the consumers demand at a predetermined price or quantity. This paper 
applies similar principle as Singh and Vives (1984) except that we take into ac-
count both the price and quantity at infinite time in order to optimize supply chain 
profitability resulting from the presence of long term price and production quan-
tity contract. Different to Stackelberg game of Ferstman and Kamien (1987) and 
Fujiwara (2006), this stage is developed by finding best price response against 
production quantity decision, which is resulted from Cournot quantity game. This 
approach avoids price sacrifice as it is naturally shown by Cournot quantity game 
and it is shown as follow 
 p
.
t( ) = s a  q1  q2  p t( )( ) ; s > 0 ; p 0( ) = p0 (9) 
In equation (9) we recognize s as speed of price to go to its optimal value. This 
speed represents how much time is needed by both firms to negotiate their price 
contract. This notation finally become insignificant when such a negotiation is 
done at infinite due date, which both firms are assumed have enough time to ana-
lyze their decision. Equation (9) shows how important long term consideration on 
strategic decision such as price and quantity.   
By assuming sticky quantity and prices, then (9) can be reformulated by inserting 
(8) into (9). Then, a current-value Hamiltonian can be founded as 
 
p
.
1 t( ) = s
a
1+ 
 q1
2 1  2( )

a
1+ 
 CP
LT2
+ Cm +
h2
2
 
 
 
 
 
	 
 
 
 
 
 
	 
2
 p1
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
	 
	 
	 
	 	 
 (10) 
To solve (10), let us set up a current-value Hamiltonian as 
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 H = p1  CO +
h1
2
+ CPur
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
q1 + s p1
.
 (11) 
S.t (10) ,q1 t( )  0,q2 t( )  0  
Where is per unit change of objective function max p( )( ) for a small change 
in . At the following derivation we will recognize  as a compound factor, 
which represents how much penalty cost must be given each time both firms re-
peat their contract negotiation. This assumption is used to force both firms to 
achieve a contract aggrement as soon as possible. However, this notation finally 
become insignificant when such a negotiation is done at infinite due date, which 
both firms are assumed have enough time to analyze their decision. We can prove 
this insignificancy at the following derivation.   
 H
q1
= p1  CO +
h1
2
+ CPur
 
 	 
 
 
 
 
 	 
 
 
 
 .s
2 1  2( )
= 0 (12) 
 1
.
= .1 
.
H
p
= 1 .+ .s( )  q1 = 0  (13) 
Steady state price can be found from (12) and (13) by setting time as infinite 
( ) 
 lim
s
p1 = CO +
h1
2
+ CPur
 
 	 
 
 
 
+
q1
2 1  2( )
 (14)
  
By inserting (8) into Cournot duopoly inversion, then can be reformulated as 
 p1 =
a
1+ 
 q1
2 1  2( )

a
1+ 
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LT2
+ Cm +
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2
 
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 
 
 
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2
 (15) 
Solve (14) and (15) simultaneously and finally leader optimum price and quantity 
can be stated as 
 q1 = 1  2( )
a
1+ 

a
1+ 
 CP
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h2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 CO +
h1
2
+ CPur
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  (16) 
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With the same way, could be obtained as  
 p2 =
CP
LT2
+ Cm +
h2
2
 
 
 
 
 
  (17) 
 
3.2 Model Description for Dynamic Betrand Game 
In this model we consider a Cournot duopoly model (see Gibbons 1992) with 
price function for retailers given by  
 Q = b  pi +  .p j  (18) 
Where is total production quantity from both retailers (retailer 1 and 2), is 
total market size, and and is price of product 1 and 2.  
In the Bertrand game both firms choose their own price to maximize their profit 
simultaneously by taking product substitutability degree as a given. We thus pro-
pose a methodology which is similar to the previous Cournot game, except that 
we take into account the quantity at infinite time in order to optimize the post-
poned decision resulting from the presence of long term quantity contract. 
Since two-stage games can solve only an individual contract, this game uses 
product price and quantity contracts consecutively. The reason is we assume that 
the products are perfect substitutes.  
Stage 2 Follower decide his price according to leader price 
 max
p2
b  p2 +  .p1( ) p2 
h2
2
+
CP
LT
+ Cm
 
  
 
  
q2 CW .L
 
  
 
  
 (19) 
Solving that equation for and by finding relationship of , one 
can obtain 
 p2 =
h2
2
+
CP
LT
+ Cm +1
 
  
 
  
. b +  .p1( ) + CW .L
2 +
h2
2
+
CP
LT
+ Cm
 
  
 
  
 (20) 
Stage 2 explores price equilibrium between two buyers. This equation shows ef-
fort to maximize standard platform utilization by increasing product substitutabil-
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ity value. Furthermore both prices are used to decide production quantity as fol-
low 
Stage 1 Capacity postponement decision  
Singh and Vives (1984) use two stages game, which firm will have to supply the 
amount the consumers demand at a predetermined price or quantity. This paper 
applies similar principle as Singh and Vives (1984) except that we take into ac-
count both the price and quantity at infinite time in order to optimize supply chain 
profitability resulting from the presence of long term price and production quan-
tity contract. Different to Stackelberg game of Ferstman and Kamien (1987) and 
Fujiwara (2006), this stage is developed by finding best price response against 
price decision, which is resulted from Bertrand pricing game and it is shown as 
follow 
 q
.
t( ) = s q  q t( )( ) ; s > 0 ;q 0( ) = q0 (21) 
In equation (21) we recognize s as speed of quantity to go to its optimal value. 
This speed represents how much time is needed by both firms to negotiate their 
quantity contract. This notation finally become insignificant when such a negotia-
tion is done at infinite due date, which both firms are assumed have enough time 
to analyze their decision. Equation (21) shows how important long term consid-
eration on strategic decision such as price and quantity.  
To solve (21), let us set up a current-value Hamiltonian as 
 H1 = q1.p1 + 1s a  p1 +  .p2  q1( ) (22) 
S.t (21), q t( )  0,  
Where is per unit change of objective function max q( )( )  for a small change in 
q t( ) . At the following derivation we will recognize   as a compound factor, 
which represents how much penalty cost must be given each time both firms re-
peat their contract negotiation. Similar to Dynamic Cournot game, leader opti-
mum price and quantity can be stated  
 p2 =
b +  .p1 +
h2
2
+
CP
LT
+ Cm
 
  
 
  
.q2 + CW .L
 
  
 
  
2
 (23) 
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 q2 = b 
h2
2
+
CP
LT
+ Cm +1
 
  
 
  
. b +  .p1( ) + CW .L
2 +
h2
2
+
CP
LT
+ Cm
 
  
 
  
+  .p1 (24) 
We can see that equilibrium quantity and price is a concave function of product 
substitability (). In conclusion, this parameter gives positive impact to supplier-
buyer join product development since the increasing of substitutability degree 
also increases supply chain profitability. 
Below, Static Cournot and Bertrand game are given to illustrate the advantage of 
dynamic Cournot and Bertrand Stackelberg games as follow.  
 
3.3 Static Cournot and Bertrand Game 
3.3.1 Static Cournot Game 
In this section, a static Cournot Stackelberg game is derived in order to compare 
with the above dynamic Cournot Stackelberg game. Let us start it by utilizing 
equation (8) into (3) as follow 
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By optimizing (25) then we find as 
 q1 = 1  2( ) a 
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(26) 
Insert (8) and (26) into Cournot duopoly inversion (see Singh and Vives, 1986) 
the and are simply calculated according to  
 P1 =
a
1+ 
 1
1  2
q1 

1  2
q2 (27) 
 P2 =
a
1+ 
 
1  2
q1 
1
1  2
q2  (28) 
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3.3.2 Static Bertrand Game 
In this section, a static Cournot Stackelberg game is derived in order to compare 
with the above dynamic Stackelberg game. Let us start it by utilizing equation (8) 
into (4) as follow 
Max1
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= b + 
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By optimizing (29) for , one obtains 
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 (30) 
Insert (30) into (20) and use both of them into (8), then, and are simply cal-
culated according to  
 q1 = b  p1 +  .p2  (31) 
 q2 = b  p2 +  .p1 (32) 
 
4. Discussion   
Studies on time and form postponement have been able to shed light on the sup-
ply chain as a dynamic system. In addition, they have underscored the importance 
of such long term stability as values, meanings and commitments and paved the 
way for more elaborate research on interface between supply chain and revenue 
management. 
What happens if both firms incorporate the long term pricing decision while ap-
plying time and form postponement at different game strategies? In that case both 
firms choose price to maximize their profit, taking as given. This yields the 
profit reaction which corresponds to the Cournot reaction. Notice that it is down-
ward sloping for the increasing of product substitutability degree (see figure 1). 
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The similar action is shown for static Cournot Stackelberg game, where firms 
choose price to maximize profit. We can see from these two kinds of games that 
dynamic game has higher profit level than static ones. That discrepancy informs 
us that long term decision must consider about dynamic property of the contract. 
Furthermore, dynamic game gives more opportunities to be applied at higher sub-
stitutability degree gives more opportunity to (see Figure 2).    
 
Figure 1  Static and dynamic Bertrand game profit comparison 
 
Figure 2  Static and dynamic Cournot game profit comparison 
To examine the case with erratic demands, suppose firms strictly predetermine 
their price and quantity settings, which is strictly revised in their profitability. 
Now if we randomize or value to represent demand variety, then we get 
or as a function of , and ; hence, the results can be drawn as follows 
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Figure 3  Static and dynamic Cournot and Bertrand game profit at varied de-
mand at low product substitutability (=0,1) 
 
Figure 4  Static and dynamic Cournot and Bertrand game profit at varied de-
mand at high product substitutability (=0,9) 
Figure 3 and 4 clearly show that dynamic production contract game (Cournot 
game) is more favourable at high substitutable products at varied demands, which 
is shown by least fluctuations than price contract (Bertrand game) at high product 
substitutability degree (please compare its fluctuation according to =0,1 and 
=0,9). These results again ensure that long term decision on how many to pro-
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duce is appropriate at higher compatible products instead of how much the price 
at less compatible product. 
We know that profit stability is a common goal of price and production quantity 
contracts. High profit stability ensures two firms can cooperate without worrying 
about any losses. Below is a comparison between two games types, which is 
gathered by finding profit at different price or quantity settings. Now if we meas-
ure their deviation from optimum profit value (replace or by our own assump-
tion), then we get  p( )  or  q( )  as a function of q,  and  . Benchmarking them 
against optimal value, the results are 
 
Figure 5  Static and dynamic Cournot and Bertrand game profit dynamics at 
varied demand at low product substitutability (=0,1) 
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Figure 6  Static and dynamic Cournot and Bertrand game profit dynamics at 
varied demand at high product substitutability (=0,9) 
Figure 5 and 6 clearly show that dynamic production contract game (Cournot 
game) is more favourable at at varied demands, which is shown by less deviation 
than price contract (Bertrand game) at high product substitutability degree (please 
compare its fluctuation according to =0,1 and =0,9). These results again ensure 
that long term decision on how many to produce is appropriate at higher demand 
variety. 
In addition to the managerial implication, dynamic stackelberg game is also sig-
nificantly superior to static Cournot game from the customer service level point of 
view (see Figure 5). That figure shows that the proposed game can cover market 
demand at a higher level than static Cournot game. This result supports the mana-
gerial policy of product commonality, where price can be determined later after 
final customization is completed.   
Furthermore, dynamic Stackelberg game is still superior over static Cournot game 
at a higher product substitutability degree. This result once more supports the 
view that static Cournot game is only appropriate to highly unique products. The 
reverse result is shown for dynamic Stackelberg game, where firms develop a 
common platform to maximize profit.    
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5. Conclusion and Further Research 
This paper revisited the Singh and Vives model on price and production prede-
termined contract by considering the dynamic behavior of demands onto make-to-
stock and assembly-to-order competition. We may summarize the results derived 
from the model, as follows. 
Production contract is superior to price contract at many respects. This type of 
contract guarantees profit stability and at the same time supports the product stan-
dardization effort 
Production quantity contract is also a dominant strategy for substitutable prod-
ucts. This conclusion is at odds with the previous Singh and Vives conclusion 
(Singh and Vives, 1984). This discrepancy is caused by the Singh and Vives 
model perhaps assuming that in Bertrand price-like competition, the quantity set-
ting will avoid both firms having to reduce their production quantity further. On 
the contrary, this paper assumes sticky prices and quantities, where it pushes both 
firms to cooperate at higher levels. By sticky prices and quantities, this paper is 
more appropriate for common platform based products instead of two widely dif-
ferentiated products.  
Price contract is a dominant strategy for highly differentiable products of make-
to-stock and assembly-to-order competition. This conclusion supports the article 
of Miegham and Dada (1999), who discusses postponement strategies differentia-
tion according to their applicability. 
The dynamic behavior analysis in this paper helps decision makers to decide their 
long term price and production quantity policy with regard to their manufacturing 
types, namely make-to-stock and assembly-to-order. The analysis results also 
support both modularity and customization principles in mass customized prod-
ucts, where decision uncertainty can be reduced by making closer customer order 
decoupling, point of sales. This paper suggests product developers to design 
common platform products and decide the price according to customer specific 
requirements.  
In terms of future research direction, the oligopoly model should be considered 
for development according to future market demand, which is determined by how 
close customer requirements are met, so in future the oligopoly model quantity 
and price can be replaced with some parameters such as inventory and lead times. 
From this result, a sequence between lead times and inventory can be determined 
and the outcome will be a decision about whether agility or efficiency is more 
important for a company, so that the outcome can be used by top management to 
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compose their business strategy. Finally, future research should accommodate 
strategic and tactical level alignment in order to develop comprehensive decision 
analysis. 
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1 Introduction 
The need for a wider array of sourcing frameworks by presenting competitive advantage 
has replaced the current trend in strategic sourcing decision-making from cost reduction 
to the ability of core competence identification (Venkatesan, 1992; Sislian and Satir, 
2000). With regard to the issue of competitiveness, Venkatesan (1992) introduced ‘core 
competence’ as a significant source of differentiation, a unique signature of the 
organisation and future advantage consideration. Prahalad (1993) insisted on core 
competence as a collective action of technology, governance process and collective 
learning. If the manufacturer does not have the capability (resources and time) to invest 
in strategic activities, then strategic sourcing is the option. Strategic sourcing is intended 
only as a strategic item or activity which has high impact on and risk for the buyer 
(Kraljic, 1983). 
Strategic sourcing is advantageous when we study mass customised products, where 
innovation is strongly needed to hedge against customer requirement varieties and 
competitors’ efforts to mimic the product (Jennings, 2002). Dual sourcing is needed to 
ensure supply flexibility in multi-product problems (Tomlin and Wang, 2005). Examples 
of dual sourcing applications are Japanese vehicle manufacturing companies such as 
Honda, with 44% of its parts having two suppliers and Toyota, which outsourced 38% of 
its parts to two suppliers (McMillan, 1990). In addition to dual sourcing, Tomlin and 
Wang (2005) apply dual sourcing and mix a combination of flexibility with lower 
procurement cost. However, thus far few serious attempts have been made to study the 
causal effect of dual sourcing and mixing flexibility with increased profit (Kim, 2000) 
instead of reducing lead times and inventory level uncertainty at the tactical level (Fong 
et al., 2000; Ryu and Lee, 2003).In a similar way to the flexibility point of view, strategic 
thinking in dual sourcing is also important in terms of communication and innovation 
(Goffin et al., 1997). However, by analysing a case study of four electronics plants, 
Goffin et al. (1997) found that none of them deemed dual sourcing an equal opportunity 
for both suppliers to supply manufacturers’ orders instead of splitting them into main and 
backup suppliers. Anton and Yao (1992) used auction theory to argue that when 
innovation is a key competitive dimension, this increases the attractiveness of a split 
award auction format to the buyer. Moreover, communication can be improved by 
revealing the suppliers’ cost to the buyer to produce a reasonable price through the 
application of bidding competition. In application, Japanese companies regularly audit 
their suppliers’ performance in terms of process capability and accountability (McMillan, 
1990). A suppliers’ audit enables the buyer to examine the suppliers’ costs so that the 
buyer can offer an optimum price to the suppliers. 
In addition to the application of dual sourcing, it is used more often in circumstances 
where bidding collusion is less or the supplier has experience of a quality control problem 
(Lyon, 2006). There is no evidence that dual sourcing is used in response to procurement 
profit improvement by presenting innovation as a key competitive dimension. As a result, 
this research does not attempt to persuade the reader to regard flexibility as a requirement 
for dual sourcing, nor to ascertain whether it is cooperative or non-cooperative suppliers 
that are the focus of dual sourcing. Indeed, by considering the three strands of 
competition in procurement (Lyon, 2006), this paper gives insight by firstly addressing 
the claim that dual sourcing supports innovation (Anton and Yao, 1992), since this is the 
most prominent literature in dual sourcing and secondly, it addresses the issue of the 
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connection between dual sourcing procurement cost and innovation performance at the 
research and development (R&D) phase of procurement (Lyon, 2006). 
In summary, this section presents several research questions by addressing some 
future research directions from the literature. The research questions are not mutually 
exclusive and all of them are solved by developing analytical models. The models are 
derived by combining innovation and economic behaviour in dual sourcing when its 
insights seem robust for the use of true dual sourcing by considering the rationality of the 
buyer and suppliers. The research questions are as follows: 
x Research question 1: Lyon (2006) concludes that dual sourcing lowers procurement 
costs where it is focused on the price benefits of competition and does not attempt to 
measure the suppliers’ innovation investment. This recent paper also investigates the 
possibility of dual sourcing to lower procurement cost by focusing on the price 
benefits of competition where suppliers’ innovation at the R&D phase of 
procurement is considered. Thus, the first research question can be formulated as: 
‘What is the connection between dual sourcing procurement cost and innovation 
performance at the R&D phase of procurement?’. 
x Research question 2: Related to the first research question, achieving price benefits 
from the competition between two suppliers and encouraging suppliers’ innovation 
are two contradictory objectives. The higher the suppliers’ innovation level, so the 
higher is the procurement price required by the buyer from the suppliers. Thus, the 
buyer needs to formulate a strategy whereby the benefit from the suppliers’ 
innovation must be higher than the price benefits from the competition of two 
suppliers. From these requirements, the second research question can be formulated 
as: ‘How can a strategy be formulated to maximise the buyer and suppliers’ payoff 
by innovation when dual sourcing cannot lower the procurement cost?’. 
One important issue in strategy formulation is that the strategy must not give an 
opportunity to the buyer or the suppliers to achieve their optimum pay-offs regardless of 
their partners’ possible reactions. Thus, strategic thinking-based analytical models are 
developed by considering that the chosen strategy should be credible from the buyer and 
the suppliers’ point of view. Credibility can be used by the buyer to stop the suppliers 
doing something they would otherwise do (‘deterrence’) or induce them to do something 
they would not do otherwise (‘compulsion’). 
In terms of research methodology, analytical models are chosen as compared to other 
methodology, for instance discrete event simulation and case study. The reasons can be 
summarised as follows. 
First, the objective of this research is how to formulate competitive strategy for the 
buyer and the suppliers when product innovation is considered. Thus, the buyer and the 
suppliers’ strategy domains are situated in terms of choosing whether to be cooperative or 
not by making innovation. Cooperative action is shown by reducing supply and demand 
uncertainty for the partners. From this point on, the buyer and the suppliers’ strategic 
moves are clearly identified so that the exact analytical model can represent the 
relationship closely. 
Second, it is possible to use this research to test and modify new theory on strategy 
formulation in dual sourcing procurement by the existence of product innovation. 
Previously, many researchers believed that dual sourcing can lower procurement cost 
(Lyon, 2006) and it can be done effectively if the two suppliers are innovative in a cost 
102	 Acta	Wasaensia
      
      
      
   404 Y. Kristianto and P. Helo    
      
      
      
      
reduction program (Anton and Yao, 1992). No previous research offers preventive 
strategy by applying strategic moves instead of curative strategy by analysing non-root 
cause factors, for example controlling lead times by applying stochastic inventory model 
(Fong et al., 2000; Ryu and Lee, 2003). From this situation, strategy formulation in dual 
sourcing procurement needs to be focused on stopping the suppliers from doing 
something they would otherwise do (‘deterrence’) or inducing them to do something they 
would not do otherwise (‘compulsion’). 
The validity of the analytical model can be improved by using empirical information 
to estimate analytical model parameter value. An example of this application is dual 
sourcing in the US Department of Defence procurement in using a simultaneous equation 
model and combining it with empirical information to estimate the parameter values, for 
instance learning curve and average cost curve unique to each problem or case (Lyon, 
2006). Another example is Novak and Eppinger (2001), who focused on the connection 
between product complexity and vertical integration using original empirical evidence 
from the automobile industry. A statistical model was developed to represent product 
complexity and vertical integration by interviewing project managers, system engineers, 
design engineers, purchasing managers and manufacturing engineers for each vehicle for 
each time period in the study. Abrate (2008) developed an econometric model to estimate 
the elasticities of substitution across time using a sample of Italian industrial customers 
facing a time of use pricing scheme. The above examples give some evidence that 
analytical models can also be aligned with empirical information. 
Without undermining the importance of empirical information for our analytical 
model, this current research excludes the application of empirical information by 
considering that the objective is to show to the readers how to formulate strategy for dual 
sourcing procurement where product innovation is considered. Thus, the outcome of this 
current research is giving guidance on how to move strategically against partners’ 
strategy for dual sourcing procurement. 
Certainly, different company situations will give different outcomes if empirical 
information is included, but the principle is the same, that is to alter the actions of other 
players later in the procurement process by manipulating the rules of a procurement 
contract by putting emphasis on credibility. 
Without ignoring other research methods, this research excludes the application of 
discrete event simulation, where it is possible to introduce a random number generator to 
represent operational performance. Though the case study has the potential to be applied 
in strategy research by identifying similarities and differences across firms that give 
various responses or strategic moves, it still cannot replace the main role of analytical 
model application, because the case study perspective is to find out different responses 
across firms on strategic moves without changing the rules of strategic moves. In that 
case, the case study can potentially be applied to measure the buyer and the suppliers’ 
performance at different responses. One example of this opportunity comes from the 
development of a supply chain performance measurement system (PMS) of the European 
operations of Nike (Lohman et al., 2004). A score card has been developed for measuring 
the performance of customers, sustainability, finance, process improvement, product flow 
and people. Since the case study is intended to understand the effect of a parallel score 
card within supply chains, it can be used to identify the similarities and differences of 
firms’ responses or strategic moves. 
The following sections first introduce related literature on dual sourcing competition 
and also the research area of this paper (literature review section). The introduction to the 
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analytical approach section is started by pricing decision analysis using the Bertrand 
game model, which continues with the buyer and suppliers’ strategic moves. The problem 
example and data analysis section presents and discusses the problem example and its 
results, which are concluded in the sections on managerial implications, conclusions and 
further research, which explore the information behind the simulation results and discuss 
some future research possibilities. 
2 Literature review 
The concept of tailored sourcing in the supply chain has been presented by Chopra and 
Meindl (2004), who discuss tailored sourcing in order to reduce supply uncertainty. 
Furthermore, Tulluous and Uttech (1992) state that multi-sourcing is more appropriate to 
low need uncertainty than high market and transaction uncertainty. Conversely, we use 
supply uncertainty and need uncertainty to investigate possible strategic moves 
application by the buyer to attract the suppliers’ collaboration, as well as to investigate 
the suppliers’ competition (Forker and Stannack, 2000). 
Patterson et al. (1999) focus on a longer-term supplier-buyer relationship based on 
goal congruency, so that cooperation level is the key issue. Furthermore, their paper 
proposes a transcendental relationship model besides a transitional and transactional one 
by adding outcome maximisation and a high level of interdependence between supplier 
and buyer. 
A supplier-buyer relationships model, however, is argued by Forker and Stannack 
(2000), who describe supplier competition in terms of an arms-length relationship as 
useful to maintain optimal performance from the supply side. Furthermore, the authors 
state that it is appropriate to apply bureaucracy to unique resources with predictable and 
frequent transaction (Patterson et al., 1999) instead of supplier-buyer relationships. Two 
surveys from the electronic and aerospace industries show that a relationship according to 
competition is preferred to cooperation in a buyer-supplier relationship (Forker and 
Stannack, 2000). Forker and Stannack concluded that the more strategic the supplier is 
from the buyer point of view, the more cooperation is preferred to competition. This 
paper, conversely, proposes competition in strategic suppliers by applying dual sourcing 
to attract competition between two suppliers. 
Supplier-buyer competition expansion from single to multi-sourcing is also discussed 
in Elmaghraby (2000), based on the work of Horowitz (1986), in buying decisions 
according to price uncertainty. Burke et al. (2007) insist on multi-sourcing when single 
supplier capacity is not sufficient to meet customer demand, regardless of product 
innovation to produce flexibility. On the other hand, Kim (2000) proposes incentives to 
the single supplier to induce innovation by stating that the incentive will be effective 
when the supplier profit increases. Wagner and Friedl (2007), however, propose the 
application of dual sourcing, by arguing that it is better to switch partially to another 
supplier whenever the buyer observes that the incumbent supplier’s cost is higher than 
the entrance supplier, in order to induce competition in terms of purchasing cost. On the 
other hand, Anton and Yao (1989) conclude that dual sourcing is not favoured when both 
suppliers collude to reduce the innovation effort, so that the two suppliers act as 
monopolists. The effect of this action is that the suppliers’ product will be highly 
differentiated and the sourcing price becomes lower because of the expansion of the total 
market size. 
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In addition to it being a dual sourcing requirement, Anton and Yao (1989) regard 
innovation as a way of inducing competition between two suppliers. The implication of 
this is that the information exchange between the two suppliers should be symmetrical in 
terms of selling price and product design. Supporting Anton and Yao’s (1989) proposal, 
we contribute to the literature by adding innovation to the supplier’s competition in dual 
sourcing by analysing the impact of innovation on the buyer strategic moves, which is 
determined by optimising the buyer and the suppliers’ payoffs. In particular, threats and 
promises are used to represent the buyer’s strategic moves towards the suppliers in 
minimising supply uncertainty. In conclusion, our contribution is focused on infusing 
strategic thinking into dual sourcing in order to investigate the causal effect of strategic 
moves on suppliers’ innovation decisions. 
3 Introduction to analytical model 
Suppose now that two suppliers can agree on only two types of flexible contracts from 
the buyer: price and quantity contract. From this point on, we refer our discussion on 
price and quantity contract to support sourcing strategy by applying a strategic moves 
game. From the buyer side, a conditional strategic moves game brings an actual gain, if 
the buyer chooses a response rule, than in some eventualities where an action is specified 
different from the optimal strategy. Thus, the credibility of the buyer’s strategy is 
unquestionable because the suppliers also have possibilities to receive a promise or be 
threatened. On the other hand, from the supplier’s side, as a first mover, the suppliers can 
take advantage by proposing product price and innovation level by changing the product 
substitutability degree J.
Figure 1 Strategic form of game between buyer and suppliers 
To induce the suppliers to be more innovative, the buyer can derive benefit from 
collaboration by imposing on the suppliers penalty cost p if the suppliers cannot meet the 
demand requirement q at total market demand b with standard deviation V  by supplying 
lower quantity –   ,s bq H  or higher quantity –   .s bq H  By taking confidence level  
D = 95%, where the buyer wants the probability of stock out Prob(q ! qs) to be no more 
than 5% and the market demand is normally distributed, then the market demand standard 
deviation V  at 1bH t  can be found as bZ
HV t , where Z is used to designate standard 
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normal variable. b
Z
HV t  represents the non-cooperative action of the buyer by giving 
demand information to the supplier more or less than the actual market demand. 
Similarly, the supplier can also threaten the buyer by becoming non-cooperative at 
s
s Z
HV t  by taking 1sH t . Conversely, the supplier will receive incentive I when the 
supplier can make V = 0 or the suppliers can supply at qs = q.
Beforehand, a competitive strategy in terms of suppliers’ product price p* and supply 
quantity q* needs to be optimised for the contract between the buyer and the suppliers by 
considering the strategic moves of the buyer in order to obtain higher payoffs. 
The following discussion is focused on the development of the strategic moves game 
by offering penalty cost p and incentive I to support the strategic moves game of the 
buyer as a second mover. Thus, we have the following strategic form of the game. 
Figure 1 presents the game between the buyer and the suppliers, where both have two 
strategic options. The buyer can play either a cooperative or non-cooperative strategy by 
introducing conditional strategic moves. Similarly, the suppliers can also play either a 
cooperative or non-cooperative strategy by moving strategically according to the 
conditional strategic moves. Beforehand, all of the strategy couples will be optimised in 
order to investigate the most optimum strategy. 
3.1 Buyer strategy (second mover) 
Suppose in the delivery contract the buyer as a customer takes the initiative by 
announcing a contract proposal which contains some requirements, for instance prices 
and the buyer and the suppliers’ responsibilities. Thus, the buyer acts as a second mover. 
Beforehand, the buyer needs to optimise the buyer selling price according to the 
suppliers’ auction price ps as follows. 
   max 1
b
b b b sp
p p pH J    (1) 
By optimising (1) against pb, then the buyer selling price pb can be found as 
 
 
1
2. 1
b s
b
p
p
H J
J
    (2) 
To simplify the calculation, b + Hb can be replaced by H. J = 0 implies that each supplier is 
a monopolist in the supplier’s respective market and the product becomes fully flexible 
when J approaches unity. The suppliers’ selling price ps in (2) can be categorised as the 
price at over-estimation   1bf bp H H t  , at under-estimation   1bf bp H H t   and at the 
buyer’s demand  f bp  H . Similarly, the buyer selling price pb is also categorised as the 
price at over-estimation   1 ,bb bp H H t   at under-estimation   1bb bp H H t   and at the 
buyer’s demand   .b bp H  
Suppose the buyer has to decide on penalty cost p and incentive I for the suppliers 
whenever they can meet the demand in the market Vs = 0. If the forecasting accuracy  
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(Hs = 0) is to be a common objective between the suppliers, then for each supplier, 
penalty p and incentive I costs must at least equal to the total cost changes due to the 
demand and supply uncertainty and by considering that the supplier will receive at 
penalty if and only if .ss Z
HV t
If the same situation can be applied to the incentive to the suppliers, then I and p are 
equal to 
         
0
1, . . 1 .
/
0, .
s
s s sbb b b
s
p c q c q
p I
I c q
HH H H
H
H D D
H
    
 
­ t   ° ®
°   ¯
 (3) 
Where c(H – b) and c(b – H) are the suppliers’ total costs in the buyer’s non-cooperative 
strategy of over and under market demand estimation, respectively. Further, the 
suppliers’ total costs with the buyer’s cooperative strategy can be designated as  
c(H  = b). The value of the suppliers’ total cost will be optimised at Stage 1 of the suppliers’ 
strategy.
Then the buyer profit function can be determined as 
        1 0; 0 .b s s b b f bbq p pH HHS V V         (4) 
        
      
2 1
1
0; 1 .
. .
b
b
s
b b s s b bb f b
s b bb f b
q p p
Z
q p p
HH H H
HH H H
HS H V D
D
 
 
  t 
  t 
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 (5) 
       
      
3 1
1
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 (7) 
If we assume in the final bargaining period that pf = ps, then we have to put the supplier 
profit function into the total profit maximisation (the supplier and buyer profits). Thus, 
the supplier strategy as a first mover needs to be optimised in order to find the optimum 
product price, as follows. 
3.2 Supplier’ strategy (first mover) 
Suppose the suppliers act as a first mover and simultaneously announce the price at 
which they are prepared to sell their product and then the amount that they will sell. The 
buyer, on the other hand, makes a supply contract for the two suppliers after the 
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incumbent supplier has had experience of bad quality (Lyon, 2006). Thus, inter-brand 
competition within the buyer outlet is allowed. Two main contract items are announced 
by the buyer, namely supply capability and flexible price as a result of innovation. The 
contract also covers an agreement on information exchange between the buyer and the 
suppliers where the buyer informs the suppliers of the module interfaces requirements. 
An example of this inter-changeability is the air conditioning unit of automobiles (Hata et 
al., 2001). There are some constraints in the case and piping for installation. The paper 
chooses three components which can be modularised for nine different types of air 
conditioner, namely heater, ventilator and air conditioner. Thus, by making modular 
design in these functions then the air conditioning unit flexibility can be improved. The 
two suppliers need to be informed fully by the buyer of the standardisation requirements. 
Furthermore, the new supplier has also been informed by the buyer about the incumbent 
supplier’s price. Thus, a Bertrand-like competition is used in this analysis by considering 
that the suppliers will set the prices first simultaneously and then in the second stage they 
observe the demand uncertainty V  and thus the buyer demands size q1 and q2 as well as 
standard deviation Vs. The benefits of this modified Bertrand game are that the supplier 
can get higher product prices p1 and p2 from the buyer and the buyer can observe the 
suppliers’ supply promptness Hs. Furthermore, it provides a comparison result with the 
existing literature on dual sourcing and also provides a foundation for future studies, 
where it would be possible to distinguish between two effects of the substitutability 
degree between products in increased competition between single-flexible product 
duopolists. Such an analysis would be useful in studying the product line decisions of 
multi-product buyers. Examples of industries that meet these criteria include 
manufacturers of computer motherboards for several series of processors and memory 
chips, computer cooling systems and the electronic fuel injection (EFI) systems of several 
car series. 
Thus the modified Bertrand model is represented as 
1 1 2.sq b p pH J V      (8) 
2 2 1.sq b p pH J V      (9) 
Where b is the buyer total market, p1 and p2 are the prices of Suppliers 1 and 2. J in 
equation (8) and (9) also represents product substitutability J. q1 and q2 are the buyer 
demands from Suppliers 1 and 2. We can see that if the total market demand uncertainty 
V  increases, then the product demand uncertainty q1 + Hs also increases due to the 
increase in the suppliers’ supply uncertainty Hs. Furthermore, the increasing of product 
demand uncertainty forces the buyer to encourage innovation in the suppliers by 
increasing the product substitutability J, which triggers the suppliers to become more 
competitive in moving from monopolists to duopolists and which increases the product 
price regardless of product demand reduction. Thus, the buyer and suppliers can be better 
off if they set a higher price. 
The notable point here is that flexibility enables the buyer to delay product 
differentiation by putting flexible components close to the order execution point, so that 
the buyer can make to stock for the component. Thus, innovation between two suppliers 
in terms of commonality degree and product platform modularity is required to postpone 
product differentiation. 
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To simplify the calculation, then b + Hb and q + Hs can be replaced by H and q. Thus, 
equations (1) and (2) can be reformulated as 
1 1 2.q p p  H J  (10) 
2 2 1.q p p  H J  (11) 
q1 and q2 is equal at Nash Equilibrium where the suppliers’ prices are also assumed to be 
equal to encourage innovation and produce flexible products. Thus, equations (10) and 
(11) can be reformulated as 
 1 2 1 fq q pH J     (12) 
To illustrate, we suppose two suppliers make an auction and the buyer makes an opening 
bid and afterwards the suppliers cooperate with one another on the chosen price and 
product substitutability. Restricting attention to the strategic moves of this two-stage 
game, we shall see that whether the suppliers choose a cooperative or a non-cooperative 
strategy, the bidding price is used by the buyer to optimise the buyer’s selling price, 
where it is finally used by the suppliers to optimise their total costs. If the buyer wants the 
suppliers to be innovative, then the buyer can apply threats and/or promises by playing 
demand uncertainty Hb d 1. Strategic moves are required to guarantee the credibility of the 
actions (Hb = 0, Hs = 0). Thus, the suppliers and buyer need to formulate their payoffs 
before they start to announce their threats and promises in the delivery contract. From 
this point on, the game is started from Stage 2, where the suppliers and the buyer decide 
their contract price, as follows. 
Stage 2 The suppliers and buyer optimise their agreed auction price. 
Suppose the buyer and the suppliers are two different organisations. Thus, neither the 
supplier nor the buyer agrees to suffer by losing profit. Below is given the joint 
optimisation by presenting mutual profits between the buyer and supplier 
     
max
max . 1
2 2. 2. 1 2
s
f
tot b sp
f fb b
tot b f fp
p p
p p c
S S S
H HS H JJ
 
§ ·§ ·      ¨ ¸¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹ © ¹
 (13) 
 s.t 0fp c t
Where Sb is the buyer profit and Ss is the supplier profit. 
Solving that equation for pf, one obtains 
   
 
3 1 .
4 4. 1
12 1
2
b b
f
c
p
H H JJ
J
   § · ¨ ¸© ¹
 (14) 
Equation (14) describes the compromise price between the buyer bid price and suppliers’ 
auction price. This equation is also developed in order to respond to Anton and Yao’s 
(1989) argument about supplier collusion. We can see that the increasing of demand 
uncertainty is also a disadvantage to the buyer by increasing the suppliers’ product price, 
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while the increasing of product substitutability will give benefit to the suppliers’ product 
price pf. Product substitutability and demand uncertainty are the two critical decisions in 
supplier and buyer cooperation. 
Stage 1 The suppliers optimise their total costs. 
From Stage 2, we have information that the selling prices of the two suppliers are equal, 
thus, in the first stage we can find 
   
 
 
 
31
4 4. 1 1 .
max .
1 12 1 2 1
2 2
b b
bc
c
c
H HJ J JH
J J
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 (15) 
By optimising (15) against c and substituting Hb by equation (1) or (2), then the supplier 
total cost c can be found as 
 
 
 
312 1 4 4. 12
2 1 2
b b
b
c
H HH J J
J
§ ·§ · ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹ © ¹   (16) 
The total costs c can be categorised as the total costs at over-estimation   ,bc H   at  
under-estimation  bc H  and at the buyer’s demand   .bc H  
Stage 1 shows that the increasing of product substitutability (J) will increase the 
suppliers’ total costs. Similarly, higher demand uncertainty will increase the suppliers’ 
total costs. Obviously, this statement is correct since higher product substitutability will 
make the suppliers more innovative and put more resources into R&D. The effects of 
demand uncertainty and product substitutability have a positive impact on innovation and 
flexibility by pushing the suppliers to develop highly flexible products in order to reduce 
demand uncertainty. Thus, from the buyer’s point of view, it is very easy to change the 
product to another supplier whenever the other product is not available. 
3.3 Supplier payoff calculation 
Suppliers’ payoffs can be determined by combining product price ps, total cost c and 
buyer demand size qs as 
        1 0; 0 .s s b ss b b bp c q IH H HS H H          (17) 
          
      
2 0; 1 1 .
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s s b s bb f b
s bb b b
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  
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Where  1 ;s s bS H H H Hd d  is the suppliers’ profit at supplier uncertainty Hs = 0 and the 
buyer demand uncertainty Hb = 0.  ssp H Hd  is the suppliers’ selling price to the buyer at 
suppliers’ total costs  0sc H   in order to produce order size  0ssq H  . Incentive is given to 
the suppliers by considering Hs = 0. The same meaning is also applied to (18). 
Conversely,  3 1; 0s s bS H Ht   in (19) denotes the suppliers’ profit at supplier 
uncertainty Hs t 1 and the buyer demand uncertainty Hb = 0,  0ssp H   is the suppliers’ 
selling price to the buyer at suppliers’ total costs  1sc H t  in order to produce order size 
 1 .ssq H t  A penalty is imposed on the suppliers by considering Hs t 1. Equation (20) has 
the same explanation. 
Equations (17)–(20) can be used for all strategic couples in the strategic form (see 
Figure 1). The value of ps, c and qs depend on the buyer strategy. Thus, in the section 
below the buyer strategic moves in applying threats and promises are elaborated. 
4 Problem example and data analysis 
Studies on dual sourcing have been able to shed light on purchasing as a strategic 
decision. In addition, they have underscored the importance of strategic thinking in the 
sourcing decision by considering that the activity should be assigned to critical activities 
which give most contribution to the final product. 
This section will be used to show the applicability of the analytical model. First, the 
required data (demand uncertainty in the market H, product substitutability degree J,
buyer order uncertainty to the supplier Hb), are used to determine the value of penalty cost 
p and incentive cost I to the supplier, where they are finally used to decide the buyer and 
suppliers’ profits at Hb = 0 and Hs = 0 or Sb1 and Ss1, at Hb t 1 and Hs = 0 or Sb2 and Ss1, at  
Hb = 0 and Hs t 1 or Sb1 and Ss2, at Hb t 1 and Hs t 1 or Sb2 and Ss2.
Let us suppose the supply contract mentions that the buyer must fulfil demand at 
1,000 units per month. This value means that the cumulative buyer’s demand information 
error must be less than one within one month. Thus, by applying equations (2), (14) and 
(16) we have the following results: 
	 Acta	Wasaensia	 111	
      
      
      
   Strategic thinking in supply and innovation in dual sourcing procurement 413   
      
      
      
      
Table 1 Buyer selling and buying prices, suppliers’ total costs c according to demand 
uncertainty (Hb) and product substitutability J
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Table 1 exhibits the calculation results for the suppliers’ total costs c, the suppliers’ 
product price pf and the buyer’s selling price pb, which is calculated by considering three 
situations: over-estimation of demand uncertainty  1 ,b bH H !   correct estimation 
 0 ,b bH H   and highly accurate estimation  1 .b bH H    This example takes one 
unit over or under the predetermined supply contract to show the sensitivity of the 
developed model, at least the difference between real demand uncertainty İ and forecast 
demand uncertainty Hb. We can see from Table 2 that our model is highly sensitive by 
giving different values on all decision parameters (the suppliers’ total costs c, suppliers’ 
product price pf and buyer’s selling price pb). 
Table 1 also shows us that high product differentiation (low substitutability degree) 
has effect on the lowering of product price from the suppliers to the buyer. This situation 
implies that the suppliers and the buyer prefer to be more innovative in dual sourcing. 
This situation is supported by Anton and Yao’s (1992) conclusion that collusion by 
suppliers can reduce innovation by reducing the product price. Conversely, this paper 
proves that high cooperation can give benefit to the buyer and suppliers by increasing the 
product price as well as product substitutability. The increasing of product substitutability 
should be followed by an increase in innovation. Indeed, by giving a higher price to a 
highly substitutable product, the buyer wants them to be more integrated. This is also one 
kind of innovation. 
Obviously, from the buyer’s point of view, supply sustainability is the main objective 
since strategic sourcing is related to a strategic item which has high risk if it is not 
available. Thus, equation (3) is used in the establishing of a penalty and incentive policy 
to the suppliers, as shown in Table 2 below. 
In Table 2 we can see that the sum of supply quantities (Supplier 1 and 2) are at the 
closest total market demand size. Furthermore, the penalty and incentive are also lower 
because of the lower suppliers’ production quantity. 
Table 2 also shows that the penalty and incentive must be high enough that the buyer 
also suffers by imposing a penalty on the suppliers. The reason is that the buyer is forced 
into an unwanted strategy because of the suppliers’ action. Furthermore, the penalty and 
incentive intention is also increased by the increasing of product substitutability, where it 
signifies that higher product substitutability must be able to reduce supply uncertainty. 
Finally, the possible payoffs from the possible strategies of the buyer and suppliers 
can be summarised below by the following equations (4)–(7) and (17)–(20). 
Table 3 shows that the suppliers’ payoffs increase with the increasing of product 
substitutability. Similarly, the buyer’s payoffs also increase. Furthermore, there is one 
situation where the buyer must make strategic moves as a second mover by restricting the 
suppliers’ action of being non-cooperative and encourage innovation. Thus, the buyer can 
say ‘I will be cooperative and innovative if the suppliers are also cooperative and 
innovative’. Likewise, ‘I will be non-cooperative and non-innovative if the suppliers are 
also non-cooperative and non-innovative’. These statements are credible since the 
suppliers and buyer’s profits will decrease dramatically when they become  
non-cooperative and less innovative. 
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Table 2 Buyer penalty and incentive policy 
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Table 3 Buyer and supplier pay-offs 
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5 Managerial implications 
Studies on strategic thinking in procurement have been argued for in some of the 
literature in dual sourcing. Nonetheless, these results give a new insight into managerial 
decisions on procurement. One notable result is that dual sourcing is strongly 
recommended to attract two suppliers to cooperate together without ignoring the 
suppliers’ competition. Indeed, producing highly flexible products for the buyer can 
increase the profit level of the buyer as well as the suppliers. This paper complements the 
ideas of Anton and Yao (1992) by suggesting a solution for the buyer in applying 
strategic moves. Strategic moves will attract the two suppliers to be more innovative 
since they relate the suppliers’ innovation with the inability to meet the buyer demand. If 
the suppliers do not make the innovation, then the buyer can move strategically by 
becoming non-cooperative Hb ! H (Table 3) and pay less (Table 1), so that the suppliers’ 
profit margin will also reduce. On the other hand, the buyers will pay a much higher price 
to show their commitment to innovation. Furthermore, the buyer’s strategy must be 
credible from the suppliers’ point of view by applying strategic moves. The buyer can 
deliberately be more non-innovative and non-cooperative, regardless of the demand 
uncertainty minimisation effort, if the suppliers also ignore supply uncertainty. On the 
other hand, the buyer can also give an incentive when the supplier can reduce the supply 
uncertainty (Table 3). 
One concern of the buyer is whether dual sourcing lowers the procurement cost when 
innovation is considered. This question was raised by Lyon (2006), who suggested dual 
sourcing application in government procurement. Lyon studied advanced technology 
procurement, where the numbers of potential suppliers are limited and assumes that the 
buyer has a higher bargaining power by putting forward quality and complexity problems 
as a motivation for dual sourcing, regardless of contract length and supply quantity. The 
possible reason for this result is that the author ignored the suppliers’ innovation 
investment, so that incentive collection as a result of innovation was not discussed. The 
current paper, however, supports Lyon (2006) partially, by showing that dual sourcing 
lowers the procurement cost at a product substitutability degree of less than 0.7. 
Furthermore, more innovation reverses this trend. On the buyer side, this benefit comes 
from the higher selling price to the end customer at a high product substitutability degree, 
since the innovation content is also higher. In conclusion, buyers can ensure that they 
push suppliers to make the highest level of innovation without allowing the suppliers to 
collude together in ignoring innovation and selling at higher quantity. Furthermore, the 
suppliers’ action in merely reducing innovation is not credible from the buyer point of 
view, because the buyer will not follow the strategy. 
6 Conclusions and further research 
This paper discussed the application of strategic thinking in dual sourcing by considering 
the effect of innovation. We may summarise the results derived from the model to answer 
the research questions, as follows. 
1 The connection between dual sourcing procurement cost and innovation performance 
at the R&D phase of procurement is that innovation increases dual sourcing 
procurement cost because the buyer needs to compensate the suppliers’ innovation to 
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induce competition. Furthermore, the application of lower penalty and incentive 
costs at a higher degree of innovation are intended to influence supply promptness 
and finally to induce the suppliers’ innovation. Thus, the buyer’s market positioning 
is also improved by offering a wide variety of products to the end customer. This 
conclusion is at odds with the previous literature on dual sourcing (Anton and Yao, 
1992; Lyon, 2006) by regarding innovation as a competitive advantage. 
2 Strategy formulation with respect to innovation can be split into two. The suppliers 
always make a commitment to be cooperative by considering the payoffs. On the 
other hand, the buyer can take benefit as a second mover to induce the suppliers’ 
cooperation by applying strategic moves. The analytical results indicate that the 
suppliers will reduce information asymmetries, thereby inducing more aggressive 
bidding at the higher innovation effort. On the other hand, the buyer has more 
leverage on future contracts by changing the dimension of product quality to induce 
innovation. As a result, the suppliers are encouraged continuously to be more 
innovative and competitive. 
3 Dual sourcing procurement with innovation is appropriate where the customer is 
quality sensitive, regardless of product price (for example, computer chips and 
mobile technologies). 
The analytical model here focused on strategic thinking application in dual sourcing by 
considering innovation. In terms of future research direction, it would be necessary to 
investigate the possibility of applying strategic thinking in dual sourcing, where one of 
the suppliers assumes that the buyer is not the dominant customer. An example of this 
situation in industry is with computer fan suppliers. The fan is a critical component of the 
personal computer. If one buyer asks the suppliers to change the design by increasing the 
speed and reducing the power consumption of the fan, then the fan suppliers will not 
directly change the design without considering the contribution of the buyer to the 
suppliers’ market share. Thus, it is difficult to attract a stronger supplier to maximise 
innovation. The possible solution is not only threats and promises, but also the 
commitment to use the fan in the entire product portfolio. The problem is that dual 
sourcing allows dual supplier application simultaneously. This is the future research area 
that should be investigated. 
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1 Introduction 
The need for mass customisation (MC) has replaced the current trend in manufacturing 
industry since the 1990s (Pine, 1993). Furthermore, nowadays the firm needs to be 
different not only in manufacturing, but also in marketing by satisfying the cumulative 
requirements of price, quality, flexibility and agility by applying information and 
operational technologies (Kumar, 2008; Vesanen, 2007). However, this trend has been 
slowly adopted by up to 1,124 articles within two decades (Kumar, Gattoufi and 
Reisman, 2008) even the trend to be exponentially growth. 
Since the MC concept is emphasised in the marketing-customer interface (Vesanen, 
2007) or in the product development and manufacturing process (Jiao and Tseng, 1996) 
separately, this concept underlines the importance of coordinating the development of 
product and manufacturing process design (Huang, 1996) within supply chains (SC) to 
enable concurrent engineering (Fixson, 2005; Fogliatto, Da Silveira and Royer, 2003; 
Hult and Swan, 2003). Engineering problems often follow as a result (Fine, 1998). 
Without arguing against the previous literature, this paper, however, fills a gap in 
coordinating the development of product and manufacturing process design by 
formulating a commonality index according to the manufacturing process design to 
satisfy customer requirements such as price, flexibility and agility (Kumar, 2008). The 
coordination building takes effect in product design strategy where the manufacturer 
needs to optimise safety stock allocation (Graves and Willems, 2008) to solve the 
engineering problem, and at the same time maximise production flexibility by 
coordinating inventory and capacity management through push–pull manufacturing 
strategy so as to reduce shipping and inventory costs (Jammernegg and Reiner, 2007). 
Thus, the inclusion of inventory coordination into product design strategy will support 
the previous product commonality benefit of inventory reduction (Collier, 1982). 
The purpose of this paper is to determine how the model should be interpreted in 
terms of action and implementation steps, and investigate the effect of coordinating the 
development of product design and manufacturing process design by meeting design 
requirements for the supply chain (Hilletofth, 2009). In particular, unlike most of the 
existing literature on product commonality analysis, we explicitly integrate product and 
process platform optimisation by adding manufacturing process optimisation into product 
commonality analysis to represent concurrent engineering in the light of agile supply 
chain (Sharifi, Ismail and Reid, 2006). 
In addition to recent literature, vector analysis in CI building is a special feature of 
this paper in measuring how closely the customer requirements are met. In fact, this new 
approach demonstrates push–pull manufacturing strategy usability in product platform 
commonality analysis. The idea is to build CI by deciding on the degree of customer 
involvement in the manufacturing phase. This approach has been posited by Blecker and 
Abdelkafi (2007) in proposing a future research direction to provide an analysis of the 
effects of component commonality on the decoupling points. Thus, from the 
manufacturing process point of view, our research offers a good opportunity to 
investigate the manufacturing process capability effect on product development 
decisions. 
This paper has been organised as follows. Section 1 introduces the motivation of the 
research. Section 2 elaborates the background of the research. Section 3 develops models 
of coordinating manufacturing process design and development of product design. 
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Section 4 explains the models by introducing one problem example and discussing the 
implications for managers. Section 5 explores the information behind the example results 
and discusses some future research opportunities. 
2 Background of the research 
Component commonality analysis was first presented by Collier (1981) and was re-
discussed further by the same author (1982) and Eynan and Rosenblatt (1996) by taking 
into consideration the effect at the aggregate inventory level. Collier (1982) shows that a 
lower number of distinct components will reduce the total safety stock, which means that 
it will also reduce the product commonality. Similarly, Jiao and Tseng (1996) explain 
that both design and manufacturing concerns need to be considered in the commonality 
measure by arguing that a high commonality of processes would necessitate high 
commonality of the components involved. 
In contrast to other investigations (Collier, 1981, 1982; Eynan and Rosenblatt, 1996; 
Jiao and Tseng, 2000a; Martin and Ishii, 1996; Siddique, Rosen and Wang, 1998; Wacker 
and Trelevan, 1986), Blecker and Abdelkafi (2007) propose a different commonality 
index, which comprises the commonality of common components and must-generic 
items, and the commonality of the product family with respect to options. The difference 
between this index and the previous literature is significant since it incorporates the 
selection probability of components, which also describes the customer preferences (Du, 
Jiao and Tseng, 2003). This paper considers that positive impact on the commonality 
level depends merely on generic items. In supporting the Blecker and Abdelkafi 
commonality index, Jones and Riley (1985) insist on customer order decoupling point 
(CODP) as a means of design for manufacturing. 
Jiao and Tseng (1996), furthermore, broaden the concept of design for manufacturing 
by proposing design for mass customisation (DFMC), which optimises 
reusability/commonality, synthesises the product family architecture (PFA) and facilitates 
meta-level integration throughout the design process. The authors mention that DFMC 
enables the manufacturer to integrate systems within the product development process. 
This concept, furthermore, is enhanced by Jiao and Tseng (2000b) by mapping the 
functionality, behavioural and structural perspective of PFA to represent different phases 
of product development integration. This mapping illustrates the multi-dimensional 
decision making process of product architecture development (Tseng and Du, 1998). 
Thus, the description of customers and their requirements have to be defined in order to 
analyse the functional requirements for obtaining knowledge about the functional 
structure and technical structure design of product family structure (Agard and Kusiak, 
2004). 
Related to the approaches of Jiao and Tseng (2000a) on PFA, Fine (1998) and Fixson 
(2005) offer a product-operations strategy combination by considering three decision 
domains, namely, product, process and supply chain domain decisions. The last author 
cites the work of Ulrich (1995) in assessing the product architecture from its functionality 
and interface characteristics. Since it is a wider perspective of the commonality concept, 
however, this paper does not provide in-depth analysis of the process and supply chain 
domain impact, but instead gives a general description of the coordinated design decision. 
Thus, supply chain agility in terms of process alignment, network integration and market 
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sensitivity can be achieved so as to obtain competitive advantage over competitors’ 
supply chains (Faisal, Banwet and Shankar, 2007; Jones and Riley, 1985). 
Taking into account the importance of a product-operations strategy combination by 
considering product, process and supply chain domain decisions, Graves and Willems 
(2000) develop a strategic stock placement in the supply chain model in reducing 
inventory cost and giving 100% guaranteed lead times. The same authors also discovered 
that the model was capable of determining agile supply chain by dynamically changing 
safety stock level as demand changes (Graves and Willems, 2008). The idea can be 
extended to production flexibility by achieving product and process flexibility to 
minimise production delay and maximise product mix (Abdel-Malek, Areeratchakul and 
Otegbeye, 2006). Thus, production time and delivery time need to be optimised in terms 
of the production cycle in a multi-stage production system with quantity varying between 
a minimum and a maximum value for each delivery (Bahroun, Campagne and Moalla, 
2007). 
Recently, Sanchez (2002) has studied the collaboration of product and process that 
make up the platform. In other words, the company should develop such a platforming 
strategy that enables it to improve the variety, and at the same time increase the reliability 
of the manufacturing process by increasing the service level. To embody the idea, 
product architecture decisions have to be made jointly and simultaneously with process 
architecture decisions. Furthermore, costs are not defined solely by bills of materials 
(BOMs) for specific product models, but have to be defined ‘systemwide’ with reference 
to all development, production and supply chain costs that are incurred in developing and 
realising new product variations over the lifetime of the platform. Thus, assessment and 
improvement of a product family by focusing on various aspects such as modularity, cost, 
commonality and variety (Alizon, Shooter and Simpson, 2007) could possibly be used for 
increasing the service level and reducing procurement cost through production and 
product process redesign (Fixson, 2007). 
This present paper looks to fill a gap between collaborative product process platform 
development (Sanchez, 2002; Fixson, 2005) and component commonality analysis 
(Collier, 1981, 1982; Eynan and Rosenblatt, 1996; Jiao and Tseng, 1996) in developing a 
platforming strategy and manufacturing process by increasing the CI level and reducing 
total costs. CI is used to develop a platforming strategy that represents a degree of 
platform flexibility and CODP that represents manufacturing process design. Thus, it can 
support a supply chain design for achieving agility by focusing on supply chain 
characteristics and dynamics through company capability, supply chain and product 
feature assessments (Sharifi et al., 2006). 
3 Model development 
This section is composed of three subsections, namely, manufacturing process design, 
cost structure and parameters, and product commonality index development. 
Manufacturing process design (Section 3.1) details how to allocate safety stock to decide 
on CODP so that it optimises total cost structure (Section 3.2) and finally improve the 
product commonality degree by analysing product commonality index (Section 3.3). 
Each subsection is detailed as follows. 
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3.1 Manufacturing process design 
We solve the manufacturing process design by decomposing the multi-stage supply chain 
strategic inventory location model into J-stages, where J is the number of workstations in 
the supply chain and there is one stage for each node. For each node-j, we define *jP  to 
be the optimum service rates and jW  to be the optimum service times that are used to 
explain strategic inventory allocation. Beforehand, jP  and jW  need to be optimised 
against system parameters such as demand rate at stage-j jO , demand inter-arrival times 
and service times standard deviation at stage-j A jV   and jV , respectively, and utilisation 
factor jU  to inform us whether in our order there is a delay/backorder at stage-j, or not. 
We model manufacturing process according to GI/G/1 queue model. The reason is 
that the demand inter-arrival and processing rate are not stationary and are just barely less 
than one (1 ) 1H U    or are equal to or greater than one ( 1)U t . This model closely 
represents the real situation in MC operations where common product platform increases 
process flexibility and the number of possible product configurations. Thus, common 
product platform makes manufacturing facility busier and has higher utilisation. This 
model closely represents demand uncertainty within mass customised production.  
By using this model and following Little’s formula (see Gross and Harris, 1974), total 
customers in the system at stage-j jN  can be interpreted as  
 
 
2 2 2.
2 1
j A j j
j j
j
N
O V V
UU
  
 
 (1) 
A jV   and jV  in Equation (1) denote the demand inter-arrival rate standard deviation and 
service rate standard deviation at stage-j. A jV   can be found as maximum difference 
between average inter-arrival time (1/ )jO  and maximum inter-arrival time at maximum 
demand during net replenishment time 1/ ( ( ))jD W  or (1/ ) (1/ ( ))A j j jDV O W   . Demand 
during net replenishment time is obtained by considering that safety stock should be 
covered only in this period because after production is finalised then the customer can get 
the product immediately. D jV   denotes demand rate standard deviation at stage-j and 
supposing that 2
ij
V  is inbound service variance and 2T jV   is production process variance 
at stage-j. In finding service rate standard deviation jT , we assumed that between 
inbound service time standard deviation ijT  and production process time standard 
deviation T jT  are independent. The reason is that T jT  depends on the number of 
customer order and ijT  depends on the upstream stage i  service rates standard 
deviation. These two processes are independent because they are two different firms. 
Finally, we formulate service rate standard deviation jT  as 2 2( )j m p j ij T jV V V V     .
Production process standard deviation T jV   can be assumed to equal A jV   by 
considering that each stage will produce to order. Inbound service time standard 
deviation ijV  can be obtained from the service rate variance at its upstream stage-i
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or B iV   for 1,2, , 1i j !  where stage-i is an adjacent node to stage-j. We define 
inbound service time standard deviation ijV  as max{ ,max{ | : ( . ) }}ij ij i i i j AV V V  .
Exceptionally, ijV  for most upstreams are known parameters since this standard deviation 
is caused by external factors of the supply chain, for example suppliers of most 
upstreams. 
On average, stage-j places an order equal to ij jO)  where ij)  denotes arc ( , )i j A
from downstream stage-j to upstream stage-i for which 0ij) ! . Stage-j cannot start 
production to replenish jO  until all inputs have been received; thus, we have 
max{ | : ( . ) }j iW W i i j A   where jW  and iW  for 1,2, , 1i j !  denote service time and 
optimum inbound service time for stage-j.
We do not permit max{ | : ( . ) }j iW W i i j A!   to avoid excess inventory and/or delay 
the orders to the suppliers so that idle capacity can be eliminated. Thus, we define 
inbound service time jW , that is i j jW T W   as max{ ,max{ : ( . ) } |}i j j iW W T W i i j A   .
Thus, with regard to the G/GI/1 queue system, iW  is equal to waiting time in a queue  
 
 
2 2
2 1
j A j j
q j
j
W
O V V
U



d

.
Since q jW   is the maximum waiting time in a queue, then the following condition is 
applied to decide on iW
 
 
2 2
2 1
j A j j
i q j
j
W W
O V V
U



d d

 (2) 
In supporting concurrent engineering, component supply variance information sharing is 
needed to compose push–pull manufacturing strategy; thus, this information can be 
obtained from the component factory and we assume in this paper at a certain amount. In 
addition, penalty cost W jC   and service cost T jC   are also measured as well as customer 
demand and its standard deviation for each product variant for allocating stocks. Thus, 
cost function is developed in order to determine our optimum decision, as follows 
( ) . .j T j j W j jE C C C NP    (3) 
Equation (3) can be generalised into  
 
 
2 2 2. .
( ) . .
2.
j j A j j
T j j W j j
j j
E C C C
O P V V
P UP O

 
§ ·¨ ¸  ¨ ¸© ¹
 (4) 
Equation (4) can be optimised according to the service rates for each node jP  so that we 
have  
124	 Acta	Wasaensia
      
      
      
   Designing supply chain 7    
      
      
      
      
 
 
 
 
2 2 2 2
2
. . .
0
2. 2.
A j j W j A j j W j j
T j
j j j j
C C
C
V V V V P
P O P O
   

 
   
 
 (5) 
 2 22. . . .
2.
2.
A j j W j T j
j j
T j
C C
C
V V O
P O   


 r  (6) 
The two results of Equation (6) can be used to decide on base stock location by 
considering the least non-negative jP  value at stage-j. This decision is used to calculate 
the optimum service time of each stage as ( / ).j j j q jW WP O   and so we have maximum 
production time jT  as j j q jT W W   .
In the case of a busy production facility as the second condition ( )j iW W! , it is better 
to delay the orders to the suppliers by q j iW W  . This suggests a different approach to 
Graves and Willems (2000) in satisfying a 100% service level by finding the maximum 
waiting time in a queue as production time jT . Finding jT  satisfies the maximum possible 
demand over the net replenishment time W  for stage-j where it is replenishment time 
i jW T  minus its service time jW  or i j jW T WW    .
Following the formulation of Graves and Willems (2000) for the expected inventory 
( )jE I that represents the safety stock held at stage-j, then ( )jE I can be found as the 
difference between cumulative replenishment and cumulative shipment, as follows  
( ) ( ) ( )j j jE I D W O W   (7) 
( ) . . .j j j DD zW W O V W   (8) 
Equation (7) expresses the expected safety stock at maximum possible demand by finding 
the demand bound ( )jD W where it is equal to maximum stock during W  at a certain level 
of customer service level at stage-j jz  (Graves and Willems, 2000). It is possible to get 
( ) 0jE I  , which means we can manage stage-j as make-to-order (MTO) instead of 
make-to-stock (MTS). Our model extends Graves’ and Willems’ (2000) strategic safety 
stock allocation by adding production time as the third variable that is optimised. 
Furthermore, without arguing the previous algorithm for holding cost at stage-j jh
minimisation, we use G/GI/1 queueing model to represent non-stationary demand and for 
finding the optimum guaranteed service time and production time. The reason is to 
provide tactical decision support for inventory managers to meet inventory cost 
minimisation and to coordinate replenishment. Guaranteed service time for stage 1j 
optimisation automatically guarantees the inbound service time for stage j, where if it is 
combined with the optimised jT , then gives guaranteed service time for stage j at 
minimum waiting time W jC   and service cost T jC  . Thus, we can meet costs and service 
time optimisation. 
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3.2 Cost structures and parameters 
To analyse the product commonality index, first we consider the cost of product 
portfolios, which is computed in a top-down manner based on product family demand 
parameters. The cost model can take into account various cost parameters such as batch 
sizes and facilities investment. 
Considering manufacturing process design, the total costs for stage-j can be 
formulated as  
 
 
1
( ) ( )
1
. 1
TC . TC . . . .TS
PT 1 1
nj
j jj j j
j p j j O j ij ij j S j j j n
j j ji j
r rI
C C C h
q q r
O OO O

 
§ ·¨ ¸   )    ¨ ¸¨ ¸ © ¹
¦  (9) 
2. .j O
j
C
q
h
O  (10) 
Below definitions are given of the notations in (9) and (10).  
1 ( )p jC  is the production cost for stage-j
2 jq  is the order batch size for stage-j
3 ( )S jC  is the setup cost of components or parts for stage-j
4 TCij  is component cost for stage-j
5 jh  is the holding cost for stage-j
6 jI  is the investment cost for stage-j
7 PTj  is the payback period for stage-j
8 jr  is the interest rate for stage-j.
From the above formulation, the cost model incorporates the investment for stage-j and 
its components are processed into the cost structure by including pay-out time PTj  and 
investment cost jI  at interest rate jr  as an additional depreciation cost, which is needed 
by the firm to reimburse the facility investment cost. Next, information from this section 
will be used by PDD to compose the product commonality index, as follows. 
3.3 Component part commonality index development 
We solve the manufacturing process design by decomposing the multi-stage supply chain 
strategic inventory location model into J-stages, where J is the number of workstations in 
the supply chain. 
In supporting design by customer (Tseng and Du, 1998), we solve component part 
commonality index development by decomposing the product structure into J-stages, 
where J is the number of products and components within the bill-of-materials (BOM). 
Let us also suppose that each component at stage-i for 1,2, , 1i j !  supports each 
customer preference in a different level, so we have irp  as the preference level of 
component at stage-i to customer requirement-r. From the PDD department information, 
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each of components at stage-i has a different level of preference for the product variant at 
stage-j by as much as ijp . Customers choose their option by deciding on several criteria 
according to their degree of importance rp . Then, we have the probability that a product-
j is chosen by the customer by considering R-customer requirements and j-component 
variants as 1
1 1
.
R j
j ir r ijr i
p p p p

   u u¦ ¦  This probability is called the total contribution 
of product-j.
Furthermore, the value of the product at stage-j jV , which describes the contribution 
of net profit of the product ,j  can be formulated as follows  
 . TCj j j j j
j k j k
V p P O
z z
ª º u ¬ ¼¦ ¦  (11) 
where jP  is the component-j price. This value is useful for product classification, where 
it can be used by the purchasing department to formulate procurement strategy. A higher 
jV  denotes that the product is an important one. In contrast, a lower value signifies a less 
important product. 
As should be expected by now, effective use of the revenue into part commonality 
measurement expresses the needs of the firm to determine the corresponding price for the 
required level of output. Thus, by considering demand at stage-j as a price function 
.j j j jp a b O   and maximum market price ja , then net profit at stage-j can be 
formulated as  
TCj j j jpS O   (12) 
The maximum market price maxjP  is assumed at 1jO  , and the product price is at a 
maximum level or it is equal to TC j  at 1jO  . The minimum market price miujP  is 
obtained from (12) by setting j jDO   and 0jS  . jD  in this case is the maximum 
possible demand during service time jW  instead of the maximum demand over the net 
replenishment time j i jT W W  . The reason for using different demand time span is that 
in this case price must be set according to total demand during the whole service period 
by considering that price analysis is taken just after all orders from the previous service 
period have been delivered. Thus, by interpolating between maxjP  and 
miu
jP  against 
1jO   and j jDO  , then the price of the product at stage-j at jO  can be obtained as below  
 min max min1j jj j j jj
D
P P P P
D
O    (13) 
Determining the product and component price is intended to describe the total 
contribution of components to the family profitability. The price is of great importance to 
a manufacturer that has more variety in product variants. This importance lies in long 
term product development and marketing decisions. The product and marketing managers 
can decide which component should be developed in the future (Jiao and Tseng, 2000a) 
by considering the selling price. Furthermore, the value informs the firm about the 
importance of each component to the customers. 
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From the above description, the commonality index can be produced by mapping the 
service time, unit product prices and total costs onto the Cartesian coordinate for the 
plane x y z   to represent agility in terms of time jW , quality jP  and total costs TC j ,
respectively. Thus, we can decompose a vector into component vectors along each 
coordinate axis. 
We assume that ideal product structure is composed of the variables minimum total 
costs min TC j , minimum service time min jW  (in this case, it is assumed as jT ) and 
maximum quality max jP , to obtain the commonality index 1jJ  . Thus, we can write 
our unit vector for ideal product ( )P  and existing product ( )Q  as:  
  max minTC cos  min  cos   cos   j jj
j j
V
P WD E JO O
§ · § ·  ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹ © ¹
 (14) 
  TC cos  W  cos    cos   j jj
j j
V
Q D E JO O
§ · § ·  ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹ © ¹
 (15) 
where max ( . ) TCj j j j jV p P O u 
These three cosines are called the direction cosines of time jW , quality jP  and total 
costs TC j . Finally, the angle between three-dimensional vectors can be represented as  
.
arccos j jj
j j
P Q
P Q
J
ª º
« » « »¬ ¼
 (16) 
where  
     2 2 2min max minTC   j j jP W P  
and  
     2 2 2W  P TC  j j jQ   
jJ  is called product substitutability for product variety-j, which signifies to what degree 
products in the product family can substitute for each other. Equation (16) shows us that 
higher contribution to product family Tp  increases jJ  value. 
4 The problem 
Our example is the design for a product family of office chair (see Du, Jiao and Tseng, 
2000). The under-frame is composed of two modules – the stand and the support. The 
seat is composed of the upholstery and the seat frame. The customers are allowed to 
select whether or not a chair is turnable, moveable, and whether or not it has armrests. 
The example seemingly looks very simple to use to demonstrate our models. 
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From the engineering perspective, variants share the same general product structure, 
durable materials and design. Upholstery is a common module of this family. Both of the 
above two comprise the common base of the product family. The stand, support and seat 
frame are three distinctive modules. We notice that the variety of seat frame is derived 
from a variety without armrests. Support armrests are not a variety parameter of the end 
product. Hence, the variety of seat frame cannot be perceived by customers and is 
invisible at the end product level. The variety without armrests is embodied as a 
distinctive structural relationship between the modules of armrests and office chair. 
A general product structure of the office chair product family can be depicted in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1 General product structure 
4.1 Results 
The first step in solving the problem is calculating how many product variants are in the 
product family. Since there are three parts that can be customised and each of them has 
two options, then the possible numbers of product variants are obtained from sum of 
factorials of components’ varieties or Variety 2! 2! 2! 8 u u   product variants. It is 
supposed that each product variant demand is independent. The symbol for components 
is first introduced to name the product variants, as in Table 1 
Table 1 Components’ symbol 
Component Symbol 
Back A
Seat Frame A B
Seat Frame B C
Upholstery D
Stand A E
Stand B  F
Pad G
Wheel H
Armrest I
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Table 2 Cost component calculation 
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Table 1 depicts the symbol of components for this paper, and the name of product 
variant is taken from the component’s name that composes it. Table 2 depicts eight 
product variants (the first eight rows) and their components and ( )jE I  inventory 
allocation, as well as push–pull CODP decisions in considering services rates and 
inbound service and production rates. This paper assumes that DV  for all products and 
components is 5%. Thus, by utilising Equations (1)–(6) we can decide on a strategic 
safety stock allocation to decide on push or pull CODP, as depicted in Table 2. It 
indicates that a longer replenishment time and higher supply standard deviation ijV  create 
higher ( )jE I . This result implies that manufacturing and supply capability ( , , )j i ijT W V
have an important role in determining ( )jE I  allocation  
Table 2 shows that different iW  has an effect on different levels of CODP, where 
longer procurement time needs safety stock allocation in the final product manufacturer. 
The above result must be used in commonality index development by considering 
Equations (9)–(17) to calculate cost components, as follows. 
Let us suppose a manufacturer receives customer requirements from the sales 
department. The firm’s website contains customer preferences such as functionality, 
comfort, durability, price and flexibility. The website asks to the customer to rank the 
requirements according to their importance level by the application of analytical 
hierarchy process (AHP), by giving pairwise comparison between two preferences. The 
structure of the decision tree can be depicted as in Figure 2. 
The customer specific information is then transferred to the central processing unit 
(CPU) to obtain the specific product, which meets the requirements at the closest level 
according to component variants. Once the information has been obtained, product 
development department (PDD) collects and analyses a brand new product commonality 
index for further improvement in product development design. Product information that 
is required by PDD are krp and ,ikp  as follows 
Further, information from Tables 3 and 4 can be used to compose jJ  by the following 
(11)–(16), as in Table 5 
Figure 2 Decision tree for product variety analysis 
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Table 3 rp  data from marketing department and irp  data from PDD department 
Customer preference information from marketing department 
Normalised 
pir (%)
Functionality 
(%)
Comfort 
(%)
Durability 
(%)
Price 
(%)
Flexibility 
(%)
  pr   
Degree of 
importance 
15 10 30 20 15 
Back 10 5 15 15 13 13 
Seat Frame A 5 20 10 10 10 10 
Seat Frame B 10 20 10 10 5 10 
Stand B 15 5 15 15 20 15 
Seat frame 10 10 20 15 5 14 
Upholstery 20 15 5 5 13 10 
Seat 10 5 5 5 10 7 
Stand 5 5 5 10 7 6 
Support 5 5 5 5 7 5 
Stand A 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Pad 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 4 Component i  preference for product j ijp  data from product development 
department 
Back
(%)
Seat 
frame (%)
Upholstery
(%)
Seat 
(%)
Stand 
(%)
Support 
(%)
Stand A
(%)
Pad 
(%)
Stand B 
(%)
pir 13 14 10 7 6 5 5 5 15  
    pij      pj (%) 
Product 
ABDEGI 
10 20 0 30 15 0 12.50 0 12.50 13 
Product 
ABDEHI 
13 13 0 15 0 0 20 30 10 12 
Product 
ABDFGI 
15 25 0 0 10 20 20 0 10 14 
Product 
ABDFHI 
10 20 0 0 0 20 20 15 15 13 
Product 
ACDEGI 
20 0 15 20 15 0 25 0 5 11 
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Table 4 Component i  preference for product j ijp  data from product development 
department (continued) 
Back
(%)
Seat 
frame (%)
Upholstery
(%)
Seat 
(%)
Stand 
(%)
Support 
(%)
Stand A
(%)
Pad 
(%)
Stand B 
(%)
pir 13 14 10 7 6 5 5 5 15  
    pij      pj (%) 
Product 
ACDEHI 
15 0 10 10 0 0 15 40 10 11 
Product 
ACDFGI 
20 0 10 0 10 30 10 0 20 13 
Product 
ACDFHI 
20 0 25 0 0 25 10 10 10 13 
         Total 100 
Table 5 CI calculation by using strategic safety stock allocation 
Product 
name 
min jW minjTC max jV jW jTC jV j jP Q | || |j jP Q jJ
Product 
AEDEGI 
3.005 30.4 8,681 6 562.1 7774.7 67,512,816 67,672,277 0.998 
Product 
AEDEHI 
2.505 9.2 7,748 5 714.0 6938.6 53,765,330 54,042,677 0.995 
Product 
ABDPGI 
20.568 10.9 9,006 41 464.6 8065.1 72,637,404 72,753,095 0.998 
Product 
AEDFHI 
20.639 4.7 8,665 41 649.9 7759.5 67,236,641 67,469,246 0.997 
Product 
ACDEGI 
3.005 7.6 7,635 6 562.1 6837.1 52,202,421 52,374,257 0.997 
Product 
ACDEHI 
2.004 3.8 7,297 4 888.7 6535.1 47,691,629 48,127,184 0.991 
Product 
ACDPGI 
5.006 6.0 8,852 10 374.7 7927.4 70,176,477 70,252,633 0.999 
Product 
ACDFHI 
20.432 3.8 8,525 41 59472.2 7634.7 65,315,461 511,175,421 0.128 
J  average 0.89 
Table 5 shows that lower TC j  takes effect in improving jJ . Further, the effect of 
strategic safety stock allocation on total cost reduction can be shown as in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 depicts that strategic safety stock allocation gives benefit in terms of total 
cost (products and components) reduction. Furthermore, the effect of this allocation on 
product development design can be shown through jJ  investigation, as follows. 
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Figure 3 Strategic safety stock allocations versus average inventory level total costs 
Table 6 CI calculation without applying strategic safety stock allocation 
Product 
name min jW
min
jTC max jV jW jTC jV j jP Q | || |j jP Q jJ
Product 
ABDEGI 
3.0 30.4 8,681 6 1656.3 7648.7 66,452,172 67,941,266 0.978 
Product 
ABDEHI 
2.5 9.2 7,748 5 2263.4 6826.1 52,908,302 55,719,152 0.950 
Product 
ABDFGI 
20.6 10.9 9,006 41 1244.0 7934.3 71,468,689 72,328,393 0.988 
Product 
ABDFHI 
20.6 4.7 8,665 41 1839.4 7633.8 66,152,578 68,037,168 0.972 
Product 
ACDEGI 
3.0 7.6 7,635 6 1719.9 6726.3 51,365,217 53,004,267 0.969 
Product 
ACDEHI 
2.0 3.8 7,297 4 2911.8 6429.2 46,926,387 51,502,766 0.911 
Product 
ACDFGI 
5.0 6.0 8,852 10 1068.7 7799.0 69,043,244 69,682,070 0.991 
Product 
ACDFHI 
20.4 3.8 2,525 41 58508.3 7511.0 64,256,856 502,890,415 0.128 
J average 0.86 
Suppose that all of the product variants and components are managed by using standard 
inventory management (base stock and safety stock). Thus, the Jj calculation for non-
optimised safety stock allocation can be shown as in Table 6. 
By comparing Tables 5 and 6, we can see that CODP management through strategic 
stock allocation can improve product commonality by increasing the Jj value from 0.86 to 
0.89. The small positive change in commonality signifies that components and products 
are used at almost equal opportunity. 
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4.2 Managerial implications 
Although the application of the manufacturing process design and product development 
design integration have provided very preliminary findings on how product platform 
commonality degree can be assessed, it can, nevertheless, be used as a powerful decision 
support system. 
Similar commonality index proposed in previous literature (Blecker and Abdelkafi, 
2007; Collier, 1981, 1982; Eynan and Rosenblatt, 1996; Jiao and Tseng, 1996) 
undoubtedly focused on product architecture designs, since the manufacturing process 
design is separately discussed (Jiao and Tseng, 1996). This suggests that the allocation of 
strategic safety stock to decide on push–pull CODP is idiosyncratic to a particular 
product architecture design. Manufacturing process performance is based on the level of 
customer involvement in the product development process, and product development 
process performance is based on the way in which products can be manufactured and 
recombined into new configurations without losing functionality and performance. Thus, 
optimising the safety stock facilitates product manufacturability as well as acceptability 
in terms of customer requirements by linking to the product development process. 
For practitioners, a strategic safety stock allocation to decide on CODP and Jj
measurement models is valuable, as they highlight various managerial and strategic 
implications of design for supply chain decisions. These decisions are usually based on 
the firm’s vision on supply chain agility (Sharifi, Ismail and Reid, 2006). When the 
framework of mapping out a dynamic and structured approach for developing agile 
supply chains is understood in a systematic manner, strategic safety stock allocation and 
Jj measurement models facilitate decision making with regard to product, company and 
supply chain factors. The decision making process facilitates coordination between the 
manufacturing process and the PDD so as to enhance knowledge sharing and trust. 
In addition to concurrent engineering, concentrating on product development design 
solely causes operation problems. The effect of this assumption is that a process or 
product is optimised by assuming that the highest commonality in either product or 
process would reduce the lead times and at the same time the inventory level. This 
assumption seems to make sense even though it also enlarges the gap between product 
development and manufacturing processes at different factory locations. Blecker and 
Abdelkafi (2007), conversely, maximise customer expectation by allowing the 
probability of the component variants to be chosen by customers. However, this paper 
has just focused on the product design area, without giving an opportunity to the 
manufacturing process to reconfigure the strategic safety stock allocation and CODP in 
order to guarantee the lead times. Thus, information sharing related product development 
(i.e. product design, material and product specifications) and manufacturing process 
(i.e. holding cost, inventory level, production capacity, production cost and 
manufacturing process capability) are required along the supply chain. This can be 
applied by applying Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI), Collaborative Planning, 
Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR) or Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) to 
facilitate concurrent engineering. 
4.3 Discussion of the models 
It is common in the literature that modular design or common components is an enabler 
for product customisation. This section gives an insight for product managers into the 
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validity of the term. This section, in fact, supports supply chain design by investigating 
the effect of customising manufacturing strategy on product design by considering jJ .
The goal of the push–pull manufacturing strategy is that the manufacturer will 
minimise the expected on-hand inventory so as to give guaranteed lead times. 
Furthermore, in terms of supply chain design, it is important to link jJ  to the 
manufacturing strategy in order to align product design and supply chain as a 
manifestation of design for the supply chain. 
In terms of TC j  effect on the product commonality index, Equation (12) informs us 
that the higher TC j  reduces jS  and furthermore jJ . Since angle between ideal product 
( )P  and existing product ( )Q  grows wider, then, the increasing of TC j  will decrease 
product commonality jJ . Reducing TC j  can be accomplished by reducing inbound 
service time iW  and its standard deviation m jV   so as to change safety stock level and 
CODP. 
Another result on cost model is that reducing jW  to minimise TC j  can be 
accomplished by customising push–pull manufacturing strategy in considering facility 
capability. By assigning safety stock appropriately to each product variant, then it is 
possible to eliminate some of the holding cost of such a product variant that is assigned to 
MTO or MTS. Obviously, it should be traded off with service cost T jC  , where shorter 
jW  results in higher T jC   (see Equation (6)). 
An impact of higher product commonality index on cost reduction is that higher 
product commonality index lowers safety stock by reducing demand standard deviation 
between product-j and product-k jV . Let us suppose that 2jV  is the demand variance of 
product-j, thus if we have two product variants j and k, then we have demand standard 
deviation for the two variants as 2 2 2jk j k j kV V V UV V    where j kUV V  is the 
covariance of jD  and .kD  Thus, reducing a product variant’s correlation U  will reduce 
jkV  where it implies higher product commonality index. 
5 Conclusion and future research 
This paper has discussed mass personalisation of the customisable product family 
through product and process reconfiguration, followed by revenue optimisation in 
considering the material procurement prices. We may summarise the results derived from 
the model as follows.  
1 Manufacturing process design customisation supports product development process 
optimisation. In fact, this effort is devoted to increasing the product platform 
commonality by minimising total costs for the entire product family. 
2 The inclusion of the customer in the product development process enables the 
application of design for MC (Jiao and Tseng, 1996). This result supports the 
conclusion of Tseng and Du (1998), who concluded that customers can make choices 
and find out their needs. Our paper, however, gives additional advantage by showing 
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the benefit of customer involvement for manufacturing process design by creating 
push–pull manufacturing strategy to reduce lead times and total costs. 
3 Linking the manufacturing strategy (strategic safety stock allocation and push–pull 
CODP) and Jj to increase product platform commonality and total costs are the main 
outcomes of this paper. This conclusion corresponds with supply chain design by 
giving an in-depth analysis from the product, process and supply chain point of view 
(Salvador, Rungtusanatham and Forza, 2002), and finally building an analysis of 
concurrent engineering by sharing information between the marketing department, 
PDD and manufacturing process department, as well as suppliers (Sharifi, Ismail and 
Reid, 2006). 
In terms of future research direction, the area of model application should be expanded to 
supply strategy in order to induce innovation on component platform modularity. Future 
research should investigate the advantage of this proposed model for knowledge sharing 
so as to encourage supply chain collaboration. 
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1 Introduction 
Lead times and inventory level are two strategic decisions which supply chain manager’s 
face over time. Holweg et al. (2005) showed four types of collaboration to increase 
responsiveness and lower inventory cost. These can be classified according to the level of 
integration, the capability of integration of the supply chain, geographical dispersion and 
demand patterns. Christiansen et al. (2007), however, argued against this investigation 
and showed that only collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment (CPFR) can 
be categorised as collaborative effort. 
The Holweg or Christiansen definitions of collaboration are difficult to apply directly 
to global and order based supply chains that are characterised by location diversity, 
control limitation, uncertainty and complexity. One reason is that global and order-based 
firms are different from centralised and mass production based ones in many respects. 
These differences extend to the requirements with respect to agile manufacturing because 
of consumer preferences for diversification (Gunasekaran et al., 2008). Thus, most 
previous discussions were focused on information visibility (Holweg et al., 2005), 
without considering the benefit of product commonality on collaboration. 
So far few serious attempts have been made to investigate the effect of product 
commonality on the dynamics of collaboration instead of its value at any given time (Jiao 
and Tseng, 2000; Mikkola and Larsen, 2004; Blecker and Abdelkaffi, 2007; Mikkola, 
2007). However, the dynamic property is important with regard to making the 
decentralised supply chain strategic decisions. 
In considering the importance of agile manufacturing to responsive supply chains 
(Gunasekaran et al., 2008), it is essential to take into account the possible effects of 
product commonality and collaboration for built-to-order (BTO) supply chains. In 
particular, collaboration according to speed and flexibility by considering supplier-buyer 
communication, which affects the firm’s production quantities as well as inventory level 
and designing innovative products (Gunasekaran et al., 2008) as a collaboration at the 
product design phase (Blecker and Friedrich, 2007). Finally, as a result of product 
platform standardisation, it is important to investigate its benefit to supply chain 
collaboration. 
In addition to recent literature, closed loop second order control analogy is a special 
case in terms of this collaboration. This approach has been introduced conceptually by 
Holweg et al. (2005) and this paper translates the concept into control system methods. 
This model is different to control theory application in management science (Sethi and 
Thompson, 2000; Sethi, 1977), where the decision is assumed to depend merely on the 
single firm, without considering other party’s reactions. This approach introduces a more 
realistic and observable method by looking at the dynamic behaviour of the two sides, the 
buyer and the supplier. Generally speaking, we investigate the control approach on the 
customised supply chain objective and profit maximisation by finding the optimum 
production rates (buyer and the supplier) and product commonality degree. 
In Section 2 we introduce background for the research on dynamic analysis in 
competition and the research area of this paper. In the following section, a two stage 
game is described, in which the buyer and the supplier are analysed using the production 
and supply contract model while the supply chain collaboration is examined by utilising 
the response analysis through control model (Section 3). The problem example section 
presents and discusses the simulation results. The managerial implication section exhibits 
benefit of the proposed models. The conclusion and further research sections explore the 
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information behind the simulation results in the previous section and discuss some future 
research opportunities. 
2 Background for the research 
Dynamic analysis was used to represent a decision maker who intends to plan his 
capacity in advance according to the present situation (Smithies and Savage, 1940). In 
contrast, Dudey (1992) argues against the idea by introducing dynamic  
Edgeworth-Bertrand competition in order to solve dynamic competition under capacity 
constraint and presenting dynamic pricing, which can be changed at any time. When this 
game is duopoly, the payoff function of each firm maps the duopolists’ strategy choices 
into the firm’s total expected profit. Event though the Dudey model used dynamic 
pricing, this model does not present dynamic capacity as a result of demand change. 
Singh and Vives (1984) focus their analysis on flexible capacity/price appropriateness 
to hedge against predetermined price/quantity contracts. Their analysis adapts to a new 
demand or price after making a price or delivery quantity contract formerly under the 
absence or presence of product substitutability degree. In contrast to that paper, our 
contribution is focused on a dynamic analysis of the capacity, by considering supply 
chain responsiveness. The tournament model (Gibbons, 1992) is used to represent a 
production game to investigate the product variety effect on supply chain performance 
(Miegham and Dada, 1999; Gustafsson and Norrman, 2001). 
The application of dynamic analysis to management science was introduced by Sethi 
(1977), for instance revenue optimisation in persuasive advertising models. The same 
principle is also applied in the context of logistics because of its applicability to 
coordinated supply chains. This paper serves as a fundamental description for future 
research in supply chain control. 
Control application in supply chains is closely linked to an important issue with 
regard to the properties of industrial dynamics (Forrester, 1958; Houlihan, 1987; Towill, 
1996; Christopher and Towill, 2001; Wilkner et al, 2007), which further carries on the 
bullwhip effect that possibly emerges along value chains. Forrester (1958) applies some 
tools from electronic data processing to feedback control in order to show how some 
input factors such as decisions, delay and prediction influence the smoothness of 
operations. Furthermore, the paper describes the bullwhip effect as the delay in some 
order processing stages which causes fluctuation behavior. This reminds us of the 
importance of improving control that can produce faster order handling and better sales 
data. 
By considering BTO control problems from the point of view of the supplier, 
however, the previous literature does not adequately address the importance of product 
variety (Jiao and Tseng, 2000; Mikkola and Larsen, 2004; Blecker and Abdelkaffi, 2007) 
on supply chain performance. Recently, Holweg et al. (2005) have studied the 
information visibility implications from the supplier’s point of view by extending the 
supplier responsibility up to the buyer sales point, resulting from the existence of 
information exchange. Previously, the effect of product variety on manufacturing 
performance has been investigated in terms of quality and productivity (MacDuffie et al., 
1996) by suggesting complexity postponement through product and process redesign 
(Lee, 1996). Recently, Miles and Snow (2007) and Gunasekaran et al. (2008) insisted on 
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collaborative capability to increase innovation capacity. Thus, information transparency 
supports supply chain performance in terms of manufacturing capability (Christiansen et 
al., 2007; Si et al., 2009) by putting orientation in a triple-A supply chain of agility, 
alignment and adaptability (Merminod et al., 2007) so as to link between supply chain 
performance (manufacturing and financial) and supply chain collaboration in terms of 
information transparency (Van der Vaart and Van Donk, 2008). 
The purpose of this paper is to generalise Holweg’s model to address the information 
visibility issue mentioned above. Demand information visibility is imposed on the model 
so as to ensure that the demand for an order is fulfilled as much as is needed for 
supporting electronic procurement (Schoenherr and Tummala, 2007). In addition, the 
problem of simultaneously solving the optimal ordering and price discount problem for 
the supplier and buyer is addressed (Hu and Munson, 2007). It is shown that the optimal 
solution now depends on both the total costs of the supplier and the buyer together with 
their production rates and product commonality decisions. Holweg’s model on 
synchronised supply naturally becomes a special case of our generalised model so that we 
propose a feedback control mechanism for BTO supply chains. 
3 Model description for supply chain design and control 
This section is composed of two subsections, namely supply chain design and response 
analysis with control model. Supply chain design (Section 3.1) details how to allocate 
buyer and supplier’s production rates to minimise safety stock and response time and at 
the same to built supply contract for providing guaranteed lead times to customers. Thus, 
response analysis with control model is used to analyse the optimum response rate 
(Section 3.2). Each subsection is detailed as follows. 
3.1 Supply chain design 
Suppose now that two firms (one buyer and one supplier) can agree on only two types of 
contracts: replenishment contract and production contract. To focus the discussion, this 
paper uses the two stages game, by considering the buyer as a first mover at stage-j and 
the supplier as the second mover at stage j – 1. To defence of this consideration, it is 
often in business negotiation that a buyer takes advantage as a first mover by proposing 
their requirements by considering their own profits and a supplier will take action just 
after received the buyer request. Thus a supplier needs to optimise their production plan 
to avoid profit violation. First, we analyse stage 1 to optimise the buyer production rate 
against the buyer revenue maximisation as Section 3.1.1 and stage 2 to optimise the 
supplier production rate against the buyer production rate (Section 3.1.2) as below. 
3.1.1 Buyer and supplier choose optimal production rate and services time at 
stage-j and stage j – 1 
We solve the buyer optimum production quantity by decomposing the multi-stage supply 
chain strategic inventory location model into J stages, where J is the number of 
workstations in the supply chain and there is one stage for each node. For each node-j we 
define *jP  to be the optimum service rates and Wj to be the optimum service times. We 
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use *jP  and Wj formulation of Kristianto and Helo (2010) by considering that our 
production process is high mix and high volume so the demand intensity is non stationary 
and unstable. Thus we have the following (see Kristianto and Helo, 2010). 
 2 2 '2. . . .
2.
2.
A j j j W j T j
j j
T j
C C
C
V V O
P O   


 r  (1) 
.jj q j
j
W W
P
O   (2) 
where
 
 
2 2
2 1
j A j j
q j
j
W
O V V
U



d

 is maximum waiting time in a queue according to GI/G/1 
queue system, A jV   and jV  in equation (1) denote the demand inter-arrival rate standard 
deviation and service rate standard deviation at stage-j. A jV   can be found as maximum 
difference between average inter-arrival time 1
jO
 and maximum inter-arrival time at 
maximum demand rate during net replenishment time 1
j D jO V 
 or 
1 1
A j
j j D j
V O O V 
    where D jV   is demand rate standard deviation and utilisation 
factor jU  can be found from jj
j
OU P  (see Gross and Harris, 1974). The two results of 
equation (1) can be used to decide on the buyer optimum production rate by considering 
the least non-negative jP  value at stage-j. This decision is also applied to supplier 
production rate *1jP   and services time and 1.jW   The above models modifies Caldentey 
and Wein (2003) single server queue model into GI/G/1 model (Kristianto and Helo, 
2010) that is used to extend the problem from one buyer and one supplier into  
multi-stages optimisation by giving 100% guaranteed lead times. 
Obviously in real business negotiation, it is important to get trust from partners in 
order to meet all of objectives (promised lead times and low costs of manufacturing). 
Thus, below is proposed business negotiation in terms of supply contract between one 
supplier and one buyer by considering reward and penalty for contract items violation. 
3.1.2 Contract strategy between a buyer and a supplier 
Suppose in the delivery contract the buyer as a customer takes the initiative by 
announcing a contract proposal which contains some requirements, for instances delivery 
promptness and prices, and the buyer and the suppliers’ responsibilities. Thus we modify 
tournament game (Gibbons, 1992) to solve this problem as follows. 
Suppose that 2ijV  is supplier service time variance and 2T jV   buyer production 
process time variance at stage –j. Thus, if we assume that between supplier and buyer are 
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independent, then we have the buyer service rate standard deviation as 
  2 2j ij T jm p jV V V V      (Kristianto and Helo, 2010). The buyer will propose 
incentive I to reducing  *j jV V  where jV  and *jV  are the buyer actual processing 
rate standard deviation and planned processing rate standard deviation where they depend 
on the supplier processing rate standard deviation .ijV  Thus, we have the following 
incentive proposal as below. 
Suppose the supplier and the buyer has established a long term contract by choosing 
the incentive I and penalty cost p for the supplier. The firm gives incentive to the 
suppliers whenever they can deliver the buyer in the predetermined service time range at 
* .i ijW Vr  If production accuracy  *ij ijV V  is to be a common objective between the 
supplier and the buyer, then, for each i, *ijV  must maximise the supplier’s expected profit, 
net of penalty and holding costs:  *ijV  must solve 
   ^ `    ^ `
   ^ `      ^ `
     ^ `
* *
0
* *
*
max .Pr .Pr
.Pr Pr
Pr
t
i ij i ij i ij i ij
i ij i ij i ij i ij
i ij i ij
I ob W W p ob W W
h ob W W p h ob W W
p I p ob W W
H
V V V V
V V V V
V V
t
  
    
   
 (3) 
The first order condition for (9) is 
     ^ `      ^ `* *Pr Pri ij i ij i ij i ij
ij
ob W W
p h I p ob W W
V V
V VV
w 
   w  (4) 
That is, the firm and the supplier choose incentive I, penalty p and holding h costs, such 
that the over or under estimation of variance  *Pr 0j job V V !  is minimised, which is 
the probability of over estimation. From Bayes rule, 
   ^ `    ^ `
   ^ ` ^ `  
   ^ ` 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* * * *
* * * *
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H
H
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³
³
 (5) 
So the first-order condition (11) becomes 
           ^ `* * * *Pr
j
ij ij i ij ij i ij i ijp h f W f d I p ob W W
V
V V V V V V      ³
In a steady state (i.e., * ),i iW W  we have 
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^ `2 *Pr
j
ij ij i ij i ijp h f d I p ob W W
V
V V V V    ³  (6) 
If H is normally distributed with variance 2V  for example, then 
 
 *
2 1
2
t ij ij
ij ijf d
H V V
V V V S
 ³  (7) 
 
   
   ^ `
*
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2
ij ij
i ij i ij
p h
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I pV V
V VV S
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if is *ij ijV V  assumed to be continuously distributed ( ),N of  then 
   * 2*
ij ij
ij ij ij ijp dV VV V V V V  ³  and equation (8) becomes 
 
   
2
*
22
ij ij
p h
I p
V V
S
  

 (9) 
Equation (9) signifies that increasing incentive I and penalty cost p will reduce 
 *ij ijV V  significantly. We can show that the buyer considers p instead of I because it 
can reduce  *j jV V  more effectively and so is the supplier because one does not like to 
be threaten. This situation supports previous theory on strategic moves game that threat 
always trustable in the opponent’s point of view. Effects of those strategies will be 
examined by analysing the supply chains response through control model as Section 3.3 
below.
3.3 Response analysis with feedback control model 
Difference equations are required to model our continuous control mechanism in order to 
get a real description of how the ramp up period in the production plant develops. These 
difference equations can quickly be turned into a mathematical model of feedback control 
by using Laplace-transforms (Wilkner et al., 2007), which is represented as a two tank 
interaction as follows. 
Figure 1 depicts an interaction between stage j – 1 and stage-j. This model modifies 
the Holweg et al. (2005) model (synchronised supply) by replacing the inventory level 
with production rate at stage-jPj. A feedback control mechanism is introduced to 
represent the interaction as follows. 
From this point on our discussion refers to second order fluid dynamics modelling 
that is adopted in BTO supply chains with an assumption that the supply chain system 
oscillates due to customer demand variety. The formulation and exploitation of such a 
mathematical model is not presented in this contribution due to space restrictions but can 
be found in Luyben (1990). 
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Figure 1 Supplier buyer collaboration 
jP1jP
1jR jR
jO
jq
1jq CK
 tH j
99
In defence of a closed loop system with information feedback application, it is often 
difficult in practice to react against demand change once at a time. A stage-i might use 
incremental production rate by considering stage-i and stage-j inventory levels and 
transportation availability. The closed loop control system presented herein is consistent 
with this perspective. 
In stage-i, the POS data is bounded so that we have demand rate at stage-j at the end 
of the review period-t as Dj(t) (In our example it is taken as 1000 units per week), and is 
then compared with the average demand rate at stage-j. Thus, a new additional 
production plan and replenishment order to stage-i need to be established as 
    .j j jH t D t O 
It is important to understand that stage-i demand is obtained from accumulative of the 
whole product variants’ demands within product family at stage-j or 
  .ij ij jj iD t Oz )¦  where it is expressed as follow 
 
   2 2 2 1
j j
i j
H s R
s K s sP W 9W
 
   (10) 
 
 
i
j j
j
s
K G
H s
P    (11) 
We recognise Rj in (10), which denotes delivery cycles product j, and it equals 
j
jq
O
 where 
qj is economic order quantity of product-j at certain values of h and setup cost s. W is stage 
j – 1 rise time characterising the response to a time-varying demand of stage-j and it just 
equal to stage-j processing time 
 
 
2 2
.
2 1
j A j j
j
j
W
P V V
U
  

Kj represents utilisation factor Uj
to inform us whether in our order there is a delay/backorder at stage-j, or not. The 
damping coefficient 9 provides a mathematical means of expressing the level of damping 
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in a system and in this paper we use 9 value is equal to 1J  where J is product platform 
commonality degree to signify quickest and most accurate response to customer demand 
at stage j where the higher value denotes more accurate response. Thus, 9 signs supply 
chain flexibility. 
In defense of the relationship 1 ,9 J  it is often that make-to-stock (MTS) production 
is applied into high mix production system where flexibility is a must. MTS is also 
signified by higher value of J to induce higher flexibility. Lower 9 represents quicker 
response to customer demand and on the other hand, higher 9 represents slower response 
to customer demand. Thus, we have closed loop feedback control as, 
Figure 2 Closed feedback control transfer function 
 1222 .  ssK
RK
j
jC
9WW
CK
1
6
 tH j
setH j
KC in Figure 2 represents stage j – 1 responsiveness. For instance, if the demand change 
at stage-j is Hj(t) = 100 units at the end of review period, then, KC = 1 will change the 
production rate r10% of D(W). The larger the KC, the more the production rate will 
change for a given Hj(t). In defence of KC application, it is often difficult in practice to 
assess responsiveness for an external customer. Similarly, when we asked managers for 
their desired responsiveness, more often than not the response is that there should be no 
stock outs for external customers (Graves and Willems, 2000). Thus, KC gives reaction in 
proportion to the error Hj(t) so that the production facility reduces or increases gradually 
the target point with very little, if any, ‘safety stock level overshoot’ so that the result is a 
smooth inventory level. This implies that higher KC requires more frequent changes in 
shop floor operations as is compared to lower KC. Finally, Figure 2 can be used to find its 
open loop transfer function, as follows, 
 
 
 
   
2 2
1
2 2
2 2
2 1 .
. 2 11
2 1
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 (20) 
So we have roots of denominator as 
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Laplace domain dynamics according to step disturbance is applied in order to represent 
sudden demand change, which can be inserted directly into (20) and inverted to obtain 
the following inversion of the Laplace transform, as follows 
 
    
1 1j
set
j
s
s s a s bs
P
O
     (21) 
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Finally, a time domain dynamics of synchronised supply can be formulated as follows 
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j
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·
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
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
 11  (22) 
Equation (22) concludes our process modelling in closed loop feedback control by 
defining optimum parameter KC and 9 that can be determined by using Ziegler-Nichols 
(ZN) controller settings (Luyben, 1990). The ZN method consists of first finding the 
ultimate gain KU, the value at which the loop is at the limit of stability with a proportional 
only feedback controller. Thus, optimum KC can be calculated from KU as 0,5. .C UK K 
4 The problem 
Section 4 is introduced to demonstrate the operability of the proposed models. This 
Section is divided into two sub sections where Section 4.1 exhibits the situation of the 
problem example and Section 4.2 discussed the results and explores some information 
behind the results. 
4.1 Illustrative example 
Our example is the supply chain design for a product family of office chair (see 
Kristianto and Helo, 2010). The underframe is composed of two modules – the stand and 
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the support. The seat is composed of the upholstery and the seat-frame. The Customers 
are allowed to select whether or not a chair is turnable, drivable and whether or not it has 
armrests. The example seemingly looks very simple to be used to demonstrate our 
models. 
Figure 3 General product structure 
Source: rewritten from Kristianto and Helo (2010) 
In focusing our discussion, we use the results of product platform commonality degree J
formulation of Kristianto and Helo (2010). In presenting synchronised supply and KJ is 
obtained from our supply chain design Section by finding stage-j (the buyer) utilisation 
factor.
First, the buyer transmits point of sales (POS) data Oj to the supplier’s factory in 
monthly basis. This information is then compared with the inventory of available 
components. Thus, a new production plan and replenishment order to the supplier both 
need to be established: for example, how many additional production quantity Hj and 
ordered component Hj–1. The higher Hj and Hj–1, the higher component inventory level is 
required because each component has its own demand variance and safety stock (Lee, 
1996). Thus, higher component commonality will reduce inventory level. 
Utilising the buyer’s POS data (see Table 1 below). Thus, on time delivery can be 
achieved by pursuing the required production rates settP  as soon as possible at predefined 
KC and Kj. setjP  ensures adequate availability without building up excessive stocks 
[equation (9)]. 
4.2 Results and analysis 
The first step in solving the problem is that calculating how much optimum production 
rates of the buyer and the suppliers. We extract some data from Kristianto and Helo 
(2010) as Table 1 below and change some of their values, for instance processing rates 
standard deviation Vj now is an independent variable to investigate the effect of supply 
contract to supply chains response. 
Table 1 Manufacturing performances for office chair product family 
Chair
Back Seat Underframe Arm rest
Seat frame Upholstery Stand Support
Seat frame A Seat frame B Stand A Stand B Pad Wheel
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Independent variables Stage
(J) Component/product Oj Vj VD–j CW–j CT–j
12 Product ABDEGI 300 0.03 30.0 10 15 
12 Product ABDEGI 250 0.03 25.0 10 15 
12 Product ABDEGI 400 0.03 40.0 10 15 
12 Product ABDEGI 300 0.03 30.0 10 15 
12 Product ABDEGI 300 0.03 30.0 10 15 
12 Product ABDEGI 200 0.03 20.0 10 15 
12 Product ABDEGI 500 0.03 50.0 10 15 
12 Product ABDEGI 800 0.03 80.0 10 15 
11 Back 3050 0.03 305.0 10 15 
10 Seat 3050 0.03 305.0 10 15 
9 Underframe 3050 0.03 305.0 10 15 
8 Seat frame A 1250 0.03 125.0 10 15 
7 Seat frame B 1800 0.03 180.0 10 15 
6 Upholstery 3050 0.03 305.0 10 15 
5 Stand A 1050 0.03 105.0 10 15 
4 Stand B 2000 0.03 200.0 10 15 
3 Pad 1500 0.03 150.0 10 15 
2 Wheel 1550 0.03 155.0 10 15 
1 Armrest 3050 0.03 305.0 10 15 
Dependent variables Stage
(J) Component/product Wi Wj Wq–j VA–j Pj
12 Product ABDEGI 4.0 0.5 0.3 0.00030 600 
12 Product ABDEGI 4.0 0.5 0.2 0.00036 500 
12 Product ABDEGI 4.0 0.7 0.4 0.00023 800 
12 Product ABDEGI 4.0 0.5 0.3 0.00030 600 
12 Product ABDEGI 4.0 0.5 0.3 0.00030 600 
12 Product ABDEGI 4.0 0.4 0.2 0.00045 400 
12 Product ABDEGI 4.0 0.9 0.4 0.00018 1000 
12 Product ABDEGI 4.0 1.4 0.7 0.00011 1600 
11 Back 2.0 4.0 2.0 0.00003 6101 
10 Seat 2.0 4.0 2.0 0.00003 6101 
9 Underframe 2.0 4.0 2.0 0.00003 6101 
8 Seat frame A 2.0 2.3 1.1 0.00007 2501 
7 Seat frame B 2.0 3.2 1.6 0.00005 3601 
6 Upholstery 2.0 4.0 2.0 0.00003 6101 
5 Stand A 2.0 1.9 0.9 0.00009 2101 
4 Stand B 2.0 3.6 1.8 0.00005 4001 
3 Pad 2.0 2.7 1.3 0.00006 3001 
2 Wheel 2.0 2.8 1.4 0.00006 3101 
1 Armrest 2.0 4.0 2.0 0.00003 6101 
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Without loosing generality, our analysis is only subjected to product ABDEGI in Table 1 
by considering that all of product variants are developed by using the same way. Thus, 
the results variation only depends on order size where processing time positively follow 
order size pattern. 
The system responses are measured at different component commonality (J = 0 
implies that each component’s variant is non-interchangeable and the component 
becomes fully flexible when J  approaches unity) and different level of processing times 
standard deviation are then used to investigate supply chain performance (Gustafsson and 
Norrman, 2001). 
Hence, the results can be illustrated as follows: 
Figure 4 Responses analysis at different product platform commonality levels for product variety 
ABDEGI (see online version for colours) 
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time
Hj
product platform commonality=0,1 product platform commonality=0,9
Figure 4 depicts how different commonality strategies benefit the reduction of lead times 
at the same level of production rates. Specifically, such benefit for the supplier and the 
buyer goes to those who can increase the product commonality. This result implies that at 
a higher commonality level, either the buyer or the supplier has lower effect on the 
services time standard deviation (Figure 5) because the buyer can react faster because of 
high flexibility on their product platform 
Furthermore, the benefit of higher product platform commonality is shown by supply 
chains production rates stability against demand change by lowering CK  as Figure 6 
below.
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Figure 5 Responses analysis at different Wj as a result of different Vj for product variety ABDEGI 
(see online version for colours) 
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Figure 6 Responses analysis at different KC as a result of different J for product variety ABDEGI 
(see online version for colours) 
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In considering service time standard deviation Vj, however, Vj needs to be minimised by 
making supply contract (see Section 3.1.2) to minimise h where it takes effect to 
minimise economic order quantity qj and minimise lead times (see Figure 7) as follows. 
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Figure 7 Responses analysis at different Rj as a result of different Vj for product variety ABDEGI 
(the higherVj, the lower Rj) (see online version for colours)
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The effect of supply contract to reducing *ij ijV V  can be exhibited as Figure 8 below by 
applying equation (9) at various h and I values. 
Figure 8 Incentive and penalty costs settings at different preferred delivery promptness violation 
*( )ij ijV V  for product variety ABDEGI
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Figure 8 shows that penalty costs is more effective to reducing *ij ijV V  than supplier’s 
incentive. This result proofs that in real business negotiation, threat is more effective than 
promise. Otherwise we can combine the both of incentive and penalty together to get 
better results in reducing *.ij ijV V
5 Managerial implication 
From this discussion, the product manager can take advantage of the proposed model by 
presenting the mutual impact between the buyer and supplier production quantity 
decision and product platform development. In this section, we analyse the results and 
some of the main implications regarding the impacts of platforming strategy on the 
benefit of production control. 
First, higher product commonality benefits the reduction of lead times. Specifically, 
such benefit comes from the economic order quantity qj reduction (see Figure 5) on 
supply chains responsiveness improvement. Furthermore, the benefit of product 
commonality is shown by the increasing of production rates stability at lower KC and 
reducing of Rj significantly at higher commonality degree (Figure 5 and 6), where it can 
also encourage the supplier to trust POS data. On the contrary, higher KC (see Figure 6) 
hinders suppliers in making a quick response since they must spend a certain time in 
increasing their production rates where in shop floor application it must incorporate 
production, maintenance, logistics and transportation coordination. Thus, the implication 
of higher KC is that all of manufacturing stages must ready for frequent changes against 
customer demands change where it can be minimised at lower KC.
Second, higher component commonality is better applied to ATO production systems 
since it generates lower service time standard deviation Vj (see Figure 5), thus increasing 
the supply chain flexibility. Lower value, however, is better applied to MTO since it 
responds over a longer period, with high responsiveness at higher KC, by putting 
emphasis on lower product platform commonality. 
This paper implies three main conclusions for managers. First, the feedback control 
system proposes a real description of how the ramp up period in the production plant 
develops, as well as investigating the component commonality effect on it. Second, 
component commonality increases inventory turnover by minimising economic order 
quantity qj and safety stock as a result of higher order cycle (Figure 7). The third 
contribution is that the paper offers a different view of optimal control applications on 
supply chain collaboration (Holweg et al., 2005).This paper, however, without arguing 
for either idea, proposes a parameter 9, which denotes flexibility. In general higher9
indicates that the buyer is operating under MTO, while lower 9 signs ATO. 
6 Conclusion and future research 
This paper discusses response analysis of BTO supply chains, which is followed by 
collaborative decision-making according to single sourcing. We may summarise the 
results derived from the model, as follows. 
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1 Product commonality is in linear proportion to response time. Higher commonality 
takes effect from increasing the service level. This situation is caused by reducing 
the service time standard deviation 2jV  (Lee, 1996). 
2 The dynamic behaviour analysis in this paper helps decision makers to decide on 
their production rates and inventory turnover, by optimising them against the 
required order cycle. This paper suggests that supply chains should trade-off their 
production rate decisions according to their customer order response time 
requirements in predetermined supply contracts (supplier responsiveness KC and 
flexibility 9).
3 Linking the decision on production rate, supply contract and BTO control system is 
the main outcome of this paper. This conclusion complements the previous 
conclusions of Holweg et al. (2005) by providing in-depth analysis from the control 
theory point of view. Furthermore, supply contract is added in this model in order to 
induce supply commitment so as to achieve the required response level. 
The analytical model here focused on symmetrical information sharing between two 
parties. In terms of future research direction, it would be necessary to investigate the 
possibility of applying strategic thinking in the model, where the supplier assumes that 
the buyer is not the dominant customer. Thus, it is difficult to maintain information 
security in terms of the buyer’s platform design, so that the issue of security can also be 
raised. This is a future research area that should be investigated. 
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The general purpose of the chapter is to present a novel approach to value chain re-
engineering by utilizing the new concept of Advanced Planning and Scheduling (APS).
The methodology applies collaboration among suppliers, buyers, and the customers to ful-
fill orders. The models show that it is possible to re-engineer the value chain by incorporating
the supply side (suppliers) and demand side (customers) within the new concept of APS. A
problem example is given to show how to implement this concept by emphasizing impor-
tant aspects of supplier and customer relationship. This concept, however, does not take
account of the importance of service and customer interface and transport optimization;
hence the customer requirement effect cannot be measured. In terms of managerial implica-
tion, this chapter maintains that the value chain should incorporate procurement and product
development into the main value chain activities since both the activities are more actively
in communication with customers. The innovation of this chapter is in including product
commonality and response analysis in the simulation model.
Keywords: Value Chain, Advanced Planning, Supply Chain Management, Scheduling,
Managerial Flexibility, Market Share
1. Introduction
Meeting customer requirements by customizing the manufacturing strategy is one
of the strategic goals which challenge supply chain managers over time. The need
for customization has been replacing the current trend of manufacturing in industry
which has been continuing since the 1990s where mass production has been shift-
ing to mass customization by featuring the competitive landscape at for instances
process re-engineering and differentiation, which forces the manufacturer to be
more flexible and quicker response (Pine, 1993). However, this trend has been
slowly adopted by up to 60% of the research articles that were published just after
2001–2003 (Du et al., 2003). There have been about 60.000 hits during this period.
Furthermore, the current trend of mass customization is shown by the emerging
1
__________________
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of the personalization concept instead of customization (Kumar, 2008; Vesanen,
2007). The most recent authors mentioned that nowadays the firm needs to be dif-
ferent not only in manufacturing but also in marketing by satisfying the cumulative
requirement of price, quality, flexibility and agility at affordable price, by applying
information and operational technologies. This trend, however, forces the firm to
re-engineer its value chain in order to meet the requirement.
Pine (1993) proposed four types of value chain re-engineering based on cus-
tomization stages differentiation. In general, the differentiation is categorized
according to product and service standardization or customization. A higher cus-
tomization degree in the value chain processes leads to quick response manufac-
turing. The idea, however, followed Porter’s value chain concept without making
breakthrough with the new phenomena of mass customization. Originating from
this idea, this chapter applies advanced planning and scheduling (APS) to customize
the value chain from back end (supply) to front end (demand).
1.1. Value Chains and APS
The value chain as a chain of activities gives the products more added value than
the sum of added values of all activities (see Fig. 1) (Porter, 1985). It is important
to maximize value creation by incorporating some support activities: for instances,
technology development and procurement. Added value is created by exploiting
the upstream and downstream information flowing along the value chains, and
firms may try to bypass the information to an automated decision maker to create
improvements in its value system.
Related to value chain re-engineering, this chapter develops a new model of
value chain by referring to the hierarchical planning tasks of APS. The reason
behind this decision is that between the Michael Porter value chain and strategic
Inbound
logistics
Operations Outbound
logistics
Marketing
and sales
Services
Firm infrastructure
Human resources
Technology development
Procurement
Primary activities
Support activities
Figure 1. Michael Porter value chain model.
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Inbound 
logistics
Operations Outbound 
logistics
Marketing
and sales 
Services
Primary activities
procurement production distribution sales
Figure 2. Michael Porter value chain model and APS decision flow.
Operations
Purchasing
Product
developmentMarketing and 
sales Service
Collaboration
Figure 3. Proposed value chain model.
network planning of APS model is the same vision of creating added value across
order fulfillment processes. The relationship can be described in Fig. 2 given below.
From the relationship, this chapter studies a new model of value chain, as
follows.
Figure 3 depicts the new concept of value chain, starting from marketing and
sales to product development and procurement. New product development receives
information from marketing and at the same time back-end operations (purchasing
department) coordinate the operations and suppliers simultaneously to fulfill cus-
tomer demands by optimizing capacity. This model spreads customer information
directly to two different sides, the external relation (the suppliers) and internal rela-
tion (the manufacturer). This model applies collaboration to improve the customer
value by using dynamic material planning. Different from the traditional approach,
this model collaborates in every product fulfillment process to synchronize the sup-
ply and production capability on a real time basis, according equal benefit of the
manufacturer and the supplier. This value chain is then continued to distribution
and transport planning, which optimize the entire supply chain by choosing the best
distribution channels and transportation.
Related to the APS, Fleischman (2002) describes the hierarchical planning
task (see Fig. 4), which, at a glance, figures out the application of value chains
from the strategic to the short-term level. The details are represented in Fig. 5 by
incorporating the support and the primary value chain activities as follows:
Figure 4 describes task deployment from strategic (long-term planning) to oper-
ations (short term), which is detailed further by developing the structure of the
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Long-term 
aggregate,
comprehensive
Mid-term
Short-term
detailed
Figure 4. Hierarchy of planning tasks (from Fleischman et al., 2002).
hierarchical planning tasks from Supply Chain Planning Matrix (Stadtler, 2005).
The authors propose the two collaboration interfaces of customers and suppliers,
as depicted in Fig. 5 below:
Related to the mass customization issue, this situation supports supply chains
to be more flexible by assessing each function core competence within supply
chains and finding the possibility to develop strategic sourcing instead of in-house
manufacturing. In this chapter, we propose an APS methodology to create a link
between internal and external operational planning within supply chains to possibly
the collaboration between APS (Fig. 5). Unfortunately, this opportunity is less
supported by the previous APS function since as it is characterized as follows:
1. In practice, APS is usually concentrated on managing production planning and
scheduling by using sophisticated algorithms. Figure 5, however, ignores the
Collaboration Collaboration
Sales Procurement Production Distribution Sales
Strategic networks planning
Master planning
Purchasing
and
material
requirement 
planning
(MRP)
Production
planning
Scheduling
Distribution
-
planning
Transport
planning
Demand 
planning
Demand 
fulfillment
and ATP
Procurement
Purchasing
and MRP
Demand 
planning
Demand 
fulfillment
and
ATP
Figure 5. Collaboration between APS (from Meyr, 2002).
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collaboration between supplier’s available-to-promise (ATP) and buyer’s Mate-
rial Requirement Planning (MRP) by assuming that supplier has infinite pro-
duction capacity, assumes that lead times are fixed and ignoring the production
schedule and sequence (Chen and Ji, 2007).
2. In addition to MRP and scheduling synchronization, APS does not emerge the
possibility to activity outsourcing and manufacturing strategy customization,
this chapter proposes optimized push-pull manufacturing strategy as well as
sourcing strategy optimization. The advantages of this approach are that the
manufacturer can reduce the production traffic by outsourcing some activities
as well as promising the delivery promptness by using promised lead times in
ATP module and making collaborative material planning where the supplier and
buyer production schedule are synchronized according to production capacity.
3. Integration with Agile Supply Demand Network (ASDN) adds benefit to this
APS model by its ability to reconfigure the supply chain network and to measure
the value of the order by financial analysis.
Figure 6 represents the APS scheme to show the difference between new and exist-
ing APS.
This new APS model is developed to represent value chain re-engineering.
Concurrent engineering is shown by customer and supplier involvement in the
process. R&D is included in purchasing and customer involvement is included in
order to describe supplier responsibility for product design and at the same time
MRP is excluded from the model to represent dynamic material planning. As a
replacement, we use collaborative material planning in order to emphasize supply
synchronization.
Procurement Production Distribution
Strategic networks planning 
Scheduling
Demand 
fulfillment and 
ATP
Physical flow
Information flow
Decision
flow
Information 
flow
Demand planningMaster planning
Production
planningCollaborative 
material
planning
Figure 6. Proposed APS model.
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Instead of this new approach, this chapter is composed according to the
logic of common APS. First there is a discussion of APS, an introduction
at a glance (Section 1.2). From internal coordination, demand planning is dis-
cussed in Section 2.1, which informs master planning (Section 2.2) to enable
ATP (Section 2.3) by fulfilling the promised lead time (Section 4.3.1) as well as
inventory level (Section 4.3.2) and optimizing production sequence and schedule
(Section 4.4). From external coordination, material planning (Section 4.5) and net-
work planning (Section 4.6) are also optimized. Moreover, APS is able to opti-
mize supply strategy (Section 4.2.2) as well as the product development process
(Section 4.2.4). The key feature of this APS is on profit optimization for the entire
supply chain by making a simulation through ASDN software (Section 4.6).
1.2. APS
Advanced Planning and Scheduling (APS) could be defined as a system and method-
ology in which decision making, such as planning and scheduling for industries,
is federated and synchronized between different divisions within or between enter-
prises in order to achieve total and autonomous optimization. Unlike other available
systems, APS simultaneously plans and schedules production based on available
resources and capability. This usually provides a more realistic production plan
(Chen and Ji, 2007).
APS is generally applied where one or more of the following conditions are
satisfied:
• Make to order manufacturing instead of make to stock
• The products require a large number of components or tasks to be manufactured
• A capital intensive manufacturing process where capacity is limited
• Products competing with each other to avail the resources
• Unstable situations for resource scheduling that can not be planned beforehand
• It requires a flexible manufacturing approach
Advanced Planning and Scheduling (APS) improves the integration of materials
and capacity planning by using constraint-based planning and optimization (Chen,
2007; Marjolein van Eck 2003). There are some possibilities to include suppliers
and customers in the planning procedure and thereby optimize a whole supply chain
on a real-time basis. APS utilizes planning and scheduling techniques that consider
a wide range of constraints to produce an optimized plan (Marjolein van Eck, 2003,
for example):
• Material availability
• Machine and labor capacity
• Customer service level requirements (due dates)
• Inventory safety stock levels
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• Cost
• Distribution requirements
• Sequencing for set-up efficiency
Furthermore, in the area of supply chain planning, there has been a trend to embed
sophisticated optimization logic into APS that helps to improve the decisions of
supply chain planners. If it is used successfully, it is not only the supporting of
supply chain strategy, but also improves the competitiveness of a firm significantly.
Some areas of possible improvement are listed below (Stadtler, 2002):
• Competitiveness improvement
• Make the process more transparent
• Improve supply chain flexibility
• Reveal system constraints
Furthermore, Fleischman et al. (2002) mention three main characteristics of APS,
which are:
1. Integral and comprehensive planning of the entire supply chain from supplier to
end customer.
2. True optimization by properly defining alternatives, objectives, and constraints.
3. A hierarchical planning system from top to bottom that requires cooperation
among various tasks in the entire supply chain.
2. Architecture of Proposed APS
With regard to the needs for personalization in the whole value chain, this chapter
tries to fill the gap between the requirement and the existingAPS by looking forward
to finding some benefits as follows:
1. Within value chain building, the most important thing is how to maximize value
to customers. This report supports the requirement by proposing reconfigurable
push-pull manufacturing strategy. This strategy can adapt to Bill-of-Materials
(BOM) changes by reconfiguring the push-pull manufacturing strategy (front
side). In order to support the strategy, this APS also optimizes the product
commonality to minimize the inventory level as well as production lead times
(back side).
2. Within e-customization, the customer meets directly with the manufacturer.
The issue which appears is how to minimize customer losses (time and
options) and at the same time manufacturer losses (overhead costs, for instance
extra administration cost, order cost, etc.). This APS model can minimize
both burdens by offering optimum design platform to the customer and the
suppliers and a reasonable inventory allocation by push-pull manufacturing
strategy (Fig. 7).
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ERP (Sales)
1. Bill of material
2. Order lead times
3. Order locations
APS
1. Demand planning
2. Master planning
3. Distribution and
transport planning
SC Execution planning 
Total inventory value 
Total profit
Total lead times 
Figure 7. APS model connection to ERP and SC Execution Planning (SCEP).
With regard to the integration issue, this APS module can be composed as
follows:
The details of the architecture are elaborated as follows:
2.1. Demand Planning
Before going ahead with any production planning process, it is important to calcu-
late the level of demand within a company. Wagner (2002) explored the three main
parts of demand planning, namely forecasting, what-if-analysis, and safety stock
calculation. The purpose of forecasting is to produce a future prediction related to
future demands. What-if-analysis is used as a risk management tool to determine
the safety stock level. This ensures the company’s proper utilization of space and
minimizing the costly inventory level. It also brings integrity to the company’s
supply chain and logistics network. Demand planning necessitates forecasting and
what-if analysis is conducted to make the optimal calculation of required inventory
and safety stock level. This chapter, however, comprises an order-based APS where
forecasting is only conducted within the push manufacturing strategy.
2.2. Master Planning
Master planning is used to balance supply and demand by synchronizing the flow
of materials within the supply chain (Meyr et al., 2002). Capacity decision from
demand planning will be used to setup product and material price, manufactur-
ing strategy by considering lead times and inventory availability from ATP and
possible suppliers’ capability from collaborative material planning. Furthermore,
master planning is also supported by receiving production schedule information
from production planning and scheduling module (see Fig. 8).
2.3. ATP
ATP is used to guarantee that customer orders are fulfilled on time and in certain
cases, even faster. The logic is shown in Fig. 9 below:
Figure 9 shows three customers who want different requirement and are situated
at different locations. ATP optimizes the resources assignments such as materials,
semi-finished goods (sub-assembly), and production capacity to guarantee that all
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Collaborative material 
planning
1. Dynamic material order
2. Warehouse stocks
3. Inventory requirement
Master planning
1. Push-pull manufacturing
 strategy
2. Supply strategy
3. Product and material  price
4. Design strategy
Demand planning
Production capacity
Strategic network planning
1. Agile supply demand networks
2. Transportation optimization
3. Distribution center  optimization
Decision flow Information 
flow
Available to Promise 
(ATP)
Promised lead times
Production planning and 
scheduling
1. Production sequence
2. Production schedule
Figure 8. Decision and information sequence within APS.
Resources
1. Material
2. Sub-assembly
3. Production 
capacity
1
2
3
Customer
Figure 9. Available-to-Promise.
orders are fulfilled on time. Furthermore, the model is also constrained by inventory
level, order batch size, supplier capability, and set-up cost constraints.
Those search dimensions are applied one by one in order to fulfill the customer
request. It is easy to observe that the above model emphasizes an iterative approach
to solve the ATP problem. The ATP problem, however, goes far beyond the idea.
The promise, however, must be fulfilled by the supplier, the manufacturer, and the
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distributors. This idea supports ASDN by moving the previous APS paradigm from
enterprise APS into the supply chain APS (see Fig. 6).
Related to this idea, this chapter, however, shifts some tasks of ATP to master
planning by customizing the push-pull manufacturing strategy for each product
type and assessing the supply strategy according to sourcing options. Thus, ATP
module functions are limited to inventory level and lead times optimization. The
impact of this stage can be explained in two ways. First, the global decision within
supply chains is more represented by responsibility on all sides (the distributors,
manufacturers, and suppliers) so that resources assignment are also possible to be
developed across supply chains. Second, it is easier to expand the supply network
planning in the future by partially adding new members within the supply chains.
This is reasonable since, for example, if the demand continuously increases in the
future so that one component needs to be supplied by more than two suppliers, then
the APS can collaborate with them.
2.4. Production Planning and Scheduling
This module is intended for short-term planning within APS so that it sequences
the production activities in order to minimize production time. In detail, Stadtler
(2002b) describes a model for a production schedule as in Fig. 10.
Figure 10 depicts the production schedule model building, where it extracts
daily operational information in the ERP such as locations, parts, bills-of-material
(BOM), production routing, supplier information, set-up matrices and timetables
1
1. Model building
2. Extracting the required data from ERP system, master 
planning
3. Generating a set of assumptions (a scenario)
4. Generating an initial production schedule
5. Analysis of the production schedule and interactive 
modification
6. Scenario
 ok?
7. Executing and updating the production schedule via 
the ERP system untilan “event” requires optimization
Figure 10. Production planning and scheduling procedure (from Fleischmann, 2002).
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(Stadtler, 2002b). This chapter applies the similar optimized scheduling to the entire
products by using Traveling Salesperson Problem (TSP) algorithm.
2.5. Collaborative Material Planning
In contrast to the traditional approach of operation management tools, where mate-
rial requirement follows a top-down hierarchical approach, and starts with Master
Production Schedule (MPS), the schedule is then detailed into Material Require-
ment Planning (MRP) by ignoring capacity constraint and assuming fixed lead
times. This chapter, however, replaces the MPS and MRP functions by applying
collaborative material planning (see Fig. 6) consisting of supplier and buyer inte-
gration by including a system dynamics approach (see Fig. 8) by following supply
synchronization model and replacing the MRP with collaborative material planning
(Holweg et al., 2005) . It is interesting that the model incorporates purchasing and
product development, which is useful to give information to master planning not
only the internal capability (ATP and production planning) but also the supplier
capability about how long the maximum time and how many are to deliver the
component.
2.6. Distribution and Transport Planning
Distribution planning is very much correlated with transport agreements for ship-
ping consumer goods from manufacturers to customers. Shipments could go directly
from the factory or from distribution centers to customers, depending on the order
types and distances. This typical distribution channel enhances supply chain inte-
gration among manufacturers, distributors and customers, who need planning ahead
of time. Furthermore, integrated transport planning decreases the cost substantially.
The relatively smaller shipments account for higher costs than larger ones. The dis-
tribution and transportation costs also depend on the locations of factories, suppli-
ers, DCs (distribution centers) and TPs (transshipment points). Correlation between
distribution and transport planning module and other APS modules as described by
Fleischmann (2002) can be summarized in Fig. 11 below:
In this chapter, ASDN is used to investigate the profitability of supply chain
networks by considering transportation as well as distribution centers. By applying
information from demand and master planning, ASDN enables us to find the supply
chain profit, inventory value, and total lead times. Even this software ignores itera-
tive procedures for network optimization. The model is however, can be represented
as strategic network planning below.
2.6.1. Strategic networks planning
In strategic network planning, firms generally focus on long-term strategic planning
and design of their supply chain (see Fig. 6). Therefore, it is related to long-term
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Distribution and
transport planning
Demand planning
1. Delivered customer 
order
2. DCs demand forecast
3. DCs safety stock
Strategic network planning
1. location of factories,
suppliers, DCs, and TPs
2. Transport modes and
paths
3. Suppliers and customers 
allocation
Master planning
1. Aggregate quantities to 
be shipped on every 
transport link
2. Seasonal stocks dynamic 
at warehouses and DCs
Production scheduling
1. Net requirements, 
timed at the planned 
departure of shipment 
from the factory
2. Planned and released 
production order
Figure 11. Distribution and transport interfaces.
decisions, such as plant location and physical distribution structure (Meyr et al.,
2002). During the process, some compulsory information, for instance the product
family structure and market share, potential suppliers and manufacturing capabil-
ity, is utilized to decide whether this planning is expansion or collaboration. For
example, a car company may wish to expand its market into the new area. They may
choose to develop their own business by locating some facilities (factories, distri-
bution centers, and warehouses) or consolidating with another existing company.
It is also possible to re-evaluate the previous strategic plan, for instance the manu-
facturer intends to relocate its factories to a country with cheaper labor costs. This
brings them advantages such as a cheap labor market, low cost of raw materials,
and the opportunities for new business markets locally.
Due to its impact on long-term profitability and competitiveness within a com-
pany, the planning depends on aggregate demand forecasting and economic trends
in the market. It is, therefore, a challenging task since the planning period ranges
from 3 to 10 years, where all the decision parameter conditions may change, for
instance customer demand behavior, market power, and supplier capability. This
strategy becomes complicated if companies execute their strategic planning infre-
quently and do not update periodically. The main objective of this type of planning
related to value chain re-engineering is to reconfigure the manufacturing process,
which is embodied by developingASDN (Fig. 12). Therefore, the model will collect
information from medium- and short-term planning, for instance vendors and dis-
tribution facilities among suppliers, distributors, and manufacturers to be optimized
against product configuration. The interfaces among them are depicted as follows:
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Sales planning
Demand and 
master planning
ATP, 
material 
planning, etc
Strategic network planning
(ASDN)
Figure 12. Strategic network planning and customer needs alignment.
Demand parameter Enterprise strategy Supply parameter
ASDN networks 
Modeling
Supply demand 
networks strategy
Sales and operating 
planning
Inventory execution
Demand pattern 
distribution 
variation
Capacity time 
delays OTD 
Quality
Architecture of networks 
order decoupling point 
location policy:MTS, 
ATO, MTO, ETO
Lot sizing decisions 
ordering policies: lot for 
lot, periodic etc. ABC 
analysis
Cycle stock/safety stock
Importance of delivery time, 
available to promise, On Time 
Delivery (OTD) etc
Figure 13. ASDN approach for networks design.
Figure 12 depicts the planning connection to the product database, which is used
to reconfigure the demand and master planning where it will be used to reconfigure
the strategic network planning. Furthermore, the details of the ASDN operations
can be represented as Fig. 13 below.
Beforehand, it is beneficial to study further from the existing APS software
in order to find the path for improvement. This report takes two APS software
examples, namely SAP APO and ASPROVA APS, and these are described in more
detail in the next section.
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3. Contribution to APS Software Development
APS has increasingly been used instead of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP),
which is also implemented in several commercials software, for example, SAPAPO
and ASPROVA. Furthermore, this chapter looks beyond comparison the possible
further development of the software by regarding the above architecture as follows.
3.1. SAP Advanced Planner and Optimizer (APO)
SAP Advanced Planner and Optimizer (APO) is a well-known software that repre-
sents an example of APS software package. SAP APO is designed for supporting
the planning and optimization of a supply chain and works both linked to ERP-
packages and also on its own. Structures of many other software packages follow
the same structure (Buxmann and Ko¨nig, 2000, p. 100):
1. The planning modules consist of procedures for “Demand Planning”,
“Supply Network Planning”, “Production Planning and Detailed Scheduling”,
and “Available to Promise”.
2. User interface (UI) “The Supply Chain Cockpit” gives the chance of visualizing
and controlling the structure of logistics chains. The UI facilitates the graphical
representation of networks of suppliers, production sites, facilities, distribution
centers, customers, transshipment locations. Additionally, by using the Alert
Monitor engine it is possible to track supply chain processes and identify event-
initiating problems and bottlenecks.
3. Solver is an optimization engine that employs various algorithms and solution
procedures for solving supply chain problems. This includes forecast modeling
techniques such as exponential smoothing and regression analysis being built
in for demand planning, and also branch and bound procedures and genetic
algorithms are available for production and distribution planning.
4. Simulation of changes is enabled by an architecture for computing and data-
intensive applications that makes it possible for simulations, planning, and opti-
mization activities to be in real time.
In this software, optimization is bounded into optimization range and resources
allocation. The optimization range is different according to whether optimization
horizon or resources are transferred. The optimization horizon will optimize each
activity in the optimization range, however, due to interrelation between activities
in these two regions. These fixed activities determine their action according to their
flexibility. Below is described the relationship table for scheduling optimization
(Table 1).
Another SAPAPO facility is networks design. Networks design creates an anal-
ysis of entire networks with regards to locations, transportation networks, facility
location, and even analysis of current territorial divisions. In practice, these designs
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Table 1. Relationship Table in Scheduling Problem by SAP APO.
1st activity 2nd activity Relationship Definition
Fixed Nonfixed Maximum interval Latest start or finish date
Fixed Nonfixed Minimum interval Earliest start or finish date
Nonfixed Fixed Maximum interval Earliest start or finish date
Nonfixed Fixed Minimum interval Latest start or finish date
comprise inbound and outbound logistics planning such as sourcing decision, trans-
portation mode determination, and warehouse location evaluation according to dif-
ferent demand supply patterns, varying costs, and capacity constraints.
The discussion on SAP APO produces the following conclusions:
1. The user interface in SAP APO helps the APS planner to investigate the profit
performance of the entire supply chain. This report uses ASDN to represent the
same objective.
2. Solver optimizer is used in SAP APO to optimize the scheduling problems
and demand forecasting. This chapter, however, applies an optimization tool to
optimize supply and manufacturing strategy. This chapter enhances the function
of optimizer from operational to tactical and strategic levels.
3. SAP APO excludes supply side optimization in terms of long-term planning
(Stadtler, 2005), in which it is important to support ATP. This new model, how-
ever, puts the planning in the higher hierarchy by positioning material planning
collaboration comprises of product development, procurement, and production
functions.
4. As well as these advantages, this model has a limitation related to distribution
and transport planning, where the optimizer needs to be developed.
3.2. ASPROVA APS
ASPROVA APS is developed by the following logic:
Figure 14 is taken from the ASPROVA APS main menu, which exhibits the
production scheduling process that is taken by receiving the order and shop floor
data to build a production schedule. The scheduling operator receives master data
(production capability) in order to issue work instructions and purchase order to
the suppliers.
ASPROVA APS, however, is concerned about scheduling operations instead
of creating the whole APS components, for instance demand planning, master
planning, and transportation and distribution scheduling. Some limitations of this
software are:
1. ASPROVA APS does not apply demand planning, for instance capacity or man-
ufacturing strategy planning;
	 Acta	Wasaensia	 173	
April 18, 2009 12:31 WSPC/Trim Size: 9.75in x 6.5in SPI-b778 b778-ch07 1st Reading
16 Kristianto et al.
Order data
Result Shop floor
Scheduling
Master data
Work 
instruction
Purchase 
orders
Figure 14. ASPROVA APS operation image.
2. ASPROVA APS does not visualize the supply chain network optimization and
3. The impact of the two limitations is that ASPROVA APS is not able to link itself
to supply chain execution program and ERP and is just a stand alone tool.
4. Problem Example
Below is given one problem example of the APS application in one truck industry,
which is represented as Fig. 15 below.
The varieties of the above product structure can be composed as (Tables 2
and 3):
From the example, this section will explain step by step the detail of the mod-
eling, as follows:
4.1. Demand Planning
The demand planning process is originated from the forecasting part, which is fol-
lowed by capacity planning, promised lead times, push-pull manufacturing strategy,
material and inventory requirements. The planning can be shown in detail by using
the following example:
4.1.1. Forecasting
Forecasting is required for long-term capacity planning instead of weekly demand.
The reason is that this APS is intended to customize orders. This chapter does not
go into deep discussion of forecasting techniques because we can use any available
technique and it depends on the demand pattern. Otherwise, in general, we can
use time series analysis by assuming that demand increases because markets and
customers expand continuously.
4.1.2. Capacity decision
Capacity decision is established first to give information to the firm with regard
to supply and manufacturing strategy. This chapter applies newsboy problem to
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Volvo
Truck
Chasis1
Wheel set1
Cabinet1
Power train1
Suspension1
Engine
1
Gear box1
Frame
1
Front axle
1
Rear axle
1
Front wheel
2
Rear wheel
4
Tire
1
Rim
1
Tire1
Rim1
Body1
1
Audio package
1
Interior decoration
Office package
Resting package
Radio
CD player1
1
Speaker1
1
1
Figure 15. Bill-of-Material (BOM).
minimize over and under stock, as follows:
E(C) = h · E(Q−D)+ + p · E(D−Q)+ (7.1)
By operating integration into Eq. (7.1) we get:
E(C) = h ·
� 1
D
Q
(Q · x−D)+ · dx+ p ·
� D
Q
0
(D−Q · x)+ · dx
= h · (Q−D)
2 + p ·D2
2 ·Q (7.2)
By optimizing Eq. (7.2) according to Q, then optimal production quantity (Q) can
be determined as:
Q1,2 =
�
p+ h ·D (7.3)
Equation (7.3) gives the result of capacity decision.
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Table 2. Truck Parts List.
Parts Model FH1 Model FH2
Body FHDA FHDA
Office package Opl00 Opll0
Interior decoration FHDA1 FHDA2
Resting package RP001 RP002
Radio FH001,FH002 FH003, FH004, FH005
CD Player 6 disc 6 disc
Speaker Doors Doors+rearWall
Engine D13A−360HP D13A−400HP
Gear box Powertronic 5sp Powertronic 5sp
Frame 4��2 6��2
Front axle FSH 1370 FSH 1370
Rear axle Hub reduction 1370 Hub reduction 2180
Tire (Front) 385/65-22,5 385/65-22,5
Rim (Front) FR22,5 FR22,5
Tire (Rear) 315/70-22,5 315/70-22,5
Rim (rear) FR24,5 FR24,5
Table 3. Required Parameters for Product Manufacturing.
Model FH1 Model FH2
Penalty cost 1 15
Holding cost 1 4
Annual demand 50 50
Order cost 1 1
Production cost 10 10
Setup cost 4 4
Material cost 1 1
Production rate per month 200 200
4.2. Master Planning
4.2.1. Push-pull manufacturing strategy
The Customer Order Decoupling Point (CODP) is assigned properly to the compo-
nents or parts which are fabricated internally. In this chapter, we categorize CODP
according to make-to-stock (MTS), assemble-to-order (ATO), or make-to-order
(MTO). The objective is to give the least waiting time and operations costs (hold-
ing, penalty, and production cost).
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We define processing time in one node consisting of supplier delivery time,
production and delivery time to the customer, so let us assume that demand has
inter-arrival variance (σA) and the assembly process has process time variance
(σB). According to GI/G/1 queue system, we have:
L = λ
2 · (σ2A + σ2B)
2 · (1 − ρ) + ρ (7.4)
whereL is the number of order, λ is the demand rate. ρ is the utilization factor. This
last equation informs us about whether there is a queue or not in our production line.
In order to determine our optimum decision, we use these into our cost function
E(C) = CP.µ + CW.L, where CP is order processing cost and CW waiting cost
(Table 4). The above cost function can be generalized into:
E(C) = CP.µ+ CW.
�
λ2.µ.(σ2A + σ2B)
2.(µ− λ) + ρ
�
(7.5)
Equation (7.5) can be optimized according to µ so that we have:
CP + (σ
2
A + σ2B).CW
2.(µ− λ) −
(σ2A + σ2B).CW.µ
2.(µ− λ)2 = 0 (7.6)
2.λ−
�
2.(σ2A + σ2B).λ.CW.CP
2.CP
≤ µ∗ ≤ 2.λ+
�
2.(σ2A + σ2B).λ.CW.CP
2.CP
(7.7)
Equation (7.7) can be modified by positing λ as a dependent variable and µ as an
independent variable so that we have:
µ∗ +
�
(σ2A+σ2B).λ.CW
2CP
2
≤ λ (7.8)
Table 4. Push-pull Manufacturing Decision for Each Component.
Product σA σB 1 Cw Cpr µ upper µ lower µ actual MTO/MTS/ATO
Radio 10 10 100 1 5 244,721 155,279 20 MTS
CD player 10 10 100 1 5 244,721 155,279 200 ATO
Speaker 10 10 100 1 5 244,721 155,279 100 MTS
Front tire 20 20 200 1 5 526,491 273,509 200 MTS
Front rim 20 20 200 1 5 526,491 273,509 200 MTS
Rear tire 40 40 400 1 5 1157,77 442,229 200 MTS
Rear rim 40 40 400 1 5 1157,77 442,229 200 MTS
Truck FH1 40 40 100 1 5 378,885 21,1146 200 ATO
Truck FH2 40 40 100 1 5 378,885 21,1146 200 ATO
Power train 10 10 100 1 5 200 155,279 200 ATO
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Equation (7.8) is a prerequisite to form postponement, if λ exceeds that limit,
form postponement should be changed to time postponement and vice versa. This
strategy, however, enables the supply chain to determine the right time for switching
from assemble to order to make to order and vice versa. This repositioning strategy
can also be used for over production rate.
4.2.2. Supply strategy
Supply strategy is defined as deciding which parts should be ordered from the
suppliers, and which parts should be produced in-house. This discussion will be
separated into two models, make or buy decision, and single or dual sourcing
strategy, which is detailed as follows.
In the outsourcing case, suppose the supplier and firm have established a long-
term contract by choosing the incentive and penalty cost I and p for the suppliers.
The firm gives incentive to the suppliers whenever they can meet the firm customer
demandsD in the predetermined range atD±ε∗t . If production accuracy (εt−ε∗t ) is
to be a common objective between the suppliers, then, for each i, ε∗t must maximize
the supplier’s expected profit, net of penalty and holding costs: (ε∗t ) must solve:
max
εt≥0
I.Pr ob{q(εt) = q(ε∗t )} − p.Pr ob{q(εt) < q(ε∗t )} − h.Pr ob{q(εt)
> q(ε∗t )} = (p− h)Pr ob{q(εt) > q(ε∗t )}
−p+ (I + p)Pr ob{q(εt) = q(ε∗t )}. (7.9)
The first-order condition for Eq. (7.9) is:
(p− h)∂ Pr ob{q(εt) > q(ε
∗
t )}
∂εt
= (I + p)Pr ob{q(εt) = q(ε∗t )} (7.10)
That is, the firm and the suppliers choose incentive I, penalty p, and holding h
costs, such that the over or under estimation of variance, Pr ob(εt − ε∗t ) > 0, is
minimized, which is the probability of over estimation. From Bayes rule,
Pr ob{q(εt) > q(ε∗t )} = Pr ob{εt > q∗t + ε∗t − qt}
Pr ob{q(εt) > q(ε∗t )} =
�
εt
Pr ob{εt > q∗t + εt − qt|εt}f(ε∗t )dε∗t
Pr ob{q(εt) > q(ε∗t )} =
�
εt
1 − F(q∗t + εt − qt)f(ε∗t )dε∗t (7.11)
So the first-order condition for Eq. (7.11) becomes:
(p− h)
�
εt
f(q∗t + εt − qt)f(ε∗t )dε∗t = (I + p)Pr ob{q(εt) = q(ε∗t )}
In a steady state (i.e., q∗t = qt), we have:
(p− h)
�
εt
f(εt)
2dεt = (I + p)Pr ob{q(εt) = q(ε∗t )} (7.12)
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If ε is normally distributed with variance σ2 for example, then�
εt
f(εt)
2dεt = 12σ√π (7.13)
(p− h)
2σ
√
π(I + p) = Pr ob{q(εt) = q(ε
∗
t )} (7.14)
if σ is assumed to be continuously distributed (N → ∞), then σ =��
(εt − ε∗t )2p(εt)dεt , and Eq. (7.13) becomes:
(εt − ε∗t ) =
(p− h)2
2
√
π(I + p)2 (7.15)
By defining the total cost to the firm as c = h(εt−ε∗t )++p.(ε∗t −εt)++ λD.CO
and replacing (εt − ε∗t )+ with (p−h)
2
2
√
π(I+p)2 and doing some integration operations,
then we have:
coutsource =
h
�
(p−h)2
2
√
π(I+p)2
�2 + p(ε∗t )2
2
�
(p−h)2
2
√
π(I+p)2 + ε∗t
� + λ
D
· CO (7.16)
While with in-sourcing we have the following costs function:
E(TC)Insource = h · E(Q−D)+ + p · E(D−Q)+ + CD · Z
+
�
λ
D
·
�
CO +
�
CP ·
�
tS + D
µ
���
+ CPur · q (7.17)
D is order quantity and Q production capacity. For analysis simplification, we will
represent our part inventory as (Q − D)+ and part backorder as or (D − Q)+.
Equation (7.17) can be solved by integrating the first two statements as:
E(TC)Insource = h.
� 1
D
Q
(Q · x−D)+ · dx+ p ·
� D
Q
0
(D−Q · x)+ · dx
+
�
λ
D
·
�
CO +
�
CP ·
�
tS + D
µ
���
+ Cpurq
And we get,
E(TC)Insource = h · (Q−D)
2 + p.D2
2 ·Q
+
�
λ
D
·
�
CO +
�
CP ·
�
tS + D
µ
���
+ CPur · q (7.18)
where λ is demand rates, CO order cost, CP production cost, tS setup cost, µ
production rate, CPur material cost, and q material quantity.
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Our decision is as follows: if E(TC)Insource > coutsource, then outsourcing is
chosen, otherwise, insourcing is the option.
In addition to sourcing strategy, a procedure is suggested below to choose
whether single or dual sourcing is an appropriate option, as follows.
4.2.3. Single or Dual Sourcing Strategy (Buy Decision)
In this section, suppose outsourcing is the best option and now the manager is facing
a dilemma between single and dual sourcing. In this section, we consider a Bertrand
duopoly model (see Gibbons 1992) with price function for retailers given by:
q = b− p1 + γ · p2 + ε∗t (7.19)
where pi and pj is price of the supplier 1 and 2 and γ is the supplier process
commonality. Different to Elmaghraby (2000), the buying decision is approached
according to price uncertainty. This chapter takes into account quantity uncertainty
in order to represent demand variety. It also accommodates Forker and Stannack’s
(2000) argument of applying competition between suppliers; indeed, the suppliers’
cooperation is also considered by applying product compatibility degree γ . In the
Cournot game, suppliers choose their own price to maximize their profit by taking
their opponent’s price as a given. We thus propose a methodology which is similar
to the Cournot game, except that we take into account the quantity at infinite time
in order to optimize the postponed product compatibility decision resulting from
the presence of long-term price contract.
To illustrate, we suppose two suppliers make an auction and the firm makes an
opening bid, and afterwards the suppliers cooperate with one another on the chosen
price and product compatibility. Restricting attention to the sub-game perfect of
this two-stage game, we shall see that if the firm chooses a bid-price, then the
predetermined price is used by the suppliers to optimize the auction price, where it
is finally used by the suppliers to optimize their production quantity. The firm does
not have any benefits by shifting from their bid price, while the supplier also has
no reasons to threaten the retailers. From this point on, the game is started from
stage 1, where both retailers decide their capacity.
Stage 1: the firm and suppliers optimize their agreed product price according to
maximum profit
max
p1
(b− p1 + γ · p2 + ε∗t )(p1 − coutsource) (7.20)
The first-order condition is:
−2p1 + γ · p2 + b+ coutsource + ε∗t = 0 (7.21)
Similarly, the FOC from second product variant is:
−2p2 + γ · p1 + b+ coutsource + ε∗t = 0 (7.22)
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Solving these two equations simultaneously, one obtains:
p2 = p1 = ps = (coutsource + b+ ε
∗
t )
(2 − γ) (7.23)
Stage 1 explores the price equilibrium between two suppliers. Equal price in this
equation shows that the suppliers are working under flexible capacity in all states
or the suppliers producing to order and accumulate commitments for all future
deliveries. There is always an equilibrium in which all the suppliers set p1 = p2 in
all periods. The suppliers expect profit to be zero whether they cooperate at time-t
or not. Accordingly, the game time-t is essentially a one-shot game in which the
unique equilibrium has all suppliers setting p1 = p2. Furthermore, both buyer and
supplier can take advantage of this problem because whenever a supplier increases
his selling price, the buyer product price also increases.
In the same way, the firm bargains pf the supplier’s price ps in order to max-
imize their profit by taking a maximum margin between product prices to end
customer pb and outsourcing price pf as follows:
max
pf
(b− pf + ε∗t )(pb − pf ) (7.24)
The first-order condition is:
2pf − b− pb − ε∗t = 0 (7.25)
Solving that equation for pf , one obtains:
pb = 2pf − b− ε∗t (7.26)
If we assume at the final bargaining period that pf = ps, then we have:
pb = 2
�
(coutsource + b+ ε∗t )
(2 − γ)
�
− b− ε∗t (7.27)
max
ps
πtot = πS + πf
max
ps
πtot = max
ps
(b− pf + ε∗t )
�
2 · (coutsource + b+ ε
∗
t )
(2 − γ) − b− ε
∗
t − pf
�
+(b− (1 − γ)pf + ε∗t )(pf − coutsource) (7.28)
s.t (pf − coutsource) ≥ 0
The first-order condition is:
2γ · pf − b−
�
2 · (coutsource + b+ ε
∗
t )
(2 − γ) − b− ε
∗
t
�
− b+ (1 − γ).coutsource = 0
(7.29)
Solving that equation for pf , one obtains:
pf =
�
2 · (coutsource+b+ε∗t )(2−γ) − ε∗t
�
+ b− (1 − γ) · coutsource
2γ
(7.30)
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Equation (7.30) describes the compromise price between the firm and suppliers.
This equation is also developed in order to respond to Anton and Yao’s (1989)
argument about the supplier’s collusion.
Stage 2: The firm and suppliers optimize the suppliers’ material price
On the suppliers’side, in order to achieve optimal profit, then we have also optimized
the material price, as follows:
In the first stage we can find,
max
pf
(b− (1 − γ)pf ) · (pf − cm) (7.31)
By optimizing Eq. (7.31) against pf , then the supplier material cost cm can be
found as:
b− 2(1 − γ) · pf + cm(1 − γ) = 0 (7.32)
cm = 2(1 − γ) · pf − b1 − γ (7.33)
Stage 2 shows that the increasing of product substitutability (γ) will increase the
suppliers’ total costs. With regard to the result, below a process commonality
and pricing-quantity decision is produced by considering long-term relationships
between the firm and suppliers (Patterson et al., 1999).
4.2.4. Component commonality decision between two suppliers
In the last stage, product design is collaborated between the firm and the suppliers,
which is intended to maximize the firm and the supplier’s profit. In that case, suppose
the suppliers profit function Eq. (7.31) is used to define γ as follows:
γ =
�
2 − (coutsource + b+ ε
∗
t )
pf
�
(7.34)
Stage 1 shows that the increasing of product substitutability (γ) will increase the
suppliers’ total costs. With regards to the result, below is given a process common-
ality and quantity decision by considering long-term relationships between the firm
and the suppliers (Patterson et al., 1999).
4.2.5. Selling price strategy
In this modeling, we define profitability for the buyer as in the Bertrand game, as
follows:
max
pi
(b− pi + γ.pj)(pi − c) (7.35)
wherepi andpj are supplier i and j the selling price, respectively and b is maximum
available quantity for the buyer. The first-order condition is:
b− 2pi + γ.pj + c = 0 (7.36)
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Similarly, the FOC from insourcing is:
b− 2pj + γ.pi + c = 0 (7.37)
Solving these two equations simultaneously, one obtains:
P = pi = pj = (γ + 2).(b+ c)
(4 − γ2) (7.38)
Equation (7.38) shows that higherγproduces a positive impact on product price to
the end-customer. From this point on, suppliers’ product price pf is used to find
the optimum production quantity for the suppliers as follows.
Stage 2 Quantity decision
This chapter applies a similar principle to that of Singh and Vives (1984), except
that we take into account both the price and quantity at infinite time in order to
optimize supply chain profitability resulting from the presence of long-term price
and production quantity contract. This stage is developed by finding the best price
response against price decision, which results from the Bertrand pricing game, and
it is shown as follows:
ps(t) = s(ps − ps(t));p > 0;ps(0) = ps(0)ps = pf (7.39)
In Eq. (7.39), we recognize s as speed of quantity to go to its optimal value. This
speed represents how much time is needed by both firms to negotiate their price
contract. This notation finally becomes insignificant when such a negotiation is done
at an infinite due date, where both firms are assumed to have enough time to analyze
their decision. To solve Eq. (7.39), let us set up a current-value Hamiltonian as:
H = q(ps − c)+ λsq˙ (7.40)
S.t Eq.(7.39), q(t) ≥ 0, where λ is per unit change of objective function (maxπ(q))
for a small change in q(t). In the following derivation, we will recognize s and ρ
as compound factor and discount rate.
∂H
∂ps
= ps − λ.s.q(t) = 0 (7.41)
λ˙1 = δ.λ˙1 − ∂H
∂q
= λ1(δ.+ .s)− q = 0 (7.42)
Steady-state quantity can be found from Eq. (7.42) as:
lim
s→∞ q =
√
ps (7.43)
We can see that equilibrium quantity is a concave function of price. In conclusion,
quantity postponement gives significant impact to the supplier-buyer supply chain
whenever both buyers agree to improve their product commonality.
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From Eq. (7.43), the total quantities produced by both suppliers can be
summarized as:
q1 = q2 = q∗ = 2
�
(c + b+ ε∗t )
(2 − γ) (7.44)
Equation (7.44) gives a solution for the suppliers about optimum capacity, which
is used by the suppliers to fulfill orders according to the firm purchase price and
quantity. Furthermore, we have ε in Eq. (7.44), which denotes observable demands
variance from the firm to the suppliers. This variance gives significant impact to the
supplier’s willingness to cooperate in product design and at the same time pushes the
firm to reduce its demand information inaccuracy to the suppliers (Tables 5 and 6).
4.3. ATP
ATP consists of promised lead times and inventory requirement as follows.
Table 5. Sourcing Decision for Each Component.
Product b p h I D C0 Cpur Error ts µ Cprod Decision
Body 245 4 2 1 100 1 1000 0,1 2 500 5 Outsourcing
Office package 141 1 1 1 100 1 20 0,1 1 300 5 Insourcing
Interior decoration 141 1 1 1 100 1 15 0,1 1 200 5 Insourcing
Radio 141 1 1 1 100 1 5 0,1 1 20 5 Insourcing
CD player 141 1 1 1 100 1 500 0,1 1 200 5 outsourcing
Speaker 141 1 1 1 100 1 5 0,1 1 100 5 Insourcing
Engine 346 10 2 1 100 1 100 0,1 2 20 5 Insourcing
Gear box 346 10 2 1 100 1 70 0,1 2 20 5 Dual-sourcing
Frame 346 4 2 1 100 1 70 0,1 2 200 5 Dual-sourcing
Front axle 346 4 2 1 100 1 20 0,1 1 50 5 Dual-sourcing
Rear axle 346 4 2 1 100 1 20 0,1 1 50 5 Dual-sourcing
Front tire 346 1 1 1 200 1 5 0,1 1 200 5 Insourcing
Front rim 346 1 1 1 200 1 3 0,1 1 200 5 Insourcing
Rear tire 566 1 1 1 400 1 5 0,1 1 200 5 Insourcing
Rear rim 566 1 1 1 400 1 3 0,1 1 200 5 Insourcrng
Power train 71 1 1 1 100 1 3 0,1 1 200 5 Insourcing
Suspension 218 1 1 1 100 1 3 0,1 1 200 5 Insourcing
Rear wheel 141 1 1 1 200 1 3 0,1 1 200 5 Insourcing
Front wheel 141 1 1 1 200 1 3 0,1 1 200 5 Insourcing
Audio 283 1 1 1 100 1 3 0,1 1 200 5 Dual-sourcing
Cabinet 283 1 1 1 100 1 3 0,1 1 200 5 Dual-sourcing
Chassis 141 1 1 1 100 1 3 0,1 1 200 5 Insourcing
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Table 6. Price and Product Platform Decision for Each Component.
Product γ pf c a Pb Total profit
Body 1 261 32 150 372 7717
Office package 1 179 75 150 208 12,692
Interior decoration 1 170 15 150 189 21,109
Radio 1 171 6 150 191 23,104
CD player 1 140 −2 150 131 3159
Speaker 1 171 5 150 191 23,132
Engine 1 411 129 150 672 53,241
Gear box 1 410 73 150 671 63,193
Frame 1 410 72 150 671 63,408
Front axle 1 416 22 150 683 73,574
Rear axle 1 416 22 150 683 73,574
Front tire 1 418 5 150 686 1,27,903
Front rim 1 418 3 150 687 1,28,689
Rear tire 1 683 5 150 1216 3,82,296
Rear rim 1 683 3 150 1216 3,83,876
Power train 1 86 4 150 21 4891
Suspension 1 263 4 150 376 43,579
Rear wheel 1 171 4 150 192 21,021
Front wheel 1 171 4 150 192 21,021
Audio 1 342 4 150 533 60,553
Cabinet 1 342 4 150 533 60,553
Chassis 1 171 3 150 192 23,534
4.3.1. Promised lead times
Promised lead times are divided into two different models, namely Make-To-Stock
(MTS) Make-To-Order (MTO) lead times, which are used by production scheduling
to setup the sequence and it is gathered by applying newsboy vendor problem, as
follows:
E(CLT ) = p · E(LT − LT ∗)+ + h · E(LT ∗ − LT)+ LT = LT
∗
√
p+ h (7.45)
where: LT ∗MTO/ATO = Qµ and LT ∗MTS = ds , d = distance from factory to customers
and s = vehicle speeds. The data required for the promised lead times for truck
FH1 and its components are summarized in Table 7.
4.4. Collaborative Material Planning
In contrast to the traditional approach of operation management tools, where mate-
rial requirement follows a top-down hierarchical approach, and starts with Master
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Table 7. Promised Lead Times.
Product/parts Q µ p h LT LT1,2
Body 100 500 4 2 14 5715
Office package 100 300 1 1 14 9899
Interior decoration 100 200 1 1 14 9899
Radio 100 20 1 1 14 9899
CD player 100 200 1 1 14 9899
Speaker 100 100 1 1 14 9899
Engine 100 20 10 2 14 4041
Gear box 100 20 10 2 14 4041
Frame 100 200 10 2 14 4041
Front axle 100 50 10 2 14 4041
Rear axle 100 50 10 2 14 4041
Front tire 200 200 1 1 14 9899
Front rim 200 200 1 1 14 9899
Rear tire 400 200 1 1 14 9899
Rear rim 400 200 1 1 14 9899
Truck FH1 50 200 1 1 14 9899
Truck FH2 50 200 15 4 14 3212
Power train 100 200 15 4 14 3212
Suspension 100 200 15 4 14 3212
Rear wheel 200 200 15 4 14 3212
Front wheel 200 200 15 4 14 3212
Audio 100 200 15 4 14 3212
Cabinet 100 200 15 4 14 3212
Chassis 100 200 15 4 14 3212
Production Schedule (MPS), the schedule is then detailed into Material Require-
ment Planning (MRP) by ignoring capacity constraint and assuming fixed lead
times. This chapter, however, replaces the MPS and MRP functions by applying
collaborative material planning (see Fig. 6) consisting of supplier and buyer integra-
tion by including a system dynamics approach. A feedback control mechanism is
used to maintain optimal condition, which is represented as a two tanks interaction,
as follows:
Figure 16 depicts an interaction between buyer and supplier. This model mod-
ifies Holweg et al. (2005) model (synchronized supply) by replacing the inventory
level with product substitutability degree (γ), by considering product commonal-
ity. It is interesting that the model incorporates component residence time in the
supplier’s (A1) and manufacturer’s (AR) warehouses, which is useful to give infor-
mation to the warehouse manager about how long the maximum time is to keep
inventory.
Tank R (buyer) production rate depends on Tank 2 (supplier) production rate
(and vice versa) as a result of the interconnection of both production rates with
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1q
1A RA Q
1R RR
2q λ
Rγ1
γ
Figure 16. Feedback control application and built to order supply chains.
production quantity q1. This analogy is taken from fluid dynamics, which states
that longer fluid transfer time is caused by high transportation hindrance (R) and
production rate difference (µ1 − µR). If we assume that total stock is the tanks’
volume and product substitutability γ is their levels, then, either AR and A1 can
be found from the manufacturer total stock (TSR = SSR + CSR) divided by its
product commonality (γ) or
TSR = SSR + CSR = z · σR
�
1
(Q−D) +
Q
2(Q−D) (7.46)
TS1 = SS1 + CS1 = z · σ1
�
1
q−Q +
q
2(q−Q) (7.47)
AR =
z · σR
�
1
(Q−D) + Q2(Q−D)
γR
(7.48)
A1 =
z · σ1
�
1
q−Q + q2(q−Q)
γ1
(7.49)
where z is the end customer service level, σ1 is the supplier delivery standard
deviation, and σR is the manufacturer delivery standard deviation.
The promised lead times of the manufacturer and the supplier are formulated as:
RR = LR = 1
Q−D (7.50)
R1 = L1 = 1
q−Q (7.51)
whereLR andL1 represent the manufacturer and the supplier lead times for in-house
production, while in the case where the manufacturer out sources the manufacturing
process, thenQ and q represent the manufacturer assembly capacity and the supplier
production capacity. First, an open loop interacting system is discussed before a
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further discussion on closed loop built-to-order supply chain.
µR(s)
µ1(s)
=
� RR
R1+RR
R1RRAR
R1+RR s+ 1
�
(7.52)
Q(s)
q(s)
= RR
τ2s2 + 2ςτs+ 1
D(s)
Q(s)
= 1
KR
(7.53)
We recognize KR in Eq. (7.53) which denotes the manufacturer response to cus-
tomer demands. The higher value signs higher manufacturer responsiveness. Time
constant (τ) represents the supplier responsiveness to customer order. ζ in Eq. (7.53)
is the decoupling point signal which provides a sign of the customer order penetra-
tion point, that is, assembly-to-order (ATO) or MTS. Looking at ζ value helps us to
detect lead time variability. Lead times tend to be shorter when ζ < 1 while ζ > 1
yields a sluggish response, while faster response without overshoot is obtained for
a critically damped case (ζ = 1). In general, ζ < 1 indicates that the manufacturer
is operating under MTS, while ζ < 1 signs ATO. Hereafter, according to the control
theory of interacting system, 2ζτ and τ2 can be formulated as:
2ζτ = RRAR + R1A1 + RRA1 (7.54)
τ2 = R1RRA1AR (7.55)
Equation (7.55) represents an open loop without information feedback so that sup-
plier has only access to buyer inventory without considering customer demand.
Open-loop control can be drawn as Fig. 17.
From this point on, a closed-loop system can be formulated by joining
Eqs. (7.50)–(7.55) to be:
q(s)
q2(s)
= RR
KR(τ2s2 + 2ςτs+ 1) (7.56)
1A RA
1R RR
2q
1γ Rγ Qq
Figure 17. Open loop: Two interacting processes.
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1−
KC
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( )1222 +τ+ ssK RR R ζτ
2q
Q
Figure 18. Closed feedback control transfer function.
Q(s)
q(s)
= KR = GR (7.57)
With closed-loop feedback control as shown in Fig. 18.
KC in Fig. 18 represents information visibility between the manufacturer and
the supplier. The larger the gain, the more the supplier delivery quantity will change
for a given demand information change. For example, if the gain is 1, a demand
information change of 10 percent will change supplier delivery quantity by 10 per-
cent. KC decision is important to the interacting system because it affects simulta-
neously the supply chain inventory (buyer and supplier) and order lead times. KC
depicts process visibility from manufacturer to supplier so that the higher value
signs higher visibility. Information visibility (KC) needs to be adjusted accord-
ing to product commonality requirement (see Section 4.2.4) in order to fulfill the
lead time requirement. Finally, Fig. 18 can be used to construct a time domain
dynamics of synchronized supply by finding its open-loop transfer function as
follows:
Q(s)
Q(s)set
=
KC
RR
KR(τ2s2+2ςτs+1)
1 +KC RRKR(τ2s2+2ςτs+1)
= KC · RR
KC · RR +KR(τ2s2 + 2ςτs+ 1) (7.58)
So that we have roots of denominator as:
s1,2 =
−
�
2ςτKR
KRτ2
�
±
��
2ςτKR
KRτ2
�2 − 4KR+KC.RR
KRτ2
2
Laplace domain dynamics according to step disturbance is applied in order to
represent sudden demand change, which can be inserted directly into Eq. (7.58)
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and inverted to get the following inversion of the Laplace transform, as follows:
Q(s)
Q(s)set
= KC.RR/KRτ
2
s

s+
�
2ςτKR
KRτ
2
�
+
��
2ςτKR
KRτ
2
�2
−4KR+KC.RR
KRτ
2
2


×

s+
�
2ςτKR
KRτ
2
�
−
��
2ςτKR
KRτ
2
�2
−4KR+KC.RR
KRτ
2
2


(7.59)
Simplifying Eq. (7.59) then we have:
a =
�
2ςτKR
KRτ2
�
+
��
2ςτKR
KRτ2
�2 − 4KR+KC.RR
KRτ2
2
,
b =
�
2ςτKR
KRτ2
�
−
��
2ςτKR
KRτ2
�2 − 4KR+KC.RR
KRτ2
2
Finally,
Q(s)
Q(s)set
= 1
s(s+ a)(s+ b),→ Q(t) =
�
1 − e
−at − e−bt
(b− a)
�
Q(t)set (7.60)
Equation (7.60) presents our process modeling as a closed-loop feedback control. It
describes the role of IT in demand management by presenting information exchange
between the manufacturer and the supplier.
4.4.1. Optimum KC Value
In this chapter, optimum KC value can be found by the application numerical
method, as follows:
LTtransient = Qtransient
D
=
Q∗ −�∞t=1
�
1 − e−at−e−bt(b−a)
�
Q(t)
D
(7.61)
where Qtransient represents production capacity at ramp-up period. Furthermore,
lead times at the normal capacity level can be calculated as:
LTnormal =
Q∗ −
�
Q∗ −�∞t=1
�
1 − e−at−e−bt(b−a)
�
Q(t)
�
D
(7.62)
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KC value can be adjusted so that LTtransient + LTnormal = LT ∗. From this result,
the suppliers can decide how much they must supply to the manufacturer, according
to KC value.
Below is one example from power train, which is manufactured byATO strategy.
In the previous section example, the data mentioned that power train lead time LT ∗
is 14 time unit and LTnormal is 3,21 time unit. From the data, we find LTtransient
is 10,79 time unit. For this section, the only new information which is required for
the simulation is the supplier capacity, and manufacturer (KR) and supplier (KC)
responsiveness, which are trial in order to meet the transient lead time requirement.
The simulation result is then depicted as follows (Fig. 19).
From the simulation, we have information thatKC,KR, andγ values are 0,1; 0,1,
and 0,4 (independent variables). It is also found that the optimum supplier capacity
is 200 units (see Table 11). Furthermore, the results of the other components can
be represented as Table 8 that is given.
Inventory requirement can be established from Eq. (7.46) and the results are
exhibited in Table 9 below.
We can see from Table 11 that inventory requirement is less than normal require-
ment whenever we apply s,Q or s, S policy.
4.5. Production Planning and Scheduling
In this stage, production planning and scheduling extracts information from demand
and master planning such as BOM, order and component lead times and inventory
level for each component in order to produce detailed operational scheduling. This
approach has been applied in other APS software, for instance SAP APO. The
difference is that the application of production reconfiguration onto operational
Power train demand fulfillment dynamics
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Figure 19. Power train order fulfillment dynamics.
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Table 8. Collaboration Between Supplier and Manufacturer.
D Q q Kc γ
Body 100 141,4 190 1 0,4
Office package 100 141,4 190 1 0,4
Interior decoration 100 141,4 190 1 0,4
Radio 100 141,4 190 1 0,4
CD player 100 141,4 190 1 0,4
Speaker 100 141,4 190 1 0,4
Engine 100 141,4 160 1 0,4
Gear box 100 141,4 160 1 0,4
Frame 100 141,4 160 1 0,4
Front axle 100 141,4 160 1 0,4
Rear axle 100 141,4 160 1 0,4
Front tire 200 141,4 205 0,2 0,4
Front rim 200 141,4 205 0,2 0,4
Rear tire 400 141,4 405 1 0,4
Rear rim 400 141,4 405 1 0,4
Power train 100 141,4 200 0,1 0,4
Suspension 100 141,4 200 0,1 0,4
Rear wheel 200 141,4 205 1 0,4
Front wheel 200 141,4 205 1 0,4
Audio 100 141,4 200 0,1 0,4
Cabinet 100 141,4 200 0,1 0,4
Chassis 100 141,4 200 0,1 0,4
scheduling is supported by the application of ASDN software by giving the mea-
surement of lead times, inventory value, and profit. The procedure is explored
further in Section 4.5.1.
4.5.1. Production Scheduling
In order to sequence the tasks of a job shop problem (JSP) on a number of machines
related to the technological machine order of jobs, a traveling salesman problem is
proposed by considering that it cannot produce illegal sets of operation sequences
(infeasible symbolic solutions). The problem can be formulated as in Eq. (7.64)
below:
Min tn (7.64)
Subject to tj − ti ≥ di (i, j) ∈ O (7.65)
tj − ti ≥ di (i, j) ∈ M (7.66)
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Table 9. Safety and Cycle Stock Requirement.
Z σ1 Q q SS1 CS1
Body 1,69 10 141,4 190 2 2
Office package 1,69 10 141,4 190 2 2
Interior decoration 1,69 10 141,4 190 2 2
Radio 1,69 10 141,4 190 2 2
CD player 1,69 10 141,4 190 2 2
Speaker 1,69 10 141,4 190 2 2
Engine 1,69 10 141,4 160 4 4
Gear box 1,69 10 141,4 160 4 4
Frame 1,69 10 141,4 160 4 4
Front axle 1,69 10 141,4 160 4 4
Rear axle 1,69 10 141,4 160 4 4
Front tire 1,69 20 141,4 205 4 2
Front rim 1,69 20 141,4 205 4 2
Rear tire 1,69 40 141,4 405 4 1
Rear rim 1,69 40 141,4 405 4 1
Power train 1,69 10 141,4 200 2 2
Suspension 1,69 10 141,4 200 2 2
Rear wheel 1,69 20 141,4 205 4 2
Front wheel 1,69 20 141,4 205 4 2
Audio 1,69 10 141,4 200 2 2
Cabinet 1,69 10 141,4 200 2 2
Chassis 1,69 10 141,4 200 2 2
where tn is the total makespan of the three operations within three machines for
the three components. tj and ti represent the precedent operations j and i where
their end and start time cannot be overlapped Eq. (65). Furthermore, the start time
operation-(j) cannot overlap the start time operation-(i) in the same machine-M
Eq. (7.66). This problem will be solved by applying MS-Excel add-in facility for
optimal sequencing problem as follows.
Suppose we intend to schedule an audio assembly where five activities are
distributed among radio, speaker, and CD player (The total lead times are 14 time
unit. See Table 7). The CD player is produced by following ATO (step 1 to 5)
and the radio and speaker by following MTS manufacturing strategy (step 4 to 5)
(see Table 4). The detailed manufacturing times and sequence are shown below
(Table 10).
The Excel form of representation of this schedule optimization can be depicted
as Table 11.
Table 10 shows the MS excel add-in facility snapshot of job-shop scheduling,
which is applied to optimize the audio manufacturing schedule. There are five steps
in the manufacturing process where J1, J2, and J3 sign steps for the CD player
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Table 10. Detailed Audio Manufacturing Machining Time.
Operations
Components 1 2 3 4 5
Radio 2 4
CD player 4 5 1 2 1
Speaker 3 2
Table 11. Audio Scheduling Data.
Optimize Objective Feasible
Name Seq_1 Dir. Min State TRUE
Search method Random Value 13 Value 0
Problem TSP Algorithm None
Job 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Job name Start J1 J2 J3 J4 J5 End
Next job 6 3 7 5 2 4 1
Sequence 1 6 4 5 2 3 7
Obj. terms 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Job data
Job names
Process time Start J1 J2 J3 J4 J5 End
CD player 0 4 5 1 2 1 0
Speaker 0 0 0 0 3 2 0
Radio 0 0 0 0 2 4 0
Release time 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
because they must be produced as ATO. J4 and J5 denote assembly processes for
the audio package. The speaker and radio do not follow J1–J3 because they are
managed as MTS. The results can be summarized in Fig. 20.
Figure 20 exhibits the result of job-shop scheduling by applying Travelling
Salesman Problem (TSP). We can see from the figure that the total makespan is
reduced from 16 (longest processing time from J1 to J5) to 12 time unit. This results
implies that now supply chains, by considering the total order lead times, have a
chance to be more flexible because now they have at least 4 time unit allowance
(16–12). In value chain perspective, the result allows supply chains to be more
competitive by reducing the likelihood of delivery lateness by giving some spaces
for uncertain events such as machine down time and changeover.
This scheduling optimization also enables the next planning stage (distribu-
tion and transport planning) to optimize the supply chain structure by reduc-
ing the order lead times. Finally, by applying the same procedure, we can build
detailed scheduling for other components. In any case, assembly and fabrication
scheduling is focused on internal factory optimization, which needs to be applied
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Figure 20. Scheduling Gantt chart.
Figure 21. Distributions and transportation planning.
into distribution and transport planning in order to optimize the total lead times
as below.
4.6. Distributions and Transport Planning
Distribution and transportation planning is used to optimize order delivery activities
from supplier to factories and from factories to end users. This section utilizes
demand, master, and production planning and scheduling to develop ASDN by
optimizing distribution centers and transportation planning, which are exhibited as
Figs. 21 and 22.
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Figure 22. Financial analysis.
From ASDN simulation, Fig. 21 depicts distribution and transport planning of
truck manufacturing, which is situated in the United Kingdom and the manufac-
turer outsources his or her components or activities across the globe. Furthermore,
inventory turn, total lead times, and holding cost (cycle stock and safety stock) are
also explored by presenting them in a financial chapter (Fig. 22).
5. Practical Implication
The concept of value chain re-engineering is shown by giving emphasis to infor-
mation availability among the supply chain and company giving value added in
each step of order processing. It ensures that customers have accurate information
about the available product configuration and allows them to configure not only the
product but also the lead times. This mechanism can be applied within this APS
because product structure database and ASDN are linked by using this proposed
APS (see Fig. 12). APS in this module gives options for push-pull manufacturing
strategy (Section 4.2.1) so that it enables the promise of order lead times as well
as optimizing so that it enables the promise of order lead times (Fig. 22) as well
as optimizing the aggregate inventory level (Table 8). ASDN in this case measures
the value added of APS steps (demand planning, master planning and production
planning, and scheduling) through financial analysis (Fig. 22). The implication
of ASDN application is that the supply chains can reconfigure the supply chain
networks or reschedule the production within the manufacturer’s plants until the
required performance target is achieved.
Related to value chain re-engineering, this APS model changes the one direc-
tion of the value chain to a two-way concept (see Fig. 6) by producing collaboration
with both customer and supplier involvement. This collaboration is shown by incor-
porating suppliers into product platform design (Section 4.2.4) and demand fore-
casting (Section 4.2.3). APS supports the integration process effectively, whereas
ATP module is imbedded into master planning where it also receives information
from the product configuration database (customer side), which can be used to
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select sourcing strategy; thus it also reduces delivery uncertainty because of sup-
plier commitment.
Last but not least, embedding production reconfiguration into distribution and
transport planning is a good idea since it has two advantages. The first advantage
is that the customer side can reconfigure product structure by considering lead
time and this step is possible since ASDN will measure the total lead time at the
final simulation. The second advantage is that manufacturers and suppliers can
reconfigure their production process by optimizing the manufacturing schedule
and reconfigure the push-pull manufacturing strategy. This is the main advantage
of value chain re-engineering.
6. Conclusion and Future Research
This chapter has discussed value chain re-engineering, which is represented by a
new APS model. We may summarize the results derived from the model as follows.
1. Supply chain collaboration needs to be addressed in the value chain discussion.
The value chain cannot be managed solely based on one direction optimization.
In fact, both the supply and demand sides must be taken into consideration
equally.
2. Technological support and procurement activity need to be involved in the main
activities of the value chain. Procurement should have a strategic position in the
business activities. Furthermore, in mass customized products, a short product
life cycle forces the supply chain to be agile and reconfigurable.
3. The first limitation of this APS is that the model does not incorporate cus-
tomer and service department interface in assuming that the sales department
is replaced by E-marketing. On the other hand, this situation has the advantage
of offering a new future research direction with regard to on the possibility of
shrinking the organization by diminishing the sales department (see Fig. 6) and
changing the firm sales to mass personalization.
4. The second limitation is that there are no any solutions to support the function of
sales mode. It would be necessary to conduct future research in personalization
of sales function by employing information technology to give added value to
the APS.
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